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JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-4-103(j).
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

I.
Under Utah law, the lack of mutual assent to all material terms in a contract
renders the contract unenforceable. Here, Defendant DxNA LLC and Plaintiff Phillip
Grimm were negotiating an employment agreement in which DxNA was willing to offer
Grimm 15 weeks' severance. Grimm testified that he "never agreed to 15 weeks" but

ii

claimed instead that the parties agreed on 26 weeks. The trial court found that the parties
entered into an enforceable employment agreement providing for 15 weeks' severance,
reasoning, "if the court enforces the [DxNA] version, [DxNA] cannot complain since it is
only having enforced 'against' it the terms that it itself offered and agreed to." Did the
trial court err in concluding there was an enforceable employment contract between the
parties?
Standard of Review. "Whether a contract exists between parties is ordinarily a

question of law, reviewed for correctness." Cea v. Hoffman, 2012 UT App 101, ,I 27,
276 P.3d 1178. The resolution of that question "ordinarily depends on the resolution of
subsidiary issues of fact." Nunley v. Westates Casing Servs., Inc., 1999 UT 100, ,I 17,
989 P .2d 1077. But where "no finding of fact is challenged, the issue is one of law" for
which the appellate court does not defer to the trial court's ruling. Richard Barton
Enters., Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 373 (Utah 1996). In addition, "the burden of proof
for showing the parties' mutual assent as to all material terms and conditions is on the
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party claiming that there is a contract." Cal Wadsworth Constr. v. City ofSt. George, 898
P.2d 1372, 1376 (Utah 1995).
Preservation. This issue was preserved below at R. 931-61 (trial court's findings

and conclusions) and R. 696-702, 832-51 (DxNA's trial briefing).
II.

Under Utah contract law, if one party makes an offer and the other party fails to
unconditionally accept that offer and instead proposes different terms, there is no
acceptance and thus no enforceable contract. Here, the trial court found an enforceable
contract between the parties by enforcing DxNA' s last offer, to which Grimm testified he
"never agreed" and to which he responded by making a counteroffer. Did the trial court
err in concluding there was an enforceable employment contract between the parties?
Standard of Review. The "proponent of the contract 'has the burden of showing

that an offer and acceptance were more probable than not.'" Cea, 2012 UT App 101,

,I 27 (quoting Sack/er v. Savin, 897 P.2d 1217, 1222 (Utah 1995)). "Whether a contract
exists between parties is ordinarily a question oflaw, reviewed for correctness." Id. The
resolution of that question "ordinarily depends on the resolution of subsidiary issues of
fact." Nunley, 1999 UT I 00, ,I 17. But where "no finding of fact is challenged, the issue
is one of law" for which the appellate court does not defer to the trial court's ruling.
Richard Barton Enters., 928 P.2d at 373.

Preservation. This issue was preserved below at R. 93 I -61 (trial court's findings

and conclusions) and R. 696-702, 832-51 (DxNA's trial briefing).

2
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III.
Under Utah law, the lack of mutual assent to all material terms in a contract
renders the contract unenforceable. Here, the trial court could not find that the parties
mutually assented on a material term of the contract-the deadline for notice of
renewal-but still concluded there was an enforceable employment agreement because
neither party was actually suing the other party for breach or default of this provision.
Did the trial court err in concluding there was an enforceable employment contract
between the parties?
Standard of Review. Same as Issue I.
Preservation. This issue was preserved below at R. 931-61 (trial court's findings

and conclusions) and R. 696-702, 832-51 (DxNA's trial briefing).
~

IV.

The trial court awarded Grimm prejudgment interest of 10% per annum under
Utah Code section 15-1-1(2). In USA Power, LLC v. PacifiCorp, 2016 UT 20,372 P.3d
629, the Utah Supreme Court held that this "statute applies only to contracts 'for the loan
or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action."' Id. ,I 109. Grimm's action
against DxNA is not on a contract for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or
chose in action. Did the trial court err in awarding Grimm prejudgment interest of 10%?
Standard of Review. Entitlement to prejudgment interest under Utah Code

section 15-1-1 is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. See USA Power,
2016 UT 20, ,I 32.

3
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Preservation. This issue was not raised below. DxNA requests that the Court

nevertheless consider it under the exceptional circumstances doctrine. 1 This doctrine
allows for consideration an issue on appeal that was not raised below "where a change in
law or the settled interpretation of law colored the failure to have raised an issue at trial."

See State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 10 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Grimm requested 10%
prejudgment interest under Utah Code section 15-1-1 in his post-trial brief filed in
January 2016, and cited Francis v. Nat'/ DME, 2015 UT App 119,350 P.3d 615, wherein
this Court affirmed an award of prejudgment interest under section 15-1-1 for nonpayment of wages. (R. 923.)
After reviewing Francis, DxNA concluded that it had no valid objection to
Grimm's prejudgment interest award under section 15-1-1 as the issue appeared settled as
it applied to Grimm. Thus, on March I, 2016, when DxNA lodged its objections to
Grimm's proposed judgment, it did not take issue with Grimm's inclusion of
prejudgment interest under the statute. (R. 964-71.) The trial court entered its original
judgment awarding Grimm 10% interest on April 29, 2016. (R. 1052-53.) Grimm filed a
motion to amend that judgment on May 6 to recalculate prejudgment interest to coincide
with the actual judgment date, which resulted from the trial court's delay in entering
judgment. (R. 1072-74.) DxNA did not oppose that motion.

1

Under USA Power, it was plainly error to award Grimm prejudgment under this
statute and that error is harmful. However, we cannot in good faith argue that the error
should have been "obvious" to the trial court. At the time it issued its original judgment
containing this interest, there was no error. Thus, the plain error doctrine does not apply.
See Meadow Valley Contractors, Inc. v. State Dep 't of Transp., 2011 UT 35, iJ 17,266
P.3d 671.
4
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i)

The Utah Supreme Court issued USA Power on May 16, 2016. Recognizing that
its cases had seemingly expanded the scope and reach of the statute over the years, the
Court expressly "disavowed" any prior statements in other cases concerning the statute's
scope. 2016 UT 20, ,r,r 107-108. USA Power effectively overrules Francis as it applies
to an award of prejudgment interest to Grimm. Had it been issued prior to trial or at the
time DxNA's was evaluating and raising its objections to Grimm's proposed judgment,
DxNA could have raised it before the trial court. But given the timing of its issuanceafter all substantive rulings and objections had been made-DxNA had no occasion to
further consider the issue and did not get hold of and evaluate the USA Power opinion
and its potential application to this case in time to put before the trial court in a
meaningful way. 2
~

In short, DxNA's failure to raise this issue below was based on the then-existing
case authority interpreting the scope of the statute. It was not tactical or intentional. This
issue is purely a legal one that will result in the correction of an error. As such, this
Court should consider it on the merits. See, e.g., Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68, ,r
20, 266 P.3d 828 (considering various "important considerations that cut against
application of the preservation rule" including that the issue is purely a legal one; the
failure to raise it before the trial court was not tactical; raising the issue with the appellate
court in the first instance was consistent with the ethical obligation to disclose adverse

2

Nor could DxNA raise the issue in a post-trial motion. See LeBaron & Assocs. Inc.
v. Rebel Enters., Inc., 823 P.2d 479,484 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("Utah courts have stated
that reference to an issue in post-trial motions is insufficient to raise an issue not
previously raised.")
5
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authority to the court; and the blame for failing to raise the issue before the trial court
could be assigned equally to both sides).

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
There are no statutes or constitutional provisions which are determinative of this
appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below.
This case arises from an employment dispute between Plaintiff Phillip Grimm and

Defendant DxNA LLC, which had employed Grimm as its CEO. (R. 931-61.) After
DxNA terminated Grimm's employment, Grimm sued DxNA asserting various causes of
action seeking different categories of compensation that he claimed DxNA owed to him,
including wages, reimbursement of expenses, severance pay, and an equity interest in
DxNA. (R. 10-18.) 3 A threshold issue was whether the parties had entered into an
enforceable employment agreement. (R. 947.) After a four-day bench trial, the trial
court concluded that the parties had entered into an enforceable employment
agreement-the terms of which the trial court found were best represented by portions of
DxNA's last proposed agreement. (R. 931-61.) The trial court thus awarded Grimm
various categories of damages, some of which solely arose under that agreement. (R.

3

Grimm also sued various individuals who were (or who Grimm claimed were)
members of DxNA's board, asserting that they were individually responsible for payment
of his wages and other compensation. (R. 16-18.) The claims against those individuals
were dismissed on summary judgment. (R. 577-78.)

6
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(iJ

931-61.) The trial court also rejected Grimm's claims for statutory penalties and attorney
fees under the Utah Labor Code, Utah Code§§ 34-28-5 and 34-27-1. (R. 959-961.)
II.

Statement of Facts.
A.

Grimm's Initial Employment.

In October 2007, the company DxNucleic Analytics LLC hired Plaintiff Phillip
Grimm as its CEO. (R. 931

,r I; Pl. Ex.

1.) 4 Grimm had a written employment

agreement (the "2007 Agreement") with DxNucleic. (R. 931-32 if 2; Pl. Ex. 1 - 2007
Agmnt.) Among other things, the 2007 Agreement was a two-year contract(§ 3.1) that
vi

set Grimm's salary at $250,000 per year, which the parties agreed Grimm would defer
because of the lack of sufficient cash flow. (R. 931-32 ,r 2; Pl. Ex. 1 - 2007 Agmnt.
§ 2.1.) Because DxNucleic was a St. George-based company, the 2007 Agreement
provided that Grimm's principal place of employment "shall be at St. George, Utah," but
allowed him to work elsewhere for "up to one week per month." (R. 931-32 iJ 2; Pl. Ex.
I - 2007 Agmnt. § 1.2.)
In June 2008, the cash strapped DxNucleic found an investor-a New York Citybased company known as Glory Capital, which was run by its two principals, Avi BenDayan and Marty Ben-Dayan. (R. 932 ,r 3; R. 2326-27 Trial Tr. vol. I 48:3-25, 49.) The
transaction went down as follows. Rather than investing in DxNucleic, a new entity was
formed, the defendant/appellant in this case, DxNA LLC. (R. 932 iJ 3; R. 2450 Trial Tr.

4

The trial court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order are contained in
the record at R. 931-946 and attached at Addendum A. References to "Pl. Ex.
" or
"Def. Ex. _ " are to the trial exhibits of the Plaintiff and Defendant, respectively. Those
exhibits are contained in tabbed binders in the record.
7
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vol. I 172: 1-4; R. 1729-31 Trial Tr. vol. III 5: 11-25, 6-7.) 5 Glory Capital then formed
another new entity, Glory Bioventures LLC, from which it made and held its investment
in DxNA. (R. 932 ,r 3; R. 2438 Trial Tr. vol. I. 160:9-25.) DxNucleic contributed its
assets for a minority interest in DxNA. (R. 932 ,r 3; R. 2438 Trial Tr. vol. I. 160:9-25.)
To avoid name confusion, DxNucleic then changed its name to NA Bioventures LLC.
(R. 932 ,r 3; R. 2438 Trial Tr. vol. I. 160:9-25.) The DxNA board consisted of the BenDayans and one NA representative. (R. 2400 Trial Tr. vol. I 162:9-19.) DxNucleic's
employees, including Grimm, then went to work for DxNA. (R. 932 ,r 3.) As with
DxNucleic, the principal location of DxNA's operations remained in St. George. (R.
1738-39 Trial Tr. vol. III 14:15-25, 15:1-12; R. 1892 Trial Tr. vol. III 168:15-25.)
As a result of the June 2008 transaction, Grimm obtained full reimbursement of
his deferred salary and expenses under the 2007 Agreement along with a 5% share of NA
Bioventures as an equity incentive in his 2007 Agreement. (R. 932 ,r 6; R. 2443 Trial Tr.
vol. I 165:6-25.) After the closing of that transaction, Grimm resigned the 2007
Agreement with DxNucleic (NA) with the expectation of entering into a new
employment agreement with DxNA. (R. 932 ,r 4.) He then began negotiating with DxNA
for that agreement. (R. 932 ,r,r 4-5; R. 2442 Trial Tr. vol. I 164:24-25, 165: 1-5.)

tv

The trial court refers to DxNA as a Utah limited liability company. (R. 932 ,r 3.)
That was a mistake. All the evidence at trial, Grimm's own testimony and every contract
and draft of a contract referencing DxNA shows that DxNA is a Delaware limited
liability company. See Pl. Ex. 11; Def. Exs. 3, 5, 9, 11 & 25; R. 2450 Trial Tr. vol. I
172:1-4) (Grimm testifying that DxNA is a Delaware company).
5
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B.

The Contract Negotiations.

Over the course of the next year, the parties-Grimm on the one hand and DxNA
(through Glory) 6 on the other-exchanged four different drafts of the employment
agreement. (Def. Exs. 3, 5, 9 [Add. B] & 11 [Add. C].) 7 During this time, Grimm was
working as DxNA's CEO for an annual salary of $250,000. (R. 933 ,I,I 7-8.) He also
continued to reside in Salt Lake County as he had been doing as CEO of DxNucleic. (R.
(jj

933 ,I,I 7-8.)

1. The First Draft: DxNA to Grimm.
Marty Ben-Dayan emailed the first draft of DxNA' s proposed employment

~

agreement to Grimm on July 18, 2008. (R. 933 ,I 9; Def. Ex. 3.) This draft, marked
"Draft - 7/3/08," was a proposed two-year contract (§ 3.1) that included the following
terms• § 1.2: Required that the "principal place of employment shall be at St. George,"
but allowed Grimm to "perform his duties ... from a location outside of St.
George, Utah for up to one week each month."
• § 2.1: Provided a salary of $250,000 with no reference to deferred
compensation as in the 2007 Agreement.
• § 2.2: Offered 20 days of paid vacation each year.
• § 3.8(b): Offered 90 days' severance in the event Grimm terminated the
contract "for Good Reason."

~

6

The trial court's findings refer to the negotiations as between Grimm and "Glory."
We use DxNA in this brief since Glory was negotiating an agreement for and on behalf of
DxNA to which Grimm and DxNA would be the contract parties and for which DxNA
was ultimately sued in this action.
7

The same exhibits appear in the record as Plaintiffs Exhibits 2, 4, 7 & 9.

9
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(R. 933 ,I 9; Def. Ex. 3 - Draft # 1.) In Grimm's view, this draft was not consistent with
what he understood would be an agreement which "mirrored" his 2007 Agreement with
DxNucleic. (R. 2333-34 Trial Tr. vol. I 55:24-25, 56: 1; R. 2338 Trial Tr. vol.I 60: 11; R.
2449 Trial Tr. vol. I 170:23-25, 171: 1-8.)

2. The Second Draft: Grimm to DxNA.
Nearly a month later, on August 21, Ben-Dayan emailed Grimm inquiring about
the status of the employment agreement. (R. 933 ,I 10; Def. Ex. 4.) Grimm emailed back
that he had put the issue on the back burner due to other pressing matters but promised to
respond. (R. 933 ,I 10; Def. Ex. 4.) Five days later, Grimm emailed Ben-Dayan a draft
with Grimm's proposed changes. (R. 933 ,I 11; Def. Ex. 5.) Among other things,
Grimm• § 1.2: Changed the principal place of employment to "Salt Lake City, Utah and
St. George, Utah with time allocated between locations as dictated by business
requirements."

~

• § 2.2: Changed the number of paid vacation days from 20 to 25 days per year.

• § 3.8: Gutted DxNA's proposed section 3.8 and replaced it with the language
from the 2007 Agreement, providing 6 months' severance if Grimm terminated
the contract for "Good Reason" or was terminated by DxNA without cause.
(R. 933 ,I 11; Def. Ex. 5 - Draft #2.) Grimm also changed the agreement from a two-year
contract to a three-year contract. (Def. Ex. 5 - Draft #2 § 3 .1.)

3. The Third Draft: DxNA to Grimm.
After months of no progress and little communication on the issue, on February
23, 2009, Glory's counsel, George Greenslade, emailed Grimm the latest draft of the

10
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<i)

employment agreement-marked "Draft 10/7/08"-which contained DxNA's revisions
to Grimm's last draft. (R. 933-34 ifil 12-14; Def. Ex. 9.) DxNA's revisions• § 1.2: Deleted the reference to Salt Lake City from Grimm's draft: "The
principal place of employment of the Executive shall be at St. George, Utah and
St. George, Utah, with time allocated between such locations as dictated by
business requirements."
• §2.2: Reduced the number of vacation days back to 20 days.
• §3.8: Deleted the entirety of Grimm's proposed language about severance and
revised section 3.8 back into subsections similar to its first draft.
• §3.8(b): Offered 15 weeks' severance pay for a without cause termination.
• §3.8(c): Added a provision that if the parties did not agree to renew the
agreement at least 90 days prior to its expiration, Grimm's employment would
end upon expiration of the contract term.
(R. 933-934 ,r 13; Def. Ex. 9 - Draft #3, attached at Addendum B.) In addition,

Greenslade told Grimm that the draft "remains subject to [Ben-Dayan's] further review
and comment." (Def. Ex. 9 - Add. B; Pl. Ex. 7.)

4. The Fourth Draft: Grimm to DxNA.
From that point, there is an absence of any documentation about the agreement for
a little over three months, until June 1, 2009, when Grimm emailed Greenslade another
proposed draft-the fourth overall and final draft. (R. 934 iI 15.) Grimm's draft included
the following changes to DxNA's last draft• § 1.2: Grimm changed the location of employment back to Salt Lake City with
travel to St. George: "The principal place of employment of the Executive shall
be at Salt Lake City, Utah with travel to the Saint George, Utah facility as
dictated by business requirements."
• §3.8(b ): Grimm increased the without cause severance pay from 15 to 26
weeks.
• §3.8(c): Grimm revised and extended the period to require renewal of the
agreement from 90 to 120 days.
11
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(R. 934 iJ 15; Def. Ex. 11 - Draft #4, attached at Addendum C.)
(i

5. The Final Communications: Three Items in Dispute
Greenslade emailed Grimm in response the next day (June 2) and ticked off
Grimm's three changes as being the only issues "separating the parties." (R. 934 iI 16;
Def. Ex. 11 - Add. C.) Greenslade summarized the issues as follows1. Principal place of employment as Salt Lake City vs. St. George;
2. Severance pay for 15 weeks vs. 26 weeks; and
3. "Section 3.8(c) of the employment agreement refers to the 120 day notice
period of Section 3.2 of the employment agreement. However, Section 3.2
provides for a 90 day notice period. Therefore, the reference to 120 days in
Section 3.8(c) should be changed back to 90 days."
(R. 934 iJ 16; Def. Ex. 11 -Add. C.) Greenslade concluded his email: "I will raise these
issues with Marty [Ben-Dayan] and get back to you. These issues are the only issues
separating the parties." (R. 934 iI 16; Def. Ex. I 1 - Add. C.)
Grimm responded by email the same day, addressing each point as follows:
1. On the location, Grimm indicated that DxNA is establishing "developing,
marketing and sales effort out of Salt Lake," which was the reason for his
change to Salt Lake.
2. On severance, Grimm stated: "My original agreement was for 26 weeks. I
know I have bounced this around with A vi and Marty and my goal was to keep
it consistent with prior [agreement] ... "
3. On the renewal period, Grimm stated that he "can live with 90 days but wanted
to extend it to the 120 to provide a smooth transition if needed."
(R. 934 iJ 18; Pl. Ex. I 0 8.)

8

For whatever reason, the Exhibit List filed by the district court clerk on January 14,
2016, does not show that Plaintiffs Exhibit 10 was received into evidence. That is not
12
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~

On June 10, Greenslade emailed Grimm that he had spoken with Marty BenDayan "about the 3 issues that separate the parties." (R. 934-935 ,r 18; PL Ex. 10.) He
then addressed each of them as follows1. "[T]he principal place of employment should be at Saint George initially and
when the company has an official office Salt Lake City then Salt Lake City can
be the principal place of employment, with time spent in Saint George as
needed."
2. "Marty wants to discuss point (2) [severance] with you when you next meet
with him."
3. "As to point (3), 90 days had been settled upon some time ago, so that period
should stay."
(R. 934-935 ,r 18; PL Ex. 10.) Grimm responded by email the next day: "I would like to

revisit the principal place of employment because if it is St. George we need language in
the agreement that covers my expenses while there and it may also create a tax liability
issue that I am researching." (PL Ex. 10; R. 2505 Trial Tr. vol. I 227:7-16.) He did not
respond to any of the other issues. (PL Ex. 10; R. 2509 Trial Tr. vol. I 231:1-6.) This
was the last email communication between the parties concerning the employment
agreement before Grimm contends it was signed. (R. 2509 Trial Tr. vol. I 231: 1-6.)
During the third week of June 2009, Grimm attended a DxNA board meeting at
Glory's New York City offices. (R. 935 ,r 21.) Prior to the meeting, Grimm met with
Marty Ben-Dayan and discussed the employment agreement. (R. 935 ,r 22.) Grimm

correct. It was offered by Grimm's counsel and received with no objection at R. 2358-59
Trial Tr. vol. I 80:21-25, 81: 1-2. It is also contained in Plaintiffs exhibit binder as part
of the trial court's record and was relied upon by the trial court in its findings. (R. 934-35
,r 18.) Accordingly, it is appropriate for the parties to cite to it on appeal.
13
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contends that he and DxNA (through Avi Ben-Dayan) signed the employment agreement
and back-dated it to June 8, 2008. (R. 935 ,I 23.) The version that Grimm contends was
signed-Plaintiffs Exhibit 11, attached at Addendum D-is the last version that Grimm
sent to Greenslade on June I. (R. 2361-63 Trial Tr. vol. I 83: 17-23, 84, 85:1; Pl. Ex. 11
[Add. D]; Def. Ex. 11, Draft #4 -Add. C.)
Grimm testified on direct examination that in signing the agreement, DxNA
agreed to allow him to work in Salt Lake "with travel to St. George as dictated by
business requirements." (R. 2362 Trial Tr. vol. I 84: 1-10.) He testified that DxNA also
agreed to 26 weeks' severance:
Q: So ultimately did DxNA agree to the 26 weeks?
A: Yes, it was consistent with the contract I had before, so we agreed, and
we signed it.
(R. 2362 Trial Tr. vol. I 84: 17-25, 85: 1.) And even though he was willing to accept a 90day notice of non-renewal period, the employment agreement he contends DxNA signed
nonetheless caved to Grimm's requested 120 days. (Pl. Ex. 11 - Employment Agmnt. §
3.8(c) [Add. D]; Def. Ex. 11 - Draft #4 § 3.8(c) [Add. C].) Grimm offered no explanation
as to what exactly occurred that resulted in the Ben-Dayan's surrender on these points of
contention, and he could not recall any specific discussion with the Ben-Dayans at the
board meeting where Grimm's last version of the employment agreement was allegedly
signed. (R. 1399-1400 Trial Tr. vol. II 13, 14: 1-13.)
But Grimm was consistent on his claim to 26 weeks' severance, not only testifying
that he and DxNA ultimately agreed on 26 weeks but also that he "never agreed to 15
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weeks." (R. 1548 Trial Tr. vol. II 162:15-17) (Emphasis added).) He was asked on
cross-examination:

Q: You would not dispute that you never agreed to 15 weeks?
A: I never agreed to 15 weeks.
(R. 1548 Trial Tr. vol. II 162:15-17.) No version of the employment agreement presented
to Grimm by DxN A contained more than 15 weeks' severance. (Def. Exs. 3 & 9 [ Add.
;j

B])
No signed copy of the employment agreement has ever been produced, though
Grimm claims that a secretary took the signed copy for filing at Glory's offices after the
meeting. (R. 935 if 25.) He never once followed up with DxNA in writing to obtain a
copy of the alleged signed employment agreement. (R. 1410-11 Trial Tr. vol. II 24, 25: 110.) There also exists no writing other than the copy of the agreement Grimm claims was
signed to indicate that the final three points of contention were resolved by the parties.
(R. 935-36 if 26.) In fact, DxNA denies signing the agreement. (R. 935 if 24.)
As Grimm testified that DxNA agreed on each point, Marty Ben-Dayan testified
that the three points of disagreement were never resolved. (R. 1751 Trial Tr. vol. III
27: 19-21.) On the location (§ 1.2), Ben-Dayan would not assent to anything other than St.
George because he did not want Grimm to have a contractual right to be somewhere other
than DxNA's primary place of business. (R. 1735-38 Trial Tr. vol. III 11:3-25, 12-13,
14:1-9.)
On severance(§ 3.8(b)), he testified that his preference was to allow for none
because Grimm was already making a "healthy salary." (R. 1741 Trial Tr. vol. III 17:24-
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25, 18-19, 20:1-2.) Eventually, Ben-Dayan was willing to offer 15 weeks, but would
never agree to 26 weeks-which was half-a-years' salary. (R. 1741-44 Trial Tr. vol. III
17:24-25, 18-19, 20: 1-2) (testifying that 26 weeks was "not something that we were
willing to accede to"); R. 1747-48 Trial Tr. vol. III 23: 15-25, 24: 1-10.) 9
Finally, Ben-Dayan viewed the notice requirement for non-renewal(§ 3.8(c)) as
additional severance, because in his view giving notice to the CEO that his contract will
not be renewed is essentially notice of termination. (R. 1748-51 Trial Tr. vol. III 24: 1925, 25-27.) As such, Ben-Dayan did not want the lame duck CEO hanging around during
a longer period of time to "poison the well" waiting for the contract to expire. (R. 1748-

i)

51 Trial Tr. vol. III 24:19-25, 25-27.) To avoid this, Ben-Dayan testified that he would
simply cut a check for that period and show the ousted CEO the door instead of letting
him remain with the company during that time. (R. 1748-51 Trial Tr. vol. III 24: 19-25,

<iJ

25-27.) To that end, Ben-Dayan viewed the additional 30 days Grimm demanded as
additional severance. (R. 1748-51 Trial Tr. vol. III 24: 19-25, 25-27.)
In sum, Ben-Dayan testified that "these are three very important points that, you
know, really essentially sunk the whole deal." (R. 1751 Trial Tr. vol. III 27: 19-21.)

C.

Glory Steps Away from Control.

After the June 2009 board meeting, everything remained status quo. (R. 936 if 28.)
Grimm continued to reside in Salt Lake and receive his $250,000 annual salary. (R. 936

iJ 27.)

No further exchange of emails or other documentation shows that the employment

9

If salary is $250,000 year, then 15 weeks' severance equals $72,115.38, and 26
weeks' severance equals $125,000-a difference of $52,884.59.
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Git;

agreement was further negotiated. (R. 936 ,r 27.) DxNA was aware that Grimm was not
primarily located in St. George but did not press the issue or insist that Grimm relocate.
(R. 936 ,r 28.) Nor did DxNA fire Grimm for that reason. (R. 936 ,r 28.)
By the spring of 2010, Glory began expressing dissatisfaction with Grimm's
performance as CEO and made threats to terminate him. (R. 936 ,r 30.) During this same
time, Glory was not funding DxNA according to its original agreement and DxNA was
~

experiencing serious financial distress. (R. 936-37,I 31.) In fact, there was a movement
afoot to reorganize DxNA and for Glory to exit as a member. (R. 936 ,r 30.) At this
point, Grimm made an explicit demand for reimbursement of his accumulated business
expenses and the equity incentives in DxNA that were referenced in the drafts of the
employment agreement. (R. 937,I 32.)

It was also during this time period that the issue of the existence of the
employment agreement surfaced. (R. 937,I,I 33-35.) Ben-Dayan took the position that
there was no employment agreement with Grimm. (R. 937,I 33.) He explained in an
email to NA's counsel: "For the record, we have not executed any employment
agreement with [Grimm]." (Def. Ex. 12; R. 937,I 33.) He further indicated: "There were
drafts back and forth but it never came to a conclusion." (Def. Ex. 14; R. 937,I 33.) On
June 4, 2010, Grimm emailed the Ben-Dayans attempting to convince them that they had
entered into a written employment agreement signed by both parties. (R. 93 7 ,r 34; Def.
Ex. 51.) Ben-Dayan responded that he did not "agree with your [Grimm's] telling of
events" and that Grimm would be terminated for cause. (R. 937,I 35; Def. Ex. 51.) BenDayan did not follow through on the threat to fire Grimm. (R. 937,I 35.)
17
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D.

The Restructuring.

Nothing further occurred with Grimm's employment because in July 2010 there
was a restructuring of the relationship between Glory, DxNA, and NA. (R. 937 if 36.)
Specifically, Glory assigned to DxNA all of its rights and interests in DxNA in exchange
for a promissory note. (R. 937 if 36.) In that assignment, Glory made various
representations about liabilities to third parties as well as employees, and "DxNA and NA
acknowledge receipt of a copy of a draft employment agreement between DxNA and
Philip Grimm." (R. 937-38 if 37; Def. Ex. 25 -Assignment Agreement§ 5.l(vi).)
Grimm signed the Assignment Agreement as CEO for DxNA. (R. 938 if 38; Def. Ex.
25.)
That transaction essentially divested Glory of its ownership in DxNA, thereby
leaving the remaining member, NA, as the sole member. (R. 937-38 if 39; Def. Ex. 25.)
Grimm continued on as CEO. (R. 938 if 40.) DxNA continued to experience financial
stress as a result of Glory's exit as well as technological problems with its product. (R.
938 if 41.) In response, Grimm made the decision to furlough all employees. (R. 938 if
42; Def. Ex. 27.) At trial, Gilbert Jennings, who was chair of the membership committee
of the controlling member NA, expressed extreme dissatisfaction with Grimm's furlough
decision because it put the company's most valuable assets-its people-at risk. (R. 938

if 43.) Still, Grimm was not fired but continued on as CEO.

(R. 938 if 44.) It would not

last.
On January 7, 2011, Jennings emailed Grimm, advising him that the board "voted
to initiate a complete reorganization of DxNA," and that as a part of that reorganization
18
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the board would be seeking resignations and releases from all employees, including
Grimm. (R. 940 ,r 55; Def. Ex. 28.) Grimm was finally able to meet with Jennings on
January 21, 2011, to discuss the situation. (R. 940 ,r 5 6.) At that meeting, Jennings made
it clear that Grimm's employment was terminated. (R. 940 ,r 59.)
Grimm was never provided a written notice stating the reasons for his termination.
(R. 940 ,r 60.) Rather, DxNA, through Jennings, took the position that Grimm was an "at

will" employee and as such could be terminated without cause. (R. 940 ,r 60.) In fact,
Jennings had investigated the existence of an employment agreement between DxNA and
Grimm and concluded that there wasn't one: Ben-Dayan denied its existence and Grimm
could never produce a signed copy. (R. 2014 Trial Tr. vol. IV 19:8-16; R. 2013-15 Trial
Tr. vol. IV 18:17-25, 19, 20:1-10; Def. Exs. 12 & 14.) In addition, according to the
~

Assignment Agreement that Grimm signed for DxNA, nothing more than a "draft" of
such an agreement existed. (R. 2015-16 Trial Tr. vol. IV 20:2-25, 21: 1-7.) 10
On January 23, two days following the Grimm/Jennings meeting, Grimm emailed
Jennings requesting payment of Grimm's salary, accrued PTO, reimbursement of
business expenses, and severance. (R. 942 ,r 68; Pl. Ex. 17 - attached at Addendum E.)
The request was accompanied by spreadsheets showing the following calculations:

10

The trial court specifically found that Grimm was terminated without cause under
the employment agreement and that DxNA did not follow the termination procedures in
the employment agreement. (R. 941 ,r,r 63, 65.) But because DxNA's new board
concluded there was no such agreement, the trial court could not be surprised that DxNA
did not follow any contractually required termination procedures in firing Grimm.
Ultimately, however, that is not an issue on appeal. Grimm did not sue DxNA because
he was fired; he sued DxNA for compensation he claims he was owed.
19
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• Unpaid salary from August 8, 2010 through January 23, 2011 of $99,866.47;
• Unpaid, accrued PTO of $56,129.93;
• Business expenses up to January 9, 2011 of $82,297.96; and
• Severance pay of either 15 weeks at [$72,836.48] or 26 weeks at [$126,249.89],
depending on which employment agreement was referred to. 11
(R. 942 ,r 68; Pl. Ex. 17 -Add. E.) Grimm indicated to Jennings, "As you are probably
aware, there are three potential employment agreements that could be used with one
having 15 weeks of severance and the other two, 26 weeks." (Pl. Ex. 17 - Add. E.) This
email also referenced the stock component of 2% that Grimm claimed was owed to him
under the employment agreement. (R. 942 ,r 70; Pl. Ex. 17 - Add. E.)
Grimm went on to note that he was entitled to the amounts owed within 24 hours
of termination of employment, but proposed that he would be willing to take payments
over time because of the financial stress to the company so long as the amount was
secured in some fashion and accrued interest. (R. 942 ,r 71; Pl. Ex. 17 - Add. E) (Grimm
specifically states, "let me propose the following ... ").) The email also suggests that the
payment be made in the amount of $10,000 per month with accelerated payments as the
business of the company improves. (R. 942 ,r 71; Pl. Ex. 17 - Add. E.) Grimm further
proposed that the parties could sit down to review the details behind the amounts owed
and make adjustments as necessary. (R. 942 ,r 71; Pl. Ex. 17 - Add. E.) Ultimately,

11

The trial court's findings reference 15 weeks at "$72,150 or 26 weeks at $150,000,"
but those are not the numbers that Grimm claimed in the spreadsheets attached to his
January 23 email. (Pl. Ex. 17 - Add. E.)
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DxNA did not pay Grimm his demanded amounts or provide him with his claimed equity
in the company. (R. 943 iJ 73; 936 if 27.)

E.

Grimm Sues DxNA

Grimm filed this action on March 21, 2011-59 days after he was terminated. (R.
1; 943 if 73.) He asserted five causes of action seeking different categories of
compensation he claimed to be owed. (R. 10-18.) These claims included breach of
contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, payment of wages
under the Utah Labor Code, an award of attorney fees under the Utah Labor Code, and
(db

promissory estopp el. (R. 10-18.) 12
As framed in his amended complaint, Grimm sued for breach of a specific
contract, the one he alleged "was agreed-upon and signed in June, 2009." (R. 11; Am.
Compl. ,r 11.) He alleged that "[t]he terms of the June, 2009, employment contract
included ... 26 weeks of severance pay if [Grimm] was terminated other than for good
cause." (R. 11-12; Am. Compl. if 12.c.) His claimed damages included "$126,249.89 as
26 weeks worth of severance," and "the promised 3% stock incentive." (R. 14; Am.
Compl. if 27.)
After a four-day bench trial, the trial court framed the central issue as follows:
"The first and dispositive issue is whether there exists an enforceable employment
agreement between DxNA and Grimm." (R. 947.) In both its findings and conclusions,
the trial court did not resolve the dispute over whether DxNA and Grimm signed

12

The trial court did not address the good faith and fair dealing claims or the estoppel
claim. (R. 959.)
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Grimm's last version of the employment agreement as Grimm claimed. (R. 931-46, 94754.) Instead, the trial court concluded that it would enforce DxNA's last draft as "the
most credible document evidencing a sufficiently definite agreement." (R. 947.) It
concluded "that the parties did in fact reach an agreement on the terms of employment,
but because there is no signed document evidencing what that was exactly, the best
evidence of the agreement is the final one proposed by [DxNA]." (R. 952.) To get there,
the trial court dispensed with the three items in dispute as follows. (R. 949-54.)
First, on the location, the trial court essentially concluded that, because DxNA's
"position was that the principal place of employment would be split between Salt Lake
and St. George ... with time allocated between the locations as dictated by business
requirements," and because "Grimm's last proffered draft specified that the principal
~

place of employment would be Salt Lake City, with travel to St. George dictated by
business requirements," the parties had essentially come to an agreement on locationthat it would be split between the two cities. (R. 950, 953.) The trial court recognized
that DxNA's last draft deleted any reference to Salt Lake City, but concluded that
"although the draft refers to St. George and St. George, this was later clarified in the June
2, 2009 email from Greenslade to Grimm [Def. Ex. 11 - Add. C]" to mean Salt Lake and
St. George. (R. 950.)
Second, on the 15 vs. 26 weeks' severance, the trial court made the following
specific findings of fact: First, that "[t]he employment agreement proposed from
DxNNGlory in June, 2009, makes clear that they were willing to offer Grimm 15 weeks
of severance pay if he was terminated without cause." (R. 946 ,r 95.) Second, that
22
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"Grimm claims that the agreement that was signed gave him 26 weeks of severance pay
if terminated without cause." (R. 946 il 96.) Third, "[t]he employment agreement that
Grimm had with [Dx]Nucleic gave him 26 weeks of severance pay if terminated without
cause." (R. 946 il 97.) And finally, it concluded that there was a dispute: "Glory's
counsel waffled on the 15 vs. 26 weeks issue in his June 2009 email, saying only the one
of the principals would need to be consulted on that topic, but that the amount of
severance remained a point in dispute between the parties as of June 2009." (R. 946 iJ
98.) From these findings, the trial court simply enforced DxNA's last, best offer of 15
weeks. (R. 954.) It reasoned:
[W]hile Grimm continued to argue for a few final points, if the court enforces the
[DxNA] version, [DxNA] cannot complain since it is only having enforced
"against" it the terms that it itself offered and agreed to. Grimm also concedes that
the [DxNA] agreement may be enforceable and, thereby acknowledges his assent
to it. (See Grimm email dated January 23, 2011, Plaintiffs Exhibit [l 7].) 13
(R. 947-48.)

Finally, the trial court never attempted to reconcile the dispute on the notice period
for renewal while expressly acknowledging that DxNA "wanted 90 days and Grimm
wanted 120 days .... " (R. 950.) Even as it found that Grimm acknowledged he would
settle on 90 days, and reasoned that "it appears that the parties ultimately agreed on this
point," the trial court concluded that because "the issue regarding notice of non-renewal
13

~

The trial court referred to Plaintiffs Exhibit 19 in its findings. However, Plaintiffs
Exhibit 19 is a voluminous-over 1,000 pages-exhibit which contains expense reports
and copies of receipts. Plaintiffs Exhibit 17-which we have attached to this brief at
Addendum E-is Grimm's January 23 email to Jennings which the trial court referred to.
Accordingly, we refer to Plaintiffs Exhibit 17 rather than sticking with the trial court's
apparent typo in referencing Plaintiffs Exhibit 19.
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~

is not an issue in this case," it "will not be mentioned further. It is simply of no
consequence because of the apparent agreement of the parties as well as the irrelevance to
this lawsuit." (R. 950.)
Ultimately, the trial court refused to find that the employment agreement which
formed the basis of Grimm's lawsuit and which he claimed was signed by the parties was
enforceable. (R. 952.) It explained:
[Grimm] claims that both parties signed a final written contract in the latter part of
June, 2009 prior to a Board meeting in New York City. Strangely, Grimm does
not have a copy nor has any party produced a copy of that agreement. Grimm
proffers a copy of an agreement that incorporates all terms favoring him as the
final agreement. Considering all the circumstances as well as the pattern of
conduct of the parties, the court finds that Grimm's position is not likely.

(R. 948.) Thus, it refused to find, as Grimm requested, that DxNA somehow conceded
on each of the final three points of contention. (R. 952.) The trial court explained that it
"does not seem likely that all matters remaining (i.e., the three points in contention as set
forth above) were settled and resolved in Grimm's favor prior to the Board meeting in
June 2009. The Ben-Dayans, in their own estimation, were tough negotiators. Mr.
Jennings of NA characterized them as very difficult people who were sometimes prone to
be verbally abusive." (R. 952.)
So instead it enforced DxNA's last, best offer as containing the essential contract
terms: "The court, therefore, concludes that the draft of the copy of the employment
~

agreement proffered by [DxNA] is the best representation of the final agreement between
the parties." (R. 953.) "That agreement," the trial court continued, "is as set forth in
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Defense Exhibit [9], 14 with the understanding that the principal place of employment
should be corrected to be consistent with the email sent by Glory's counsel on June 2,
2009." (R. 953.) The trial court concluded that the "pertinent provisions are":
1.

Salary is $250,000 per year. (Section 2.1.)

2.

The Equity Incentive Arrangement results in Grimm receiving 2% accrued
membership interest in DxNA. (Section 2.3.)

3.

Principal place of employment was to be split between St. George and Salt
Lake (as corrected) with time allocated between the locations as dictated by
business requirements. (Section 1.2.)

4.

There were to be 20 days of paid vacation. (Section 2.2.)

5.

Business expenses would be reimbursed in "accordance with the policies and
procedures from time to time adopted by the Employer, provided that the
Executive properly accounts for such business expenses in accordance with
the Employer's policies." (Section 2.4.)

(j

***
8.

If the Executive is terminated for other than Cause, he is "entitled to receive
payments in amount equal to ... [his] salary for a period of 15 weeks following
the date ... [of termination]." (Section 3.8(b).)

(R. 953-54.)

Using these contract terms, and as relevant to this appeal, the trial court awarded
VI)

Grimm 15 weeks' of unpaid severance in the amount of $72,115.38 plus prejudgment
interest thereon at the rate of 10% per annum under Utah Code § 15-1-1, and a 2%

14

The trial court referenced Defense Exhibit 10 in its findings. That appears to be
another typo because Defense Exhibit 9, not 10, contained DxNA' s last version-overall
Draft #3-and offer. Defense Exhibit 10 is an email referencing the employment
agreement but has no agreement attached. Defense Exhibit 9 is attached as Addendum B.
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membership interest in DxNA under the equity incentive provisions of the employment
agreement. (R. 958-59, 1053, 1121.) 15 DxNA appeals.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Grimm sued DxNA for breach of a specific employment agreement. Before he
could claim a breach, however, he had the burden to first establish the existence of that
agreement. As a matter of law, he failed to meet that burden. This is so for three
reasons.
I.

First, like any other contract, the existence of an express employment

contract requires a meeting of the minds on the integral features of the contract. See

Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler v. Young, 2004 UT 26, ,r 13, 17-18, 94 P.3d 179. Grimm
thus had the burden of establishing "mutual assent as to all material terms and
conditions" of the employment agreement. Cal Wadsworth Constr. v. City of St. George,
898 P.2d 1372, 1376 (Utah 1995). The trial court's findings demonstrate a lack of
meeting of the minds on the integral features of the employment agreement, in particular

®)

the severance provision. Specifically, Grimm claimed that the parties agreed on his
proposed 26 weeks' severance and signed the last version of the employment agreement
that he sent to DxNA containing that term. The trial court found this was "not likely."
That should have resulted in judgment for DxNA. But the trial court instead took the last
~
15

The trial court's original judgment is in the record at R. 1052-53. This original
judgment breaks down each category of damages awarded to Grimm. That judgment was
subsequently amended at R. 1121. The amended judgment has only a total judgment
amount but did not change the amounts awarded under the categories at issue on appeal.
(R. 1052-53, 1121.)
26
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version of the employment agreement that DxNA sent to Grimm offering 15 weeks'
severance and enforced it as the employment agreement between the parties.
The trial court concluded that if it "enforces the [DxNA] version, [DxNA] cannot
complain since it is only having enforced 'against' it the terms that it itself offered and
agreed to." But Grimm testified that he "never agreed to 15 weeks'" severance. We are
thus left with a failure of mutual assent: the trial court would not find that DxNA agreed
to 26 weeks' severance and could not find that Grimm assented to 15 weeks' severance.
The trial court could not simply grab DxNA's last offer of 15 weeks and enforce it
against DxNA because it was at one point willing to offer it. Grimm unequivocally did
not agree with that term. Because Grimm failed in his burden to establish mutual assent
to the terms of the agreement that he put forward, his breach of contract claim fails as a
matter of law.
2.

Second, the trial court could not enforce DxNA's last, best offer because

Grimm never unconditionally accepted DxNA's proposed terms but instead rejected them
by making a counteroffer. Fundamental to contract formation are the basic elements: "an
offer, an acceptance, and consideration." Cea v. Hoffman, 2012 UT App 101, ,r 24,276
P.3d 1178. The acceptance of any offer '"must unconditionally assent to all material
terms presented in the offer, including price and method of performance, or it is a
rejection of the offer."' Id.

,r 25 (quoting Cal Wadsworth Constr., 898 P.2d at 1376).

If

the offeree proposes different terms, there is no contract because there is no acceptancethere is instead a counteroffer which operates as a rejection and terminates the offer
thereby relieving the offeree of any !ability. Id. Here, the trial court enforced DxNA's
27
STG_704205

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

last, best offer of 15 weeks' severance. But not only did Grimm testify that he never
accepted the offer-"he never agreed to 15 weeks"-his response to that offer was a

~

counteroffer of 26 weeks. That counteroffer was a rejection of DxNA's offer. Once
rejected, the trial court could not put that offer back on the table and enforce it against
DxNA as a contract term.
3.

Third, the trial court refused to resolve one of the other issues separating

the parties-the notice of non-renewal provision. While recognizing that this issue was
"[ o]ne of the main points in contention" (R. 936), and that DxNA "wanted 90 days and
Grimm wanted 120 days " (R. 950), the trial court punted the issue away on the grounds
that "the issue regarding notice of non-renewal is not an issue in this case," and "will not
be mentioned further." (R. 950.) But the mere fact that Grimm was not suing DxNA
over this specific provision does not make it irrelevant to the central question of whether
there was an express employment agreement.
The existence of an enforceable employment agreement requires mutual assent to
"all material terms," not just those on which one party decides to sue the other in the
underlying litigation. Cal Wadsworth, 898 P.2d at 13 76-78. The failure of mutual assent
as to "all material terms" means that the claimed contract does "not come into existence."
Id. The renewal provision was a material issue "separating the parties." Grimm claims

that the parties signed an agreement which acceded to his requested 120 days. The trial
court found that each point of contention was not resolved in Grimm's favor-meaning
that Grimm did not show that DxNA agreed to 120 days. So just as the trial court could
not find that the parties' mutually assented to severance, it could not find that the parties
28
STG_704205

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ii

mutually assented to this material term. But instead of concluding as a matter of law that
~

there was no enforceable contract as it should have, the trial court simply carved this
provision out of DxNA' s proposed agreement and enforced the rest against it. That was
error. Trial courts are not permitted to manufacture contracts for parties for which they
did not themselves bargain and agree.
In sum, as a matter of law, there is no enforceable employment agreement. As a
result, it was error for the trial court to award Grimm damages for breach of that alleged
employment agreement. This Court should reverse.
4.

Finally, the trial court awarded Grimm prejudgment interest of 10% per

annum on his monetary damages. This was based on Utah Code section 15-1-1. In USA
Power, LLC v. PacifiCorp, 2016 UT 20, 372 P.3d 629, the Utah Supreme Court held that

this statute "applies only to contracts 'for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or
chose in action."' Id.

,r 109.

Grimm's action against DxNA is not on a contract for the

"loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action .... " Utah Code§ 15-1-1.
It is for nonpayment of wages, expenses, and other compensation that Grimm claims

were due and owing him as a result of his employment with DxNA. And the
Vil

employment agreement which he sought to enforce against DxNA (even if it stands), is
not a contract for a loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action. It is a
contract for employment. Accordingly, Utah Code section 15-1-1 (2) does not apply and
the award of 10% prejudgment interest under that statute should be reversed and the
matter remanded to the trial court for a determination of the correct award of prejudgment
interest on any portion of the judgment that remains intact.
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ARGUMENT

I.

Grimm Failed to Establish the Existence of an Enforceable Employment
Agreement Because the Trial Court Did Not Find Mutual Assent as to all
Material Terms.
Grimm's first and principal cause of action against DxNA is for breach of an

express employment agreement-the one he claims the parties signed in June 2009,
presented at trial as Plaintiffs Exhibit 11. (R. 14-15.) To assert a claim for breach,
Grimm has the burden to first establish the existence of the contract. See Anderson v.
Larry H. Miller Communications Corp., 2012 UT App 196, iiii 12-13, 284 P.3d 674
(affirming judgment for employer on breach of contract claim because plaintiff did not
establish a contract); Bair v. Axiom Design, L.L.C., 2001 UT 20, ii 14, 20 P.3d 388
(explaining that the first element of a breach of contract claim is the existence of a
contract). As a matter of law, he failed to meet that burden.

A.

Grimm failed to meet his burden of establishing mutual assent to his
claimed 26 weeks' severance.

Like any other contract, the existence of an express employment contract requires
a meeting of the minds on the integral features of the contract. See Prince, Yeates &
Geldzahler v. Young, 2004 UT 26, ii 13, 17-18, 94 P.3d 179. 16 That is, the parties must
16

All versions of the employment agreement between DxNA and Grimm contain a
New York choice oflaw provision. See Employment Agmnt. § 5.3 ("This Agreement
shall be governed by the laws of the State of New York applicable to agreements made
and to be performed entirely within the State of New York."). However, Utah law
governs the threshold question of whether contract formation occurred because applying
the choice-of-law clause to resolve the contract formation issue would improperly
"presume the applicability of a provision before its adoption by the parties has been
established." Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 119 (2d. Cir. 2012). See also
Trans-Tee Asia v. M/V Harmony Container, 518 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2008) ("[W]e
cannot rely on the choice of law provision until we have decided, as a matter of law, that
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mutually assent to the contract's essential tenns. See Nielsen v. Gold's Gym, 2003 UT
37, if 14, 78 P.3d 600 (affinning "trial court's ruling that the contract was unenforceable
for lack of mutual assent as to the essential tenns"). As the proponent of the contract,
Grimm had the burden to establish "mutual assent as to all material tenns and
conditions" of the employment agreement. Cal Wadsworth Constr. v. City of St.
George, 898 P.2d 1372, 1376 (Utah 1995) ("[T]he burden of proof for showing the
parties' mutual assent as to all material tenns and conditions is on the party claiming
that there is a contract.").
Essential contract tenns are generally those tenns that enable a court to detennine
each party's obligations, to decide if one or the other is in breach, and to provide a
remedy for that breach. See Nielsen, 2003 UT 37, iJ 12; Restatement (Second) of
Contracts§ 33(2) (1981). Such essential tenns include, for example, "the time of
perfonnance, the price, the work to be done, or the property to be transferred." Cea v.
Hoffman, 2012 UT App 101, iJ 24,276 P.3d 1178. In an employment contract,
compensation is an essential tenn. See, e.g., 27 Am. Jur. 2d Employment Relationship§
17 (Westlaw 2016) (explaining that "essential tenns" in an employment contract include
"compensation"). See also Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler, 2004 UT 26, iJiJ 13-14
(reversing trial court's denial of summary judgment to employer on contract-based claims
vi
such a provision was a valid contractual tenn and was legitimately incorporated into the
parties' contract."); B-S Steel ofKansas, Inc. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 439 F.3d 653, 661 n.9
(10th Cir. 2006) (referring to "the logical flaw inherent in applying a contractual choice
of law provision before detennining whether the underlying contract is valid").
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where there was a lack of definiteness for terms of additional, performance-based
compensation).
Severance, as a form of compensation, is unquestionably an essential term. It was
of great importance to both sides; was an issue "separating the parties"; and ultimately
was a category of damages for which the trial court tagged DxNA. Thus, the lack of
mutual assent on severance defeats the existence of the employment agreement and
consequently any claim that DxNA breached that agreement.
Beginning with his amended complaint and through trial, Grimm put forward a
specific version of the employment agreement that he contends the parties agreed to and
signed. This version awarded Grimm 26 weeks' severance if he was terminated without
cause. But the trial court refused to find that this version of the employment agreement
was enforceable. It refused to find that DxNA agreed and assented to 26 weeks as
Grimm claimed. After hearing and weighing all the evidence over the course of a nearly
week-long trial, the trial court expressly found that "Grimm's position is not likely." (R.
948.) In other words, Grimm failed to carry his burden to establish mutual assent as to all
material terms of the employment agreement that he sought to enforce. That alone
should have resulted in judgment for DxNA on this issue. See Cal Wadsworth, 898 P.2d
at 1376-78 (holding that without mutual assent as to "all material terms" the claimed
contract "did not come into existence" between the parties). That alone warrants reversal
of the trial court's conclusion that there was an enforceable employment agreement.
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B.

Grimm "never agreed" to the 15 weeks' severance that the trial court
enforced as a contract term.

Even though Grimm failed in his burden, the trial court nevertheless found an
enforceable agreement between the parties by taking DxNA's last, best offer and
enforcing it: "[I]f the court enforces the [DxNA] version, [DxNA] cannot complain since
it is only having enforced 'against' it the terms that it itself offered and agreed to." (R.
947.) That was erroneous as a matter of law.
Trial courts are not permitted to impose terms on parties for which they have
explicitly disagreed. See Richard Barton Enters., Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 373 (Utah
1996) ("'Courts may not impose a modification of a lease to which the parties have not
agreed and, a fortiori, may not do so when the parties have explicitly disagreed as to the
essential terms thereof."') (quoting Valcarce v. Bitters, 362 P.2d 427,428 (Utah 1961)).
And at trial, Grimm's testimony never wavered: He "never agreed to 15 weeks." Not only
that, but he testified that the parties agreed to 26 weeks. He sued DxNA for a specific
employment agreement containing 26 weeks. He testified that they signed the version
containing 26 weeks. He sought damages for 26 weeks' severance pay. Ben-Dayan, on
the other hand, was just as adamant. He never agreed to 26 weeks and only reluctantly
offered 15 weeks. No draft of the employment agreement from DxNA contained more
than 15 weeks' severance.
What's more, the trial court did not explicitly find that the parties agreed on the 15
weeks' severance that it ultimately awarded Grimm. It did not because it could not.
Instead, it focused on Grimm's post-termination communications, reasoning: "It is
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significant to the court that Grimm acknowledged this possible outcome [ 15 weeks'
severance] in his January 23, 2011 email sent after he was terminated. In it he noted the
possible interpretation of the agreement that would allow him 15 rather than 26 weeks of
severance." (R. 952.) That, the trial court concluded, constituted Grimm's assent. (R.
947-48.) That is not assent. That was Grimm's post-termination effort to get paid
something.
In the email to which the trial court referred, Grimm references "three potential
employment agreements": (1) the 2007 Agreement with DxNucleic, containing 6 months'
severance from which Grimm resigned; (2) the last draft from DxNA containing 15
weeks' severance to which Grimm testified he "never agreed"; and (3) the last draft that
Grimm sent to DxNA containing 26 weeks, which the trial court found the parties did not
~

agree to. (Pl. Ex. 17 - Add. E.)
The fact that Grimm resorted to this pick one of "three potential employment
agreements" approach after his termination confirms the lack of mutual assent-it does
not supply it. The trial court not use that statement to manufacture mutual assent for the
parties in order to fabricate and then enforce a contract that they never made. See
Richard Barton Enters., 928 P.2d at 373; Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler, 2004 UT 26, ,r 14
('" [T]he court cannot fabricate the kind of a contract the parties ought to have made and
enforce it."') (quoting Valcarce, 362 P.2d at 428-29)). Indeed, the focus should be on
"all preliminary negotiations, offers, and counteroffers" and "expressions of the parties"
at the time of the alleged contract, Nunley v. Westates Casing Servs., Inc., 1999 UT 100,

,r 22, 989 P.2d 1077 ("Whether a contract has been formed is ultimately a conclusion of
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law"), not post-hoc statements occurring after the dispute over the very existence of the
GI

contract has crystallized.
Given the trial court's various statements about Grimm getting something in place
with DxNA that was "commensurate" with his 2007 Agreement (at R. 949), it appears
that the trial court was fashioning an equitable solution to the purely legal question of
contract formation. That is not permissible under Utah contract law. See Nunley, 1999
UT 100, ,r 17 ("Whether a contract has been formed is ultimately a conclusion of law").

***
In short, Grimm had a burden to establish that the parties mutually assented to all
material terms of the employment agreement that he put forward as the contract between
the parties, including that DxNA agreed to 26 weeks' severance. He failed. As a matter
of law, that failure defeats his breach of contract claim. See Cal Wadsworth, 898 P.2d at
1376. Once Grimm failed in that burden, the trial court could not manufacture Grimm's
assent to a different term for which he expressly and adamantly "never agreed." This
Court should therefore reverse and remand with instructions to amend and reduce the
judgment as set forth in Point IV below.
II.

Grimm Rejected the Offer that the Trial Court Chose to Enforce as a
Contract Term.

The trial court's decision to enforce DxNA's last offer of 15 weeks' severance is
erroneous as a matter of law for another, independent reason: Grimm rejected it.
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A.

Grimm did not unconditionally accept DxNA's offer of 15 weeks'
severance, he rejected it with his counteroffer.

Fundamental to contract formation are the basic elements: "an offer, an
acceptance, and consideration." Cea v. Hoffman, 2012 UT App 101, ,r 24,276 P.3d
1178. Again, as the "proponent of the contract [Grimm] 'has the burden of showing that
an offer and acceptance were more probable than not."' Id.

,r 27 (quoting Sack/er v.

Savin, 897 P.2d 1217, 1222 (Utah 1995)).

~

An offer is an unambiguous '"manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain,
so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to the bargain is
invited and will conclude it."' Cea, 2012 UT App 101, ,r 24 (quoting Engineering
Assocs. v. ln,ing Place Assocs., 622 P.2d 784, 787 (Utah 1980) (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 24) (1981 )).
The acceptance '"must unconditionally assent to all material terms presented in
the offer, including price and method of performance, or it is a rejection of the offer."'
Cea, 2012 UT App 101, ,r 25 (quoting Cal Wadsworth Constr., 898 P.2d at 1376). If the
offeree proposes different terms, there is no contract because there is no acceptancethere is instead a counteroffer. Id. (explaining that if an offeree proposes '"different
terms from those of the offer"' it '"constitutes a counteroffer, and no contract arises
unless the original offeror accepts it unconditionally"') (quoting Cal Wadsworth Constr.,
898 P.2d at 1377)). A counteroffer operates as a rejection of the original offer. See id.
In fact, anything other than an unconditional acceptance terminates the offer. See id.
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ij)

Once terminated, an offer cannot be revived through subsequent acceptance. See Burton
v. Coombs, 557 P.2d 148, 149 (Utah 1976).
The trial court found that DxNA was willing to offer and did offer Grimm 15
weeks' severance. That offer was extended in DxNA's last draft (the overall third draft)
that Greenslade emailed to Grimm. It was that draft-in the record as Defense Exhibit 9
and attached as Addendum B-that the trial court ultimately chose to enforce as "the best
representation of the final agreement between the parties." (R. 953.) 17
But Grimm did not unconditionally accept DxNA's proposed terms. Grimm
responded with a counteroffer. He responded by emailing DxNA his fourth and last draft
which, among other things, changed the severance term back to 26 weeks. As a matter of
law, that counteroffer was a rejection of DxNA's offer. "It is a well-settled, elementary
principle of law that if the offeree rejects the tendered offer, obligations of the parties are
terminated and neither can force performance by the other." Burton, 557 P.2d at 148-49.
And this is so even "though the original offer is not expressly withdrawn." Id. at 149.
Once Grimm rejected DxNA's offer, it was off the table. No further action by
DxNA was necessary. As a result, the trial court could not thereafter revive DxNA's
offer of 15 weeks' severance, enforce it as a contract term against DxNA, and award
Grimm damages for breach. Accordingly, the trial court erred as a matter of law in
enforcing the term against DxNA. This Court must reverse.

17

Again, the trial court referenced Defense Exhibit IO in its findings. But that was in
error. The correct exhibit is Defense Exhibit 9. See supra note 14.
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B.

The trial court could not revive DxNA's offer and accept it on Grimm's
behalf.

On that score, there is also no finding that DxNA revived its offer of 15 weeks'
severance after Grimm's counteroffer. And Grimm's email to Jennings over a year-anda-half later suggesting that there are "three potential employment agreements that"
Grimm could choose from 18 could not, as a matter oflaw, breathe life into DxNA' s offer.
"[W]hen an offer is rejected by refusal, conditional acceptance or by counter-offer, the
party making the original offer is relieved from liability and the party who rejected the
offer cannot, of his own volition, create an agreement by his subsequent acceptance."

Burton, 557 P.2d at 149.
Yet that is in some measure how the trial court rationalized its decision to enforce
DxNA's last offer. It referenced Greenslade's email to Grimm that Grimm would need to
speak with Ben-Dayan about severance-the so-called "waffling." (R. 946 iJ 98.) But
Greenslade telling Grimm that Grimm would need to speak with Ben-Dayan is not an
offer as it in no way "manifest[s] of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to
justify another person in understanding that his assent to the bargain is invited and will
conclude it." Cea, 2012 UT App 101, if 24 (citation omitted). The same with the trial
court's focus on what it called Grimm's acknowledgement in the January 23 email to
Jennings that DxNA's version of the employment agreement containing 15 weeks'
severance "may be enforceable." (R. 948; see also Pl. Ex. 17 -Add. E.) That is not an
unconditional acceptance of DxNA's long-since rejected offer.

18

Pl. Ex. 17 -Add. E.
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The trial court understood this because it expressly found that "the amount of
severance remained a point in dispute between the parties as of June 2009." (R. 946 ,r
98.) That is consistent with Grimm's unequivocal testimony that he "never agreed to 15
weeks," which alone demonstrates that he did not, at any point, unconditionally accept
DxNA's offer of 15 weeks. What the Utah Supreme Court observed in Burton on its way
to affirming a trial court's refusal to find the existence of an enforceable contract could
apply just as well here:
The record does not disclose any offer tendered except at the beginning of trial and
plaintiffs unequivocally rejected defendants' offer at that time. Not only does the
record fail to disclose subsequent offers during trial, but plaintiffs' testimonies
tend to support their earlier rejection.
Burton, 557 P.2d at 149. Grimm's testimony not only tends to support his earlier

rejection, it shows that he was adamant, steadfast, and unwavering in that rejection. Just
as it became impossible for Grimm to later accept an offer that was rejected and not
renewed, it was impossible for the trial court to later accept it on Grimm's behalf. See id.
at 150 ("It was impossible for plaintiffs to assert acceptance at a later time unless
defendants had expressly renewed their offer, and the record does not show that this was
done").
As a result, the trial court's decision to enforce 15 weeks' severance against
DxNA as a contract term under the premise that it cannot complain because it was at one
point willing to agree to that term is erroneous as a matter of law. DxNA can complain
because its offer was rejected. It can complain because it is manifestly unjust to permit
Grimm to sue DxNA for damages under a specific agreement, have DxNA prevail on that
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issue and defeat the existence of that claimed agreement, only to find out that the trial
court would revive a long dead offer because at one point in time DxNA was willing to
make it. As our supreme court explained, it creates an "unjust result to put [DxNA] in
the position" of defending at trial Grimm's assertion of an enforceable contract of 26
weeks' severance "and then find[ing] out that [it is] bound by a later acceptance" of an
offer that was previously rejected. Burton, 557 P.2d at 149.

***
In sum, the burden of proof was on Grimm to prove all elements of contract
formation. See Cea, 2012 UT App 101, ,I 27. He failed to do so. This provides another
basis for this Court to reverse and remand with instructions to amend and reduce the
judgment as set forth in Point IV below.

III.

The Trial Court's Refusal to Resolve the Notice Provision is also Fatal to the
Enforceability of Grimm's Claimed Employment Agreement.
As explained above, the lack of mutual assent or acceptance of the severance

provision alone defeats Grimm's claim that there exists an enforceable employment
agreement and consequently sinks his claim that DxNA breached that agreement by not
paying him severance or giving him a 2% membership interest in DxNA. See infra Point
IV. There is still another issue that defeats Grimm's contract-based claims as a matter of
law. That is the trial court's refusal to resolve one of the other issues separating the
parties-the notice of non-renewal provision.
As the trial court recognized, "[ o]ne of the main points in contention was the
notice of non-renewal." (R. 936.) It acknowledged DxNA "wanted 90 days and Grimm
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wanted 120 days." (R. 950.) But instead of resolving that issue, the trial court simply
punted it away because in its view, ''the issue regarding notice of non-renewal is not an
issue in this case" and "will not be mentioned further. It is simply of no consequence
because of the apparent agreement of the parties as well as the irrelevance to this
lawsuit." (R. 950.) That is no answer.
The mere fact that Grimm was not suing DxNA over this specific provision does
not make it irrelevant to the central question of whether there was an express employment
agreement. Again, to have an enforceable employment agreement there must be mutual
assent to "all material terms," not just those on which one party decides to sue the other
in the underlying litigation. Cal Wadsworth Cons tr., 898 P.2d at 13 76-78. The failure to
have a meeting of the minds as to "all material terms" means that the claimed contract
"did not come into existence." Id.
This provision, set forth in section 3.8(c) of the third and fourth drafts of the
employment agreement, set the outside date on which the parties were required to agree
on whether to continue their employment relationship. It was essentially the triggering
provision as to whether the CEO would continue at the helm for another year or exit from
the company. At bottom, it was an issue related to the time of performanc~the time in
which the parties would need to agree on whether to continue the relationship. To that
end, it was material to the agreement, even if not a provision for which either side was
claiming default or breach in the litigation. See I Williston on Contracts § 4:21 (4th ed.
Westlaw 2016) (explaining that "a lack of definiteness in an agreement" concerning "the
time of performance" may result in the lack of an enforceable agreement); Nielsen, 2003
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UT 3 7, ,I 13 ('" Whether or not the [missing term] was essential to the contract requires an
examination of the entire agreement and the circumstances under which the agreement
was entered into."') (quoting Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Meyer, 575 P.2d 1048, 1050 (Utah
1978)).
This provision was a central issue for DxNA in its defense to Grimm's contract
claim. (R. 834-841 (DxNA's Post-Trial Brief); R. 1748-51 Trial Tr. vol. III 24: 19-25,
25-27).) It was, after all, one of the key issues "separating the parties." (R. 934 if 16.)
As Ben-Dayan explained, it was one of "three very important points that, you know,
really essentially sunk the whole deal." (R. 1751 Trial Tr. vol. III 27: 19-21.) As he
testified, giving notice to the CEO that his contract will not be renewed is a form of
termination. When you terminate someone, Ben-Dayan explained, you show them the
door-you don't let them hang around for an extended period of time to poison the well.
The additional 30 days that Grimm wanted and proposed was simply not acceptable. The
trial court did not find differently.
In the communications between the parties, and in the trial court's findings, DxNA
dug its heels in at 90 days and Grimm said he could "live with" 90 days. The trial court
even explained that "[DxNA] wanted 90 days and Grimm wanted 120 days, though
Grimm indicated that he would settle on the 90 days." (R. 950.) But even as Grimm was
suggesting he could live with 90 days, he testified that he and DxNA agreed on and
signed his final version of the employment agreement. This means that the parties
inexplicably agreed to Grimm's proposed 120 days. (Pl. Ex. 11 -Agmnt. § 3.8(c).)
iv
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Of course, the trial court also found it inexplicable, concluding that it is "not
likely" that the parties agreed to Grimm's proposal. So just as the trial court could not
find that the parties' mutually assented to severance, it could not find that the parties
mutually assented to another material term-the notice of renewal provision. It could not
find mutual assent to 120 days, as Grimm contended; nor could it find that the parties
mutually assented to 90 days, as DxNA wanted. But instead of concluding as a matter of
law that there was no enforceable contract, as it should have, see Cal Wadsworth Constr.,
898 P.2d at 1376-78, the trial court simply carved this provision out of the final draft
proposed by DxNA and enforced the rest of it against DxNA concluding that "the best
evidence of the agreement is the final one proposed by [DxNA]," with the exception of
Section 3.8(c).
Carving out material terms from the agreement then foisting the remainder upon
the parties is impermissibly making contracts for parties for which there is no meeting of
the minds on all material terms. See Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler, 2004 UT 26, 1 14.
The trial court's conclusion to jettison the notice of non-renewal provision rather than
recognizing it as an insurmountable legal obstacle to contract formation is making a
contract for the parties for which they did not bargain and to which they never agreed.
To allow this result to stand would mean that in contract negotiation, parties now
must decide how far is too far in bargaining for terms. If they are not directly sued over
their take-it-or-leave-it term-the term for which they walked away from the negotiation
table-they risk having the court enforce all other terms against them. And this is so,
even though it is undisputed that they would not have entered into the contract without
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the other party's acceptance of that particular term. That is why our case law requires
mutual assent to "all material terms." Cal Wadsworth, 898 P.2d at 1376-78. It is simply

~

another, independent reason the trial court erred in enforcing DxNA's proposed draft
employment agreement-minus the notice of non-renewal provision-against it.

IV.

The Trial Court's Award of Damages Under the Employment Agreement and
Prejudgment Interest Should be Reversed.
A.

Grimm is not entitled to any category of damages or compensation
arising under the unenforceable employment agreement.

In the absence of an employment contract, we default to the rule in Utah that
Grimm was presumptively an at-will employee. See Hansen v. Am. Online, Inc., 2004
UT 62, ,r 7, 96 P.3d 950 ("Utah's employment law presumes that all employment
relationships entered into for an indefinite period of time are at-will, where the employer
or the employee may terminate the employment for any reason (or no reason) except
where prohibited by law."). That presumption is reinforced by DxNA's own at-will
policies. DxNA's employee handbook provides: "Employment with DxNA LLC is
i)

entered into voluntarily and both you and DxNA LLC are free to end the employment
relationship at any time, for any reason, with or without cause or advance notice so long
as there is no violation of applicable federal or state law." (Pl. Ex. 32 - DxNA Policy§

~

101.)
As an at-will employee, Grimm could still claim certain items of compensation, in
particular his salary. And though DxNA argued against awarding Grimm these items or
for at least reducing them, they do not arise strictly from the employment agreement. But
other categories of damages awarded to Grimm arise solely out of the agreement and not
44
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the employer/employee relationship. They do not exist but for the agreement. The trial
court recognized as much when it made an award of these items to Grimm, referencing
the particular section of the employment agreement on which it based each award.
Severance payment. The trial court awarded Grimm 15 weeks' severance under

the agreement because Grimm was not terminated "for cause" as defined in the
agreement. (R. 955-56.) Therefore, the trial court concluded, he was "entitled to receive
payments in amount equal to ... [his] salary for a period of 15 weeks following the date ...
[of termination]." (Section 3.8(b).)" (R. 954.) The trial court thus awarded Grimm
damages in the amount of $72,115.38 for 15 weeks' severance plus prejudgment interest
thereon. (R. I 052-53.) That award should be reversed.
Equity in DxNA. The trial court found that that the "Equity Incentive

Arrangement" in Section 2.3 of the agreement "results in Grimm receiving 2% accrued
membership interest in DxNA." (R. 953.) This was based on its conclusion that "[t]he
agreement provides that Grimm is entitled to 1% membership interest after a vesting
period of 18 months. Then he is entitled to an addition[al] 1% interest on each of his
second and third anniversary dates. He met the vesting period for 1% to accrue. He was
also employed on his second anniversary date for an additional I% accrued." (R. 95859.) The trial court thus awarded Grimm "entitled to 2% membership interest in DxNA."
(R. 959) which it required DxNA to transfer to Grimm within 15 days of entry of

judgment. (R. I 053.) Because that award arises solely under an unenforceable
agreement, it should be reversed.
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B.

Grimm was not entitled to 10% prejudgment interest under
Utah Code§ 15-1-1.

The trial court also awarded Grimm prejudgment interest of I 0% per annum on his
damages, an interest award that totaled $137,811.87. (R. 1053, 1122.) This award was
based on Utah Code section 15-1-1. (R. 923.) As Grimm noted below (at R. 923), in
Francis v. Nat'/ DME, 2015 UT App 119,350 P.3d 615, this Court affirmed an award of
prejudgment interest under this statute in a case involving a claimed breach of contract
for non-payment of wages (unpaid commission). See id.

,r 44.

The Francis court rejected

the employer's argument that the statute should be limited to only those classes of
contracts involving a loan or forbearance. See id.

,r,r 40-44.

In USA Power, LLC v. PacifiCorp, 2016 UT 20,372 P.3d 629, the Utah Supreme
Court held that "'the statute applies only to contracts 'for the loan or forbearance of any
money, goods, or chose in action."' Id.

,r I 09.

In so holding, the Court disavowed any

statements in other cases-stretching back to 1979-which suggested that the scope of
the statute was much broader than this narrow category of contracts. See id.

,r,r 107-108

& n.190-191. It explained that those cases did not present the issue as squarely as in
USA Power, and in USA Power the resolution of the issue was "necessary to our
decision." Id.

,r 108.

To that end, USA Power effectively overruled Francis.

As a general matter, a judicial opinion which interprets a statute applies
retroactively. See Monarrez v. Utah Dep't ofTransp., 2016 UT 10, ,r 28,368 P.3d 846.
That is particularly true where a party cannot claim justifiable reliance or undue burden
because of retroactive application. See id. The question here is simply the application of
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the appropriate interest rate. That is not something that Grimm could not plausibly argue
Gj

creates an undue burden on him or on which he justifiably relied.
Applied here, Grimm's action against DxNA is not within the limited class of
(ii

contracts to which Utah Code section 15-1-1 applies: It is not based on a contract for the
loan of money or goods or for the forbearance of any chose in action. See Utah Code §
15-1-1; USA Power, 2016 UT 20, ,I 108. It is for nonpayment of wages, expenses, and
other compensation that Grimm claims was due and owing him arising out of his
employment relationship with DxNA. Indeed, the employment agreement which he
sought to enforce against DxNA (even if it stands), is not a contract for a loan or
forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action. It is a contract for employment.
Accordingly, Utah Code section 15-1-1 (2) does not apply and the award of 10%
prejudgment interest under that statute should be reversed and the matter remanded to the
trial court for a determination of the appropriate rate of prejudgment interest to apply to
any portion of the judgment that remains intact on remand.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court's decision that there is an enforceable employment agreement
should be reversed. The award of damages to Grimm which are based on the existence
of that agreement should also be reversed. And the trial court's award of prejudgment
interest should be reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court to consider and
award an appropriate rate of prejudgment interest to any remaining portion of the
judgment.
DATED: December 30, 2016.
DURHAM JONES

ELIJAH

& PINEGAR, P.C.

L. MILNE

Attorneys for Appellant
DxNALLC
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AM 8: //
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTA1-i

Pl-IlLLIP GRIMMt

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW, AND ORDER

Plainti~

vs.

Case No.

t I O'5 oi1 b!A

DxNA LLC, et al.,
Judge Pamela G. Heffernan
Defendants.

This case was tried to the court on January 11, 12, 13, and 14~ 2016~ Both parties were

represented by counsel. After considering all the testimony, exhibits2 and arguments of counsel,
the court enters the following findings and decision.

FINDINGS OF FACT:

l. In approximately October of2007~ plaintiff (hereafter "Grimm"} was hired to the

position of CEO by DxNA Nucleic Analytics LLC (hereafter "Nucleic").
2. G1imm entered into a written contract with Nucleic which contained many provisions
including the following:
a. Salary of $250,000.00 per year.
b. An equity membership of 5% in Nucleic.
c. A promise of prompt reimbursement of business expenses with reimbursement to be

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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made "in accordance with the policies and procedures (of) Employer.... "
d. Termination allowed without cause with procedures in place if tcnnination was with
cause.
e. Principal place of employment of CEO was to be St. George, Utah with an allowance of
up to one week a month outside of St. George, Utah.
3. The following is from plaintifrs trial brief that the court finds essentially describes a
reorganization in June, 2008 of Nucleic into DxNA LLC (hereafter "'DxNA):
In June. 2008 [Nucleic] was in need of additional funding to continue its operations.
Glory Capital, through its principals, Avi Bcn-D[a]yan and Marty Ben-D[a]yan, located in
New Yorkt fanned a new company named DxNA, LLC, a Utnh limited liability con1pany,
which is the named Defendant in this case. DxNA was fonned spec.ifically to invest ·in Dx
Nucleic Analytics. As part of this process, Glory Capital fom1ed Glory Bioventures, LLC
to hold its investment in the new entity, DxNA LLC. As a result of the capital infusion
from Glory Capital (via Glory Bio Ventures, LLC), Glory Bio Ventures became the
majority owner of DxNA LLC in 2008, and Dx Nucleic became a minority owner,
changing its name in the process to NA Bioventures, LLC, a Utah limited liability
company.... ['U]ntil Ju1y2010 DxNA, LLC only had two members: Glory Bioventur~ and
.NA Biovcntures:, LLC.... As a result of ... restructuring, all employees .of Dx Nucleic
Artal}1ics were eventually transferred over to DxNA LLC. In [Ju.ne of 2008] Mr. Grimm
became an employee of DxNA, LLC like all other employees.

4. On the eve of the creation ofDxNA, Grimm was informed by defendant's counsel, Mr.
Little, that he would be required to resign from Nucleic and a new employment agreement would
need to be entered into with DxNA.
5. Grimm was under no obligation to resign from Nucleic and received no severance pay,

but he relied on the promise thnt he would have a new employment agreement.
6. At or about the time of the Glory closing on June 6, 2008, Gtimm was paid deferred
compensation and other benefits that had accrued while he was acting as CEO ofNucleict with the
exception of severance pay, and he resigned from Nucleic, although his resignation does not
appear to have been reduced to writing.

2

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

000932

~

7. No written employment agreement was then in place between Grimm and DxNA, but
Grimm continued to be paid his annual salary of S250,000.00 per year and continued for a time to
receive reimbursement for his business expenses.
8. Grimm continued to reside in Salt L~e County and commuted to St. George, Utah for

business purposes as he had been doing while employed as CEO of Nucleic.

9. The first :draft of the Dx.NA employment agreement came from Glory on or about July
18, 200R
l 0. On or about August 2 I, 2008 Glory inquired about the status of the agreement and
Grirnm responded that he would respond and also acknowledged that he had put the issue to the
back burner due to 91her pressing matters.
11. On August, 26, 2008, Grimm sent an email to Glory with a revised draft of the

agre.ement attached which among· other things made the following pertinent changes;
a; Changed the principal place of employment from St. George, Utah to Salt Lake City,
Utah.
b. Changed the number of vacation days from 20 Lo 25 days per year.
c. Changed the sevcran<;e pay frotn 90 ~ays if t~nninatcd for cause to 6 months if
terminated for other than for cause.
12. 011 December22, 2008 Greenslade (counsel for Glory) GOnmmnicated by email to

Grimrn referencing Grimm's commitment to respond to anothe-r draft of the emp1oyment
agreemen\. Presumably ~his meant the draft dated October 7! 2008.
13. Apparently, no progress was mad~ on reaching a final agreement until February 23,

2009 when the October 2008 draft was sent or re-sent to Grimm. The pertinent changes appc~r to

be that:
3
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a. ·"Tbe p.rincipal place of tmployment of the Executive shall be at St. George, Utah and St
George, Utah, with time a11ocated between such locations as dictated by business
requirements. '
b. Severance pay of 15 weeks. for termination other than-for cause is now offered.
c. Vacation or PTO is specified at 20 days.
1

14. At trial there was a discussion about the apparent error in the DxNA/Glory draft

Which specifies location of employment as St. George and St. George. It is apparent that it was

intended to be St. George and Salt Lake.
t 5. There is an absence of any documentation about the agreement until June 1, 2009

when there was an email from Grimm to Glory and another proposed draft of the agreement which
includes the follmving pertinent changes by Grimm:

a. Principal place ·of employment is specified by Grimm as Salt Lake City with trave1 to St.
George as required.
b. Severance pay of 26 weeks if termination occurs for other than cause.
16. On June 2, 2009 Glory rcspond.ed t<> the June 2009 draft s.cn1 by Grimm and
referenced above. The email states that the followit1g are ihe olllY, issu_es that remain and that
Glory's:nttomey will 'discuss those issues with Marty Ben-Dayan:
'1. Principnl place of employment as Sall Lake City vs. St George_;
b; Severa11ce pay for 15 weeks vs 26. weeks; and
c. Notice of non•r.enewal of contract prior to expiration of contact of 90 days vs. 120 days.

17'. Also, O.lory noted on June 2, 2009 thnt the employt11e11t agreementwas to be dated

June 6, 2008 (i.e.• the date of the dlory's c.losin_g)1 not June I, 2008.
:l 8. On June 10, 2009~ after a few other emails addrcsshJg the terms of the agreement.

Glory e111ailed Grimm and addressed the three points that remained in contention as follow~:

a. 'Tflhe .principal place of employment should be at Saint George initially and when the
company has an-official office in Snit Luke City then Salt Lake City can be the principal

4
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pince of employment, with time spent in Saint George as needed."
b. ··Marty wants to discuss point (2) with you when you next meet with him.'' ["Point (2)"
refers to the severance pay issue].
c. HAs to point (3 ), 90 days had been set1led upon some time ago, so that period should
stay." [This references the notice period for non-renewal of the contract aftedts expirationl
but this is not an issue in this case since Grimm was tcnninated before the expiration of the
three-year contract tem1.]
19. As of the June, 2009 draft described above, there appears to be no dispute between the
parties as to the equity incentive provisions granting Grimm a l % membership interest in DxNA
on each :of the first, second, and third anniversaries oft he date of the agreement with the first I% to
vest no earlier than 18 months after the date of the agreement. (This agreement regarding t11e
equity was to equalize the dilution in Grimm's shares owned when DxNA was created. Prior to
that, Grimm was granted 5% shares in Nucleic, which was diluted do,1v"tl to around 2 % when the
reorganization occurred in June 2008.)
20. In additiont at that time the parties had sct1lcd on 20 vacation days per year.
21. During the third week of June 2009 there was a board meeting at Glory's office in
New York City which Grimm attended.
22~ Prior to the board meeting, Grimm met with Glory, specifically Marty Ben-Dayan,
and discussed the employment agreement.
23. Grimm contends that he and Glory (through Avi Ben-Dayan) signed the agreement

ca

prior to the Board meeting and it was back-dated to June 8, 2008.
24. Glory denies signing the agreement.

25. No signed copy of the agreement has ever been produced, though Grimm claims that
an assistant at Glory took the signed copy for filing al Glory's office meeting.
26. There exists no writing olher than the copy of the agreement Grimm claims was
5
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signed to indicate that the final three points of contention described previously were resolved by
the parties; however, at the time of the board meeting substantial portions of the contract were
agreed on. There were no blank portions of the agreement. just three points of disagreement on the

exact language. One of the points in contention was the notice of non-renewal which has already
been noted to be a nonissue in this case.
27. After the June 2009 board meeting, no further exchange of emails or other
documentation indicates that the agreement was negotiated further; however Grimm continued to

reside in Salt Luke and to commute to St. George. Grimm also continued to receive his $250,000
annual salary, engaged in extensive business travel and incurred business expenses which he was
reimbursed for, and reportedly took some PTO. No equity interest in DxNA was ever given to

Grimm a:fter that date.
28'. Glory was aware that Grimm was not primarily located in St George and claimed this

was a major problem from their point of view, characterizing the company as a ship without n
captain present. Nonetheless~ they did not press the issue or insist that Grimm relocate. They did

not threaten to fire him for that reason, either. Things continued according to the status quo.
29. While the lack of further discussion about the final points in contention inures to the
benefit of Grimm, as he contends that this is further proof that the parties reached a final written
agreement, Glory's testimony at trinl was that the parties simply let the entire matter "go to sleep."
JO. In the spring of 2010, Glory began expressing dissatisfaction with Grimm as CEO of
DxNA and there were threats to terminate him. At the same time there was a movement underfoot
to reorganize DxNA and for Glory to exit as a member.
31. During this same time. it appears Glory was not funding the operation of DxNA

6
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according to their original agreement and the company was experiencing serious financial distress.
32. During May through June 2010, Grimm explicitly made a demand for reimbursement
of his business expenses, which he claimed were in excess of$70,000.00~ and also made a demand
for the equity incentives in DxNA that were referenced in the drafts of the written employment
contract.
33. In May 2010, Glory, through Marty Ben-Dayan, took the position that there was no
written cmp.loymcnt agreement with Grimm. It contended that there were drafts of an agreement

but no finalized agreement.
34. On June 4,2010, Grimm sent an email to the Bcn-Dayans. stating that he had entered
into a written employment agreement signed by both parties. He again referenced his
unreimbursed bu•siness expenses, stock in-OxNA, accrued PTO, and severance pay.
35. In response, Marty Ben-Dayan stated that they did not uagree with your [Grimm~s]
telling of events" and that he would be terminated for cause. Glory did not fo11ow through on the
threat to fire Grimm.
36. In July 2010 there was a modification of the relationship between Glory and DxNA.
Specifically, Glory assigned to DxNA all of its rights and interests in DxNA in exchange for a
promissory note.
37. ln that assignment Glory represents the following:

Neithcr·Glory, nor any member, manager, agent, servant or representative of O,lory,
has entered into any agreement with or created any obligation to any party that is enforceab1e
against DxNA with respect to supplies, services, intellectual property, or ownership in
DxNA~ which is not in writing and which has not been delivered to NA. Neither Glory, nor
any member, manager, agent. scr\'antt or representative of Glory~ has entered into, on behalf
of DxNA, any written or oral employment agreement that is enforceable against DxNA with
any employee of DxNA; provided, however, that DxNA and NA acknowledge receipt of a
copy of a draft employment agrt.~ment between DxNA and Philip Grimm. (Section 5.1 (vi)
7

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

000937

of the Assignment Agreement.)
38. Grimm signed the Assignment Agreement as CEO of DxNA.

39. That transaction essentially divested Glory of its ownership of DxNA. thereby leaving
the remaining member, NA BioVentures LLC (hereafter referred to as "NA") as the sole member.
40~ Grimm continued as CEO.
41. Glory's depmture from DxNA resulted in serious financial problems for the company.

Simultancouslyt there were other issues, resulting in financial stress to the company, including
technological problems with their product.
42. In response to the financial difficulties facing DxNA Grimm made a decision to
furlough all employees ofDxNA, and by cmni1 dated August 13, 2010 announced that the entire
workforce would be furloughed for the last three weeks of August. (Defendants' Exhibit 27.)
43. At trial Mr. Jennings, chair of the membership committee of the controlling member
NA, expressed extreme dissatisfaction with the decision to furlough all employees indicating that

this would essentially result in a drain on the most valuable resource t11e company had- its people.
44. Grimm was not fired but, rather, continued working as CEO o.f DxNA.
45. A couple of employees were brought back to work after the furlough and, apparently,
most of the rest were eventually brought back to work.
46. Certain high-ranking employees, such as Mr. Maples and others, after taking a short
furlough and collecting unemployment benefits. decided to simply return to work even though they
were not receiving a paycheck at that time. They were later paid.
47. The evidence shows that Grimm worked throughout the furlough and on through the
time he was tenninated in January 2011. While DxNA and NA dispute that Grimm worked during

8
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that time.and even during the fall and early winter of 20 lO and 201 I, the court ·finds through
testimony at trial, ·hundreds of pages of emails, business receipts, as weU·as other testimony and
documentation that there is sufficient evidence to establish that Grimm was working during this
disputed period of time.

48.. To illustrate that Grimm was working, see, for example, an email to employees from

Grimm date9 August 24, 2010 describing the Board's dircctiv~s to him, and also the business update
from Griinm--to the Board dated August 12., 2010.
49. There is no evidence that the Board of NA objected to Grimm -c·ontinuing tb work.
50. While Grimm claims there were statements and promises made by the NA Board that

wage payments would continue through the furlough and onwilrd when the company was able to
p~y, the court finds there is not suffi<:i~nt evidence of those "'promises.,, Instead tl1e cm1rt finds that
the Board was aware that Grimm was working, travelling, ancl conducting business on behalf of
Gi}

DxNA> and that Grimm's expectation of continued payment for bis services (Le.~ wages) was
reasonable.

SL !tis um;lisputed th~t from August 8, 20 I0, G1iimm received-only one payme11t c.>f wages·.
52. Others who continued to work during the period particularly after the furlough

eventtial1y received payment for their wages, e.g., Mr. Mosman (who lfnd to file suitto receive
compensation) and Mr. Maples..

53. ·Of significanc~ to the court,_ a.nd further evide11ce that GriJ11m_ was working on OxNA' s

bt1sines.s, is .the seri~s o(promissory notes executed by Grimm on behalf of OxNA where, '1S late as

il
early January. 2011 ~ Grimm signed a personal guarantee of one of the notes..
54. The ,e,;idence also establishes that though Grimm at the beginning of the furlough

9
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applied for and ultimately received unemployment compensation payments, he later tcnninated and
withdrew his unernploym~nt compensation application and returned the unemployment funds he

received.
55. On January 7, 2011 Mr. Jennings sent an email to Grimm. It is necessary to quote that
~

email in order to establish at least a beginning of a timcline ofcritical events that would follow:

The Board of Directors. met today and voted to inidate a complete reorganization of
DxNA. As part of the reorganization~ we will be seeking a resignati.on and release from •all
employees in consideration of the Comp.any issuing membership inter:ests in fulfillment of
outstanding obligations to the employees. Given the Company's financial condition, those
who do not resign will be tenninated. All affected employees will be eligible to apply for
employment in the company following the reorganization.
Since you are among those nffceted, I wanted to infom1 you of the detennination
and let yoQ know thai l or any of the Board members are available to discuss :any qu~stions
that you have at your convenience.
56.. Grin1m attempted to arrange a :meeting with Mr. Jennings to discuss the situation and
was finally able to meet with him on January 21, 2011.

57. Ort January 23~ 201 l ~ Grimm sent Mr. Jennings an email acknowledging their
meeting on January 21.
58. Grimm was never provided with a ;rclea·se., nor didDxNA seek Grimm's termination
t110i1gh be .was identified as an affecled employee.

59. It Was at the January 21 ,. 2011 meeting that it was clear that Grimm was te)1llinatcd.
60~ Grimm was never provided a \vritteo notice stating the reasons for his tennination,

and the l<!Stimony from Mr. Jennings is that DxNA took the position that Grimm was an. uat wmn
employee and he could be terminated without cause.
61. The court acknowledges Mr. Jennings' te-stimony that he and others were very
(ii)

10
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dissatisfied with Grimm,s performance as CEO, but there also existed general dissatisfaction with
lhe overall culture of the organization.
62. Mr. Jennings made it clear that the reorganization effort which resulted in the
termination of all employees was done in order to change the somewhat dysfunctional culture that
had developed within the organization.

63. The court specifically finds that Grimm was tcm1inatcd without cause and also notes
Q;

that Grimm is not complaining:about the circumstances or basis upon which he \\~as terminated.
64. Specifically, the alleged violations thatNA now cites for Grimm's termination as set
forth in Section 3.4 of the draft employment agreement ure not supported by the evidence. (See the

specific claims set forth in Defendant's Post-Trial Brief, pages 21-23.) The claims of working

outside the organization on his separate business, improper cl~ims of business expenses, failure to
properly documc.nt and submit expenses in a timely way, and the rest are simply not supported by
the evidence. (See Plaintiff's Post-Trial Brief for further detail.)

65. Notably, if NA/DxNA had terminated Grimm for cause, it would have triggered
procedural safeguards prior to tem1i11ntion as prQvided in the agreement. Ox.NA relies on that
agreement for its claimed bases of tem1ination for cause. The agreement also requires the
following procedure if tem1ination occurs for cause:
Qj

(T]he Executive shall not be deemed to have been terminated forCausc unless the Board of
Directors of the Employer delivers a written notice to the Executive setting forth the
reasons for the Employer's intention to terminate for Cause and specifically identifying the
manner in which the Board of Directors of the Employer believes that the Executive has
engaged in conduct giving rise to the Employer's ability to terminate his employment for
Cause, which conduct (to the extent it can be corrected) is not substantially corrected by the
Executive within 30 days following his receipt of such notice. (Agreement, Section 3.4.)
66. No written notice giving the reasons for intent to l<!nninate was given to Grimm by the

t.j)
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Board nor was he given 30 days from notice to correct any deficiencies that could be corrected.
67. If the deficiencies (some or all) could not reasonably be corrected, Grimm was
minimally entitled to written notice of the reasons for te1mination. That was not done.
68. On January 23,201 I, two days following the Grimm-Jennings meeting, Grimm sent
an email to Mr. Jennings requesting payment of his salary, accmcd PTO, reimbursement of
business expenses, and severance. The request was accompanied by spreadsheets showing the
following calculations:
a. Unpaid salary from August 8. 2010 through January 23, 2011 of $99,866.47;
b. Unpaid, accrued PTO of$56,129.93;
c. Business expenses up to January 9, 2011 of $82,297.96; and
d. Severance pay of either 15 weeks at $72,150 or 26 weeks at SI 50~000, depending on
which employment agreement was referred to.
69. Health reimbursement was also referred to, but Grimm indicated that he would deal
directly with Jim Mapes on that.
70. The January 23, 2011 email also references the employment agreement and the stock
comp.onent of 2% that Grimm claims was owed to him at that time.
71. The email goes on .to note that Grinunis entitled to-the amounts,owed within 24 hoursof tennination ofemployment, but he proposes that he would be willing to take payments over
time because of the financial stress to the company so long as the amount is secured in some
fashion and accrues interest. The email also suggests that the payments were to be made in the
amount of$10,000 per month with accelerated payments as the business of the company improves.
Grimm also indicates that they can sit down 10 review the details behind the amounts owed and
make adjustments as necessary.
72. Grimm wns then inst meted by DxNA to provide copies of receipts to document his
12
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~

business expenses. Grimm sent them electronically, but since there was some kind of problem with
vl

the electronic transmission, Grimm agreed to manually copy the receipts and provide them to
DxNA, which he did.
73. DxNA did not pay Grimm anythin_g, and Grimm then filed this action on March 21,
2011, 59 days after his January 21, 2011 meeting with Mr. Jennings.
With regard to the issue .of reimbursement of business expenses, the court makes the
foJlowing additional findings:
74. The Employee Handbook that has been referred to previously is fairly consistent that
employees need to submit receipts for expenses and that requests for reimbursement "should" be
submitted within 10 day, but another version of the handbook specifies that receipts should be
turned in within a week. One Ver$ion of the handbook states that failure. to provide receipts within
30 days may result itt rion'.'"rehnburscment; another version of the handbook doesn't state that.
75. It became quite clear during trial that the employee handbook iil whatever version was
not followed by Grimm. While the handbook refers to all employees, the ultimate authority as to
the handbook and -its policies fell to Grimm.
76. Grimm did not follow the procedures for business expense reimbursement. Rather, it
was his practice to defer submitting expenses during periods of financial stress within the

c9mpany. He also did not regularly submit rcccipLc; from actual transactions with his

reimbursement requesJ. Rather, he submitted h.is credit card statements as documentation. This
was the usual practice and Grimm received reimbursement accordingly. That changed in Febmary
~

2011 after he was terminated and DxNA demanded actual receipts for his accumulated expenses

which he then provided.
13
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~

77. Unrcimburscd business expenses accumulated from i\farch 3, 2009 through January
9,2011.

78. Demand for reimbursement was made as early as spring/summer of 2010, but no
payments were forthcoiuing.
79. Ac trial an effort was made by DxNA to dispute the validity of some of Grimm~s
expenses. For instance it was alleged that personal use of the company vehicle may have occurred,
a personal trip to Phoenix may have been made, and some magazines and snacks were purchased at

the airport on some of Grimm's i11temationa1 trips.
80. The claims that Grimm used a company vehicle for personal use and may have taken
a personal trip at company expense arc speculative. There was no reasonable or substantiated
evidence of defendant's claims despite an attempt to do so.

81. The incidental purchase of snacks and magazines during international business travel
is also not suspect. They are all relatively small amounts and were explained by Grimm at trial as
business related since he was traveling long hours by plane. A magazine to read, for instance, or a
bag of trail mix. is part and parcel of business expense relating_ to travel, particularly under the
circumstances Grimm described.
82. DxNA simply did not present adequate evidence or urgument to justify reducing the
business expenses as presented.
83. In addition to deferring requests for expense reimbm·scment, Grimm would allow the

company to defer payment of his wages, again during times of linancial stress within the company
With regard to the issue of PTO the court makes these additional findings:
84. The portion of the employment agreement that Grimm and DxNA (through Marty

14
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Ben-Dayan/Glory) agreed on allowed Grimm 20 dnys of paid vacation'' per year. lt allowed those
0

days to "accme in conformity with the

Employcr♦s

nonnal vacation pay practices." (See the

various versions of the agreement, Section 2.2.)

85. Record keeping by DxNA is intemnlly inconsistent in that one document shows one
amount and another shows a different amount of accrnal of PTO for Mr. Grimm.

86. Grimm proposes that he should be compensated according to one version of the
Employee Handbook.
87. To compound the confusion, there are multiple versions of the Employee Handbook
with variations on how PTO is computed and how it is to accme over years.
88·. It is clear, however, that regard1ess of the version of handbook referred to, the number
of paid vacation days in Grimm's employment agrcem~nt is not the same as would be computed
using provisions in any of the handbooks. He ultimately agreed to 20 days per year according to
the employment agreement.

89. Furthe11nore, it is also clear that Grimm did not follow the employee handbook, as
evidenced by his business expense rcirnburscm~nt practices outlined above.
90.. The employee handbook is also geared toward employees who work 40 hours per
week even if they are paid a salary.
9 l. Grimm, on the other hand, came and went in his employment without st1pervision, us
one would expect ofa CEO. He was in St. George at best one or two days per week on average. He
did not necessarily always keep to a 40-hour workweek, which the PTO guidelines in the
handbook contemplate. This is not to say, however, that Grimm did not work at least 40 hours per
week, especially in light of the frequent travel and the flexibility Grimm hud in executing company
15
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business.
92. All in all, the court finds that it is not reasonable to apply the employee handbook in a

4w

piecemeal fashion to Grimm.
93. Grimm's testimony at trial was that he used 8 days of vacation in 20IO, leaving him
~

12 days of unpaid vacation for that year.

94. To the extent the court finds that Grimm is entitled to PTO it will be limited to t11e
days unused in 2010.

~

The coun makes the following additional findings regarding severance pay:
95. The employment agrecmcm proposed from DxNA/Glory in June. 2009 1 makes clear
that they were willing to offer Grimm 15 weeks of severance pay ifhc was tem1inated without

cause.
96. Grimm claims that the agreement that was signed gave him 26 weeks of severance
pay if terminated without cause.

97. The employment agreement that Grimm had with Nucleic gave him 26 weeks of
severance pay if tenninated without cause.
98. Glory's counsel waffled on the 15 vs. 26 weeks issue in his June 2009 email, saying
only the one of the principals would need to be consulted on that topic, but that the amount of
severance remained a point in dispute between the parties as of June 2009.
99. The coun will make the final dctcnnination of whether to allow and the amount of
severance pay in the section of this decision relating to the validity of the contract.

DECISION:

16
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Vjg

!.
~

ls there an e'!forceable employmentagreemem between Grimm and DxNA?
The first and dispositive issue is whether there exists an enforceable employment agreeme11t

between bxNA and Grimm.

In order to enforce an agreement between the patties it is fundamental that there is a- meeting
of the mind$ or an assent The tcnns ofthe agreement mt.1st be sufficiently definite that they can be
enforced consistent with the parties, intent.

Signatures to a written contract are helpful fo that they show virtually unequi'vocnlassent.
A signature, though, is not necessarily required to create a binding contract See, -e.g; Ercanbtackv.
1

Crandall-Wa_lker Motor Co., 550 P.2d 723 (U1ah 1976), Commercial Union Associates v. Clayton.,.

863 ·P.2d 29 (Utah 1993 ).

Assent may also be shown _through the conduct of the parties. The Ut.ah Supreme Court in
Nimley v. Westates-Casing Se1, 1ices /11c., 1999 UT I00, ,J 22, 989 P.2d 1077,. 10-84, held that "'[i]n
determining whe_ther the parties ·created an enforceab]e contract, a court shou·Jd consider all
preliminary negotiations, offers, and ·counteroffers ancl interpret tbe various expressions of the
parties for purposes of deciding wheth~r the partie.s reached agreement ()n complete and definite

tenns.9' Id. (citation omitted).

In the instant case there are· troubling aspects of i-his transaction; but _:the ·court finds that
based up.on the· parties conduct and aU surrounding circumstances there "is a sufficiently clear
statement of th.e intention of the parties to conclude thatthere is an enforceable agreement regarding
Grimm•s employment. ln so conduding, ,the court finds that the final proposal by 01Qry(DxNA that

existed in June 2009 (hereafter-referred to as ~~the Glory agreementn)is the most credible document
evidencit1g a sufficiently definite agreement. While there remained several points in contention i-n
17
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that June 2009 document, they arc rather casi1y disposed~ of particular1y when .the agreement is
interpreted from Glory's perspective. -in other words, while Grimm continued to argue for a few

final points! if the court enforces the Glory version, Glory cannot complain since it is only having
enforced •·against'' it the terms that it itself offered and agt·ced to. Grimm also concedes that the
Glory agreement may be enforceable and, thereby acknowled_ges his assei1t to it. {See Grimm email
dated January 23, 2011, Plaintiffs E>i;hibit 19.)
In reaching this conclusion the court is aware of several issues that need to be addressed.
The first is the lack of a signature on the contract As previously expressed, the lack ofa signature is
not fatal- though it is mysterious.
Plaintiff claims that both parties signed a final written contract in the latter part of June,

2009 prior to a Bo'1rd meeting in New York City. ~trangelyt Grimm does not have a co.py nor has
any party produced a copy of that agreement. Grimm proffers a copy of an agreement that

incorporates all tenns favoring him as the final agreement. Considering

an the circumstances as

well as the pattern of conduct of the parties, the court finds that Grimm's position is not likely.
Glory claims that neither party signed tl1c agreement and that the issue of an. employment

contract died for lack of foterest. As l~sti fied to by Glory, the issue ·'went to sleep. n The mystery is

deepened by the suddeti drop off of any further discussion ~tboµt the agre.ementaftcr the June Board
meeting. The explanation for this peculinr situation has several possible exp1amnions:l. The parties signed•an agreement as Grimm contends and the document was mislaid,

misfiled, or othenv.ise missing in action by mistake.:.
2. The parties did not sign an agreement or otherwise come t-0 an Agree1nent. and the issue

simply died a quiet death as Glory contends.
18
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3. The parties signed the agreement but no copy was given to Grimm and Glory destroyed
it.

The second explanation is the most unlikely. Grimm was promised that he would receive a
replacement employment contract when he resigned from Nucleic and became an employee of
DxNA. Reaching an agreement was clearly important to both Grimm and Glory, as evidenced by
the multiple drafts of the agreement and the email communications concerning them.
(j

It makes little sense that Grimm would simply resign from Nucleic without receiving an
employment contract commensurate with the one he had had with Nucleic. Fm1hermorc, Glory was
the proponent of the first draft of the employment agreement in July 2008, and subs.equent emails in
evidence show that they were anxious to get an agreement with Grimm in place. The agreement was
negotiated over nearly a year, again wi111 Glory insistent on getting the matter resolved. The

negotiations were not extensive in that there were only a few points that the parties were arguing
about lt is somewhat puzzling to the court that Grimm was quite slow in responding to Glory's
requests for action on the agreement during this year-long process. To.the ex1cnt that the agreement
was important to him, it is odd that he neglected the matter for months at a lime. His explanation

was that he was too busy with other matters. It is possible that since Grimm continued to receive his
annual salary of S250,000 per year as he had with Nucleic, was reimbursed business expenses, and
took PTO, he simply went with the flow of the status quo. The others issues of the agreement were
not pressing on a day-to-day basis. Still, Grimm's dilatory conduct seems peculiar.
At any rate, after several drafts were exchanged primarily focusing on several points of
disagreement, in June 2009 Glory's position was that the parties were in agreement on all issues
except for three points, one of which is simply not an issue in this case. They were:
19
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1. The number of weeks of severance pay in the event of termination without cause:
Glory insisted on 15 weeks, while Grimm wunted 26 weeks. The issue at that point was how much

severance, not whether there was to be severance. It was also agreed that severance would attach in
the event of a no-cause tcrn1ination, which was different than G1ory's first position as stated in its
first draft in July 2009.
2. The principal place of location of the CEO, i.e., Grimm: Grimm was persistent in
wanting Snit Luke City to be the principal place of employment. Glory's position was that the
principal place of employment would be split between Salt Lake and St. George (although the draft
refers to St. George and St. George, this was later clarified in the June 2, 2009 email from
Greenslade to Grimm), with time allocated between the locations as dictated by business
requirements. Grimm's last proffered draft specified that the principal place of employment would
be Salt Lake City, with travel to St. George dictated by business requirements.
3. The notice period for non-renewal of the employment agreement at the end of the third
year tenn: Glory wanted 90 days and Grimm wanted 120 days, though Grimm indicated that he
would settle on the 90 days. Although it appears that the parties ultimately agreed on this point, the

~

issue regarding notice of non-renewal is not an issue in this case and, therefore., will not be
mentioned further. It is simply not of consequence because of the apparent agreement of the parties
(iv

as well as the irrelevance to this lawsuit.
The two significant points of disagreement were the amount of severance and where the
principal place of Grimm"s employment would be.
The exchange of emails between Glory's counsel and Grimm is telling about the stance of
the parties and the status of the agreement.

<iJ
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On June 2, 2009 an email from Glory's counsel identified the three remaining points of
contention outlined above. The email goes on to note that ·~[t]hc issues are the only one [sic]
separation the parties. It states that the agreement ~'will be dated June 6, 2008" (not JW1e 1, 2008),
which was the dnte of closing.
The June 2, 2009 email was apparently in response to the draft of the agreement sent by
Grimm on June 1, 2009. In that email Grimm asks counsel to review the agreement and make any
@

changes as needed "se we can get this done in the next few days as we are at tl1e one year
anniversary and I know Marty would like it completed.''
On June 10, 2009, GJory's counsel emailed Grimm, addressing the principal place of
~mployment issue by saying that "the principal place of employment sl10uld be at Saint George
initially and when the company has an official office in Salt Lake City then Salt Lake City can be
the principal place ofemployment, with time spent in Saint George as needed." The email gQes -on
to state that Marty [Ben:..Dayan] will meet with Grimm regarding the severance issue. It also
addresses the notice of non-renewal issue.
The next .nnd last email regarding the agree.ment came from Grimm on June I 1, 2009t
addressing-only the principal place of employment issue.
Quite clearly tbe parties anticipated resolving the matter at their next meeting which would

(;jb

have been the board meeting in June. While there were no further discussions after the board
meeting. the most reasonable explanation is that the parties reached an ngreement as Grimm
contends rather than Glory's explanation that the issue died a quiet deathtt in the months that
0

<r/1

followed.
The third explanation, that the agreeme11t was signed and destroyed by Glory, is possible.
vi;

21
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However, there is no evidence of that rather unflattering possibility, so the com1 will not focus on it.
All in all, the first cxplanatfon is the most likely one. The parties were on the cusp of
finalizing their agreement as evidenced by the exchange of emails in early June, 2009. It simply
makes no sense that the issue would hnve fallen off the edge of a cliff and disappeared.
It also docs not seem likely that all matters remaining (i.e., the three points in contention as

set forth above) were settled and resolved in Grimm's favor prior to the Board meeting in June
2009. The Ben-Dayans, in their own estimation, were tough negotiators. Mr. Jenni_ngs of NA
characterized them as very difficult people who were sometimes prone to be verbally abusive.
Given all of the foregoing, the court concludes that the parties did in fact reach an agreement
on the tenns of employment, but because there is no signed document evidencing what that was

cxactly,the best evidence of the agreement is the final one proposed by Glory. It is significant to the
court that Grimm acknowledged this possible outcome in his January 23, 2011 email sent after he
was terminated. In it he noted the possible interpretation of the agreement that would allow him 15

rather than 26 weeks of severance.
The court is aware that in the spring/summer of 2010, Glory disavowed any employment
agreement with Grimm and that Grimm promptly insisted that was not co1Tecl. The court is also

aware that Glory represented in the Assignment Agreement in July of 20 l Othat no employment
contracts were ··entered into~ on behalf of DxNA, any written or oral employment agreement that is
enforceable against DxNAwith any employee of Ox.NA; provided) however that DxNA and NA
acknowledge receipt of a copy of a dran employment agreement between DxNA and Philip
Grimm." Glory's conclusions regarding the existence of an agreement and the enforceability of any
such agreement nre opinions only and not binding on the court. TI,eir representations are not
22
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consistent with their negotiations and representations to Grimm. Furthermore, their
characterization of having received a draft of an agreement between Grimm is only a half truth.
Glory was the initiator of the agreement negotiations and acknowledged that there were minimal
~

points of disagreement as of June 2009. Grimm signed the Assignment Agreement on behalf of
DxNA as CEO, but that is hardly binding on him, as the representations were not made by Grimm.
The court, therefore: concludes that the draft of the copy of the employment agreement

~

praftered by Glory is the best representation of the final agreement be.tween the parties. That

agrce1nent is as set forth in Defense Exhibit 10, with the understanding·that the principal place of
employment should be corrected to be consistent with the email sent by Glory's counsel on June 2,
2009. The other pertinent provisions are as follows:
l. Salary is $250,000 per year. (Section 2.1.)
2. The Equity Incentive Arrangement results in Grimm receiving 2% accrued membership
~

interest in DxNA. (Section 2.3.)

3. Principal place of employment was to be split between St George and Salt Lake (as
corrected) with time allocated between the locations as dictated by business reqijiremcnts~ .(Section
1.2.)

4. There were to be 20 days of paid vacation. (Section 2.2.)
~

5. Business expenses would be rcimbur~cd in .aaccordnnce \Vith the policies and

procedures from time to time adopted by the Employer, provided that the Executive properly
accounts for such business expenses in accordance with the Employer's policies." (Section 2.4.)
vii

6. The terms of termination were:
a. The Executive may be terminated without cause at any time. ·'The Emp1oyer
23
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may, but shal1 not be required to, give the Executive advance written notice of the
termination of the Executive S employment. The tennination of the Executive ts
7

employment shall be effective as of the date specified in such written notice." (Section 3.3.)
b. The Executive may be terminated for cause as specified in Section 3.4; however,

a written notice by the Board of Directors is required which sets forth the reasons for

te11nination with cause and hspecifically identifying the manner in which the Board of
Directors of the Employer believes that the Executive has engaged in conduct giving rise to

~

the Employer's ability to terminate his employment for Cause, which conduct (to the extent

it can be corrected) is not substantially conected by the Executive within 30 days following
his receipt of such notice.• , (lei.)
7. If the Executive is tem1inated for Cause, salary and ben~fits would cease immediately
and Employer ushall" pay to the Executive al) amounts owing and Executive is required to deliver a

)

~

release to Employer. (Section 3.8 (a).)
8. If the Executive is tcm1im1tcd for other than Cause, he is ·'entitled to receive payments in
amounts equnl to ... [his] salary for a period of 15 weeks following the date ... fof termination]."
(Section 3.8 (b).)
II. Is G1·imm entitled to recover damages and, ifso, i11 what amo1111ts?
~

Before the court can decide this issue it is necessary to analyze the following:
I. Did Grimm breach the agreement regarding the principal place ()f business
requirement?
GJory's agreement with Grimm makes clear that he was to at least split his place of

employment between St. George and Salt Lake as dictated by business. That provision is not
24
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consistent with Glory,s original position or with the position taken by Glory at trial. Mr. Ben-Dayan
testified that it was critical that Grimm be located in St. George rather than Salt Lake. While Grimm
was not in St. ·George more than one or two days on average the agreement does not specify that
Ci)

there had to be an equal amount of time spent in each location. Admittedly, Glory and eventuaUy
NA were unhappy that Grimm was not in St. George more than he was, but they never made an
issue of it in any written notice of tenninution or the like. Instead there existed at best a grudging

<I>

acceptance of Grimm,s practice of spending more time in Salt Lake than St. George. Under these
circuinstanccs, it is of little consequence that Grimm did not meet Glory's or NA 's expectations.
They could have terminated him or given l1im notice that tlu~ practice would not be tolerated, but

instead they resented his conducl in virtual silence. As such there was no breach of the contract.

2. What was the date of Grimm's 1em1ination and was it for cause?
The court finds that the email sent to Grimm by Mr. Jennings on January 7, 2011 was
insufficient to establish that dnte as the date of tem1inntion. Instead the email indicates only that the
company would be ··seeking a resignation and release," It also indicated that as of January 7, 2011,
@

the company was initiating a reorganization of OxNA. It was not until Grimm met with Mr.
Jennings on January 21, 201 I that his termination was accomplished.
-Grimm never received written notice that he engaged in conduct that would give rise to

termination for cause, nor was he given 30 days following receipt of such a notice to correct the
si'tuation (to the extent it could be corrected). The January 7, 201 I noti-c.e only refers to a

reorganization of the company. It in no way can be interpreted lo state a basis for tennination for
cause based on Grimm's conduct. The fact that NA and the Board may have been dissatisfied with

Grimm for any number ofreasons does not mean that the tcnnination was for cause as contemplated
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in the employment agreement. The court, therefore. concludes that NA tenninatcd Grimm for other
than Cause which it had the right to do.
3. ls Grimm entitled to reimbursement of business expenses. and, if so, how much?

Grimm is entitled to reimbursement of business expenses pursuant to Section 2.4 of the
employment agreement. DxNA complains, however, that Grimm did not submit his expenses in a
timely way and did not provide adequate documentation of them. They also take issue with some of

the claimed expenses saying they were personal in natUre and not business related.
While rccogn izing that the business expenses claimed are substantial, the court finds there
was inadequate evidence presented to reduce the amounts claimed. The effort to show that the
company automobile was used for personal purposes and that a claimed trip to Phoenix was

personal> not business-related, fell short. There simply is insufficient evidence to prove those
claims. Furthcnnore, the relatively minor amounts incurred at the airportt such as a bag of trail mix

(

or n few magazines, were explained to have been incurred during international business trips where
it would be customary to pick up a few items at the airport before boarding a lengthy international

trip. They satisfy as business expenses for that reason.

~

The claim that documentation was not adequate or timely is also not persuasive. Prior to

amassing the business expenses that have not been reimbursed, it was Grimm's practice to submii
· expense reports and credit card statements as documentation of those expenses. This was routinely

@ii

done by him and he received reimbursement without complaint. He also would on occasion defer
submitting expense reimbursement requests during times of financial stress within the company.
This was a practice that was not complained of or criticized. Furthennore, Grimm made a demand
for reimbursement of a substantial portion of those expenses in June, 2010. He hns never been
26
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~

reimbursed for any of it. In addition, after Grimm was terminated and he made a demand for
reimbursement, DxNA asked for actual receipts documenting the claims. Those actual receipts
were produced in their entirety.
Grimm is thus entitled to fo]I reimbursement of his c]aimcd expenses.

4. What amount of salary is Grimm entitled to, if any?

It is undisputed that Grimm has not received any payment on his salary from August 8, 201 O
until the dateofbis tcm1ination on January 21. 2011 with the exception of one time. Plaintifrs
computation ofthe amount due is $99,866.47.

Defendant takes the position that Grimm is entitled to SO.
Defendant's position is not tenable~ The evidence amply established that Grimm worked on
DxNA 's business throughout the compensation period. As set forth in the findings above, the court

rejects the defense's arguments. While Grimm did receive unemployment compensation, it is also
evident that he returned the funds received and withdrew his unemployment compensation
application. Defendant's claims that Grimm was terminated for cause and did not earn the amounts
@

he is claiming have also been decided differently by the court in preceding sections of this decision.
Grimm is thus entitled lo the ful1 ~mount of his wage compensation claim.
5. What amount of PTO is Grimm entitled to, if any?
The agreement applicable to Grimm allows him 20 days per year of PTO. While Grimm in

earlier negotiations sought 25 days per year, he capitulated to Glory's position on this.
Grimm seeks unused PTO that he claims accrued in 2008, 2009t and 201 0. His claim totals

$56,129.93. He justifies his claim based on the Employee Handbook which allows accrua1 and
carryover of PTO. The problems with this are legion. First, there appear to be many versions of the
~
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Handbook over the years, some that designate provisions retroactive to June of 2008. While the
agreement refors to accrual of PTO in -~confonnity with the EmpJoyer's normal vacation pay
practice,., it does not refer to the Employee Handbook.
A fair reading of the handbook also is that it applies to employees other than those in
Grimm's position as CEO. It is altogether more understandable when applied to hour1y employees.

Furthennore, on other issues, it is clear that Grimm did not fo11ow the handbook when it
came to expense reimbursement, particularly in that he did not nonnally submit actual receipts for
expense reimbursement as others were required to do, nor did he submit them within a week or ten
days of incurring them. Instead he submitted credit card statements and deferred large amounts of

expense requests to a later date when the company was not experiencing financial problems. It is

simply not appropriate for the court to conclude that the employee handbook should apply to
Grimm piecemeal. As a CEO, Grimm spent little time in St. George. He was not on the 40- hour

workweek which the PTO guidelines contemplate. He came and went in his employment without
supervision as one would expect of a CEO.

At trial Grimm testified that during 2010 he took only ei.ght of the twenty vncation days he

was allowed per year. It is reasonable that he should be compensated for the remaining twelve
unused days for that year. To allow accrual of PTO beyond that is not reasonable. The agreement
does not define what the company's nonnal business practices are for a CEO. Therefore, the court
exercises its latitude and djscretion to impose a reasonable interpretation. lt therefore finds twelve

days of Grimm's salary for 20 IO to be appropriate.

6. ls Grimm entitled to any membership interest in DxNA?
The agreement provides that Grimm is entitled to I% membership interest after a vesting
28
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period of 18 months. Then he is entitled to an addition 1% interest on each of his second and third
anniversary dates. He met the vesting period requirement for I% to accrue. He also was employed
on his second anniversary date for an additional l % accrued.
It is of significance to note that when Grimm voluntarily resigned from Nucleic he gave up

about half of his membership interest as a result of a dilution of the interest when the membership
allocation changed with DxNA. The possibility of accruing 3% membership interest in DxNA was
part of the negotiated terms to make up for the dilution in membership interest in Nuc1cic.
The court finds that Grimm is entitled to 2% membership interest in DxNA. He will also
comply with all requirements for receiving membership interest as set for in the agreement.
Based upon the foregoing decision, it is unnecessary to decide on the claims of the breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and promissory cstoppel.
7. Turning to the issues under the Utah Payment of Wage Act, Utah Code Ann. Section

34-28-1, et seq., is Grimm entitled to the statutory penalty and attorney fees?
Utah Code Ann. Section 34-28-3( 1)(e) allows that if a terminated employee makes a written
demand for payment of unpaid wages, the employer must pay those unpaid wages witl1in 24 hours

or be assessed a penalty of the rate of unpaid wages up to 60 days. Jn order to recover the penalty,
the employee must bring a civil action within 60 days of the date of separation.
The coutt found that Grimm was tenninated on Jnnuary 21, 20 l l. Grimm sent an email on

January 23, 2011 to Mr. Jennings indicating that he was owned nioney for business expenses,
unpaid payroll, PTO, and severance of either 15 or 26 weeks depending upoi1 which ·employment
agreement is used. He also references his equity interest of2% in DxNA. Grimm specifically states
·'there are three possible employment agreements that could be used with one having 15 weeks of
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severance and the other two, 26 weeks.~· (Sec P1aintiff s Exhibit 17.) Grimm then goes on to state
that uutah State Jaw requires settlement of amounts owed within 24 hours of tem1ination of
employment. However, ns we discussed, this requirement could cause immediate financial

challenges for the Company so we agreed to try and find an acceptable means of getting the balance
paid." Grimm then goes on to propose a payment schedu1c and asks that they reach an agreement
regarding uthe mechanics of payoff and security to support the debt. Then we can sit down to
review the details behind the amounts owed and make any adjustments needed .... "

Grimm accompanied the Hdcmandn email with some documentation of the amounts he
requested with interest added. Those supporting documents are not a model of clarity and are, in
fact, confusing at best.
No agreement was reached and Grimm filed a civil action on March 21, 2011, 59 days after
his termination. No amounts have ever been paid by DxNA.
The fundamental problem with the email for purposes o.f satisfying the statute at issue is that

the email is not a demand to be paid wages within 24 hours. While the statute specifies that the
wages are due immediately, it is the written demand from the employee that triggers the 24-hour
period and the penalty if the amount is not paid. Grimm's email does not demand payment within
24 hours. lnslead it suggests that an altemntive arrangement of payments Qver time with interest
would be acceptable. Grimm also confounds the ..demand'. with an acknowledgement that the
amounts owing were subject to adjustment.

It seems evident that the statute is designed to provide for immediate payment of a clearly
defined amount of wages due to a tcm1inated employee who might otherwise be left in a welfare
situation. The penalty was also quite clearly designed to be punitive lo an employer who fails to pay
~
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wages to what might be a desperate employee. While Grimm's email certainly put DxNA on notice

of his claims, it cannot be construed to be a demand of the kind contemplated in the statute. For that
reason. the statutory penalty was not triggered and is therefore not owed.
The same reasoning applies to the c1aim for attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
Section 34•27-1. That statute contemplates a written demand for wages 15 days before suit is

brought. A demand contemplates a clear request for immediate payment, not a proposal for
payment over time with specific arrangements to be worked out in the future. For this reason, no
attorney fees wiJl be awarded.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this

/ ,:}._ day of
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY
~

I hereby ccnify that on this tl_ day Or

Feknt.t(/~ 2016, I provided a true and corrccl

copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER to each of
the parties/attorneys named below hy placing a copy in such attorney's file in the Clerk's Office at
the Fifth District Courthouse in St. George, Utah and/or by placing a copy in the United States Mail,
first-class postnge prepaid, and addressed as follows:

Andrew W. Stavros
Austin B. Egan
STAVROS LAW, P.C.

1693 South 700 East, Suite 200
Draper, Utah 84020

Bryan J. Pattison
Elijah L Milne

DURHAJv1 JONES & PINEGAR, P.C.
192 East 200 North, Third Flo.or
St. George, UtaJ1 84770
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From:

Greenslade, George A. [ggreenslade@wolfblock.com]
Monday, February 23, 2009 2:37 PM
Phillip Grimm
Martin Ben-Dayan
Employment Agreement
Employment Agreement. DOC

Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Attachments:

•

•
•

Phil - As you requested, attached is the latest electronic version of
your employment agi-eement. The last time J revised your employment
agreement was some time ago, and Marty may not have fully reviewed all
of the changes in the attached draft, so it remains subject to his
further review and comment.
Jfyou would like a red.lined copy of your employment agi-eement, let me
know the date of the latest draft that you have reviewed and I will
prepare and send a redlined version .

George Greenslade
Wolffilock LLP
250 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10177
(212) 883-4954 (ph)
(212) 672- 1154 (fax)
ggreenslade@wolfblock.com
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Draft-10/7/08

EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
This Employment Agreement (this "Agreement,,) is entered into as of June 6,
2008 by and between DxNA LLC, a Delaware limited liability company (the "Employer"), and
Phillip H. Grimm (the "Executive'').

RECITALS
WHEREAS, the Employer desires to employ the Executive as Chief Executive
Officer of the Employer, and the Executive desires to accept employment with the Employer, on
the terms and conditions set forth below.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing recitals and the respective
covenants and agreements of the parties contained in this document, the Employer and the
Executive agree as follows:

ARTICJ..,EI
EMPLOYMENT AND DUTIES
1.1
Position and Duties. The Executive shall serve as Chief Executive Officer of the
Employer. The Executive shall initially report directly to the Board of Directors of the
Employer. The Executive shall discharge such duties as are assigned to him from time to time as
the Board of Directors of the Employer in a diligent and professional manner, on a full-time
basis.
1.2
Location. The principal place of employment of the Executive shall be at St.
George, Utah and St. George, Utah, with time allocated between such locations as dictated by
business requirements.
1.3
Outside Business Activities Precluded. During the Employment Tenn (as
hereinafter defined), the Executive shall devote his full business time, energy and ability to the
performance of this Agreement. The Executive shall not, without the prior written consent of the
Employer, perform other business services of any kind or engage in any other business activity,
with or without compensation. The Executive shall not, without the prior written consent of the
Employer, engage or prepare to engage in any business activity adverse to the Employer's
interests; provided, however, that nothing in this Section 1.3 shall prevent the Executive from
participating in the following activities for so long as such activities do not impair the
Executive's ability to fulfill his duties or obligations under this Agreement or W1der the NonCompete Agreement referred to in Section 4.2 below: (a) engaging in religious, charitable or
other community activities; (b) serving on the board of directors of an entity that does not
compete with the business of the Employer, or (c) managing the Executive's personal
investments if such investments are not in entities that compete with the business of the
Employer.
~
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ARTICLE II
COMPENSATION
2.1
~ - For the Executive's services hereunder, the Employer shall pay as salary
to the Executive the amount of $250,000 per year during each of the calendar years of the
Employment Term, prorated for any year in which this Agreement is in effect for only a portion
of a calendar year. The Executive,s salary shall be payable in equal installments in conformity
with the Employer's nonnal payroll practices, wiless otherwise agreed to by the Board of
Directors of the Emp]oyer. The Executive's base salary shall be reviewed by the Employer from
time to time at its discretion, and the Executive shall receive such salary increases, if any, as the
Employer, in its sole discretion, shall determine.
Other Benefits. During the Employment Tenn, the Executive shall be entitled to
participate in and receive all other benefits of employment generally available to the Employer's
other personnel, including, but not limited to, inclusion in the Employer's retirement plans,
medical plans, disability plans and other similar benefit plans, subject to and on a basis
consistent with the tenns, conditions and overall administration of such plans. The Executive
shall be entitled to 20 days of paid vacation each year during the Employment Tenn) which will
accrue in conformity with the Employer's normal vacation pay practices. The Employer may, in
its sole discretion, grant such additional benefits to the Exe~utive from time to time as the
Employer deems proper and desirable.

2.2

2.3

Equity Incentive Arrangement.

(a)
On each of the first, second and third anniversaries of the date of this
Agreement, the Executive shall be granted, for no additional consideration, a 1% membership
interest in the Employer; provided, however, that no such grant will be made unless the
Executive is then employed as the Chief Executive Officer of the Employer.

(b)
The membership interest granted to the Executive on the first anniversary
of the date of this Agreement will not vest until 18 months after the date of this Agreement and
will only vest if the Executive is still employed as the Chief Executive Officer of the Employer
on the date that is 18 months after the date of this Agreement. Until the membership interests
have vested, the Executive shall have no rights to receive distributions in respect of such
membership• interests or to exercise voting or other rights with respect thereto.
(c)
Any membership interest issued to the Executive on the second and third
anniversaries of the of the date of this Agreement will not be subject to vesting.
(d)
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 2.3(a) and Section 2.3(b), in the
event that a Liquidity Event occw-s on or prior to the third anniversary of the date of this
Agreement., any membership interests previously granted to the Executive or to be granted to the
Executive on the first, second and third anniversaries of the date of this Agreement will, to the
extent that they have not already done so, be granted, accelerate and/or vest upon a Liquidity
Event.
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(e)
Prior to becoming a member of the Employer, the Executive will be
required to execute a Joinder to Operating Agreement in substantially the fonn of Exhibit B to
the operating agreement of the Employer.
(f)
If requested by Glory BioVentures LLC ("Glory"), the Executive agrees
that he will execute and deliver to Glory a proxy in substantially the form attached hereto as
Exhibit A pursuant to which the Executive grants to Glory the right to vote the membership
interests in the Employer that are issued to him pursuant to the provisions of this Section 2.3.
The Executive agrees that he will re-execute a proxy whenever requested by Glory. The
provisions of this Section 2.3(f) shall remain in effect for the Employment Tenn and for a period
of3 years after the termination of the Employment Teim.

2.4
Expenses. The Executive shall be entitled to receive prompt reimbursement for
all travel and reasonable business-related expenses incurred by him during the Employment
Term, including reimbursement for the Executive's travel related expenses incurred in
connection with domestic and foreign travel in the course of discharging his duties to the
Employer, such reimbursements to be made in accordance with the policies and procedures from
time to time adopted by the Employer, provided that the Executive properly accounts for such
business expenses in accordance with the Employer's policies. In addition, the Employer will
provide to the Executive the use of an automobile and will pay the associated operating expenses
for such automobile.
2.5
Deductions and Withholdings. All amounts payable or which become payable
under any provision of this Agreement shall be subject to any deductions authorized by the
Executive and any deductions, taxes and withholdings required by law.

ARTICLE III
TERM OF EMPLOYMENT
3.I
Tenn. The tenn of this Agreement shall commence on the date hereof and sha11
continue through the 3rd anniversary of such date, unless renewed or tenninated as hereinafter
provided (the "Employment Termn).
3.2
Renewal of Tenn. This Agreement shall be renewed and the Employment Tenn
shall be extended for successive one-year periods upon mutual agreement of the parties at Jeast
90 days prior to the end of the Employment Term.
·
3.3
Early Tennination by the Employer for other than Cause. The Executive's
employment by the Employer may be terminated at any time during the Employment Term by
the Board of Directors of the Employer, for any or no reason and without Cause (as hereinafter
defined), upon delivery of written notice to the Executive. The Employer may, but shall not be
required to, give the Executive advance written notice of the termination of the Executive's
employment. The termination of the Executive's employment shall be effective as of the date
specified in such written notice.
3.4
Early Tennination by the Employer for Cause. The Executive's employment may
be terminated for Cause at any time by the Board of Directors of the Employer. For these
purposes, termination for "Cause" shall mean tennination because of the Executive's. (a)
NYC:770114.7/GLOI28·251687
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personal dishonesty or willful misconduct in the performance of hls duties or obligations
hereunder; (b) intentional or repeated fai]ure to perform satisfactorily his duties or obligations
hereunder; (c) gross carelessness or neglect in the performance of his duties or obligations
hereunder; (d) violation of any law, rule, or regulation applicable to the business of the
Employer; (e) committing embezzlement or being charged with a felony or other offence
involving moral turpitude; (f) committing any material breach of this Agreement by the
Executive; or (g) committing acts that have a material and adverse effect on the Employer's
reputation or the reputation of an affiliate of the Employer. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the
Executive shall not be deemed to have been terminated for Cause unless the Board of Directors
of the Employer delivers a written notice to the Executive setting forth the reasons for the
Employer,s intention to tenninate for Cause and specifically identifying the manner in which the
Board of Directors of the Employer believes that the Executive has engaged in conduct giving
rise to the Employer's ability to terminate his employment for Cause, which conduct (to the
extent it can be corrected) is not substantially corrected by the Executive within 30 days
following his receipt of such notice.
3.5
Early Tennination by the Executive for other than Good Reason. The Executive
may terminate his employment under this Agreement at any time by giving the Employer written
notice of his resignation at least 60 days in advance; provided, however, the Board of Directors
of the Employer may determine upon receipt of such notice that the effective date of such
resignation shall be immediate or some time prior to the expiration of the 60-day notice period.
The Executive's employment shall terminate as of the effective date of his resignation as
determined by the Board of Directors of the Employer.
3.6
Early Termination by the Executive for Good Reason. The Executive may
terminate his employment under this Agreement at any time for Good Reason (as hereinafter
defined). Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Executive's employment under this Agreement
shall not be deemed to have been tenninated for Good Reason wtless the Executive delivers a
written notice to the Board of Directors of the Employer setting forth the reasons for the
Executive's intention to terminate for Good Reason and specifically identifying the manner in
which the Executive believes that the Employer has engaged in conduct giving rise to the
Executive's ability to terminate his employment for Good Reason, which conduct (to the extent
it can be corrected) is not substantially corrected by the Employer within 30 days foJlowing
delivery to the Board of Directors of the Employer of such notice. For the purpose of this
Agreement, "Good Reason" shall mean: (a) without the Executive's express written consent, a
material reduction of the Executive's duties, position or responsibilities relative to the
Executive's duties, position or responsibilities in effect immediately prior to such reduction, or
the removal of the Executive from such position, duties and responsibilities; and (b) without the
Executive's express 'Written consent, a reduction of the Executive's salary or incentive bonus
opportunity in effect immediately prior to such reduction.
3. 7
Tennination Due to Death or Disability. The Executive's employment hereunder
shall terminate immediately upon his death. In the event that by reason of injury, illness or other
physical or mental impairment the Executive sha11 be: (a) completely unable to perform hls
services hereunder for more than two consecutive months, or (b) unable to perform his services
hereunder for 50% or more of the normal working day throughout four consecutive months, then
the Employer may tenninate the Executive 7 S employment hereunder upon written notice to the

\----......--
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Executive. The Executive's beneficiaries, estate, heirs, representatives or assigns, as appropriate,
shall be entitled to the proceeds, if any, due under any Employer-paid life insurance policy held
by the Executive, as determined by and in accordance with the terms of any such policy, as well
as any vested benefits such as accrued vacation benefits.
3.8
Payment of Compensation and Benefits Upon and Following Termination of
Employment.
(a)
Upon termination of employment under Section 3.4 (Early Termination by
the Employer for Cause), Section 3.5 (Early Tennination by the Executive for other than Good
Reason) or Section 3.7 (Temunation Due to Death or Disability), all salary and benefits of the
Executive hereunder shall cease immediately and the Employer shall pay to the Executive all
amounts accrued and unpaid hereunder. The Executive shall be required to execute and deliver a
general release to the Employer in connection with any such termination of employment.

(b)
Upon termination of emp1oyment under Section 3.3 (Early Tennination by
the Employer for other than Cause) or Section 3.6 (Early Termination by the Executive for Good
Reason), so long as the Executive shalJ execute and deliver a general release to the Employer in

•
.

'

connection therewith, the Executive shall be entitled to receive payments in amounts equal to the
continuation of the Executive's then current salary for a period of 15 weeks following the d~te
that the Executive's employment is terminated and to the continuation of the Executive's then
current medical and dental plans for a period of 15 weeks following the date that the Executive's
employment is terminated .
( c)
Upon termination of employment under this Agreement for a failure to
renew the Employment Term at least 90 days prior to the end of the Employment Term as
contemplated by Section 3.2 (Renewal of Term), all salary and benefits of the Executive
hereunder shall cease as of the end of the then current Employment Term. The Executive shall
be required to execute and deliver a general release to the Employer in connection with any such
termination of employment. The Employer and the Executive agree that a failure to renew the
Employment Term at least 90 days prior to the end of the Employment Term as contemplated by
Section 3.2 (Renewal of Term) shall not be deemed to constitute a termination of employment by
the Employer under Section 3.3 of this Agreement (Early Termination by the Employer for other
than Cause) or to provide a basis for termination by the Executive under Section 3.6 of this
Agreement (Early Termination by the Executive for Good Reason).

ARTICLE IV
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
4.1
Intellectual Property. It shall be a condition precedent to the effectiveness of this
Agreement that the Executive execute and deliver to the Employer an Acknowledgment of
Rights to Intellectual Property and Assignment of Intellectual Property in substantially the form
attached hereto as Exhibit B.
4.2

Non-Competition. It shall be a condition precedent to the effectiveness of this

Agreement that the Executive execute and deliver to the Employer a Non-Competition
Agreement in substantially the fonn attached hereto as Exhibit C.
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ARTICLEV
GENERAL PROVISIONS

Ci)

5.1
Entire Agreement. This Agreement and the exhlbits hereto contain the entire
understanding and sole and entire agreement between the parties with respect to the subject
matter hereof and supersede any and all prior agreements, negotiations and discussions between
the parties hereto with respect to the subject matter covered hereby. Each party to this
Agreement acknowledges that no representations, inducements, promises or agreements, oral or
otherwise, have been made by any party, or anyone acting on behalf of any party, which are not
embodied. herein, and that no other agreement, statement or promise not contained in this
Agreement shall be valid or binding. This Agreement may not be modified or amended by oral
agreement, but rather only by an agreement in writing signed by the Executive and the Employer
which specifically states the intent of the parties to amend this Agreement
5.2
Assignment and Binding Effect. Neither this Agreement nor the rights or
obligations hereunder shall be assignable by the Executive. The Employer may assign this
Agreement to any successor of the Employer, and upon such assignment any such success0r
shall be deemed substituted for the Employer upon the terms and subject to the conditions
hereof.
5.3

Governing Law; Consent to Jurisdiction.

This Agreement shaJl be governed by the laws of the State of New York
(a)
applicable to agreements made and to be performed entirely within the State of New York.
(b)
Any legal action, suit or proceeding in equity or in law arising out of or
relating to this Agreement and the transactions contemplated hereby shall be instituted only in (a)
any state or federal court in the State of New York, (b) any federal or state court in the State of
Utah or (c) any state or federal court in a state ·in which the undersigned is then resident, and the
Executive agrees not to assert, by way of motion, as a defense, or otherwise, in any such action,
suit or proceeding, any claim that the Executive is not subject personally to the jurisdiction of
such court, that his property is exempt or immune from attachment, that the action, suit or
proceeding is brought in an inconvenient forum, that the venue of the action, suit or proceeding
is improper, or that this Agreement may not be enforced by such court. The Executive further
irrevocably submits to the jurisdiction of any such court in any such action, suit or proceeding.
Nothing contained herein shall be deemed to affect the right of any party to serve process in any
manner permitted by law.
5.4
No Waiver. No waiver of any term, provision or condition of this Agreement,
whether by conduct or otherwise, in any one or more instances shall be deemed or be construed
as a further or continuing waiver of any such term, provision or condition, or as a waiver of any
other term, provision or condition of this Agreement.

5.5
Notices. Any notice or other communication required or that may be given
hereunder shall be in writing and sha11 be delivered personally, sent by receipted facsimile
transmission or overnight courier, or sent by certified, registered or express mail, postage
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prepaid, and shall be deemed given when so delivered personally, or sent by receipted facsimile
transmission or overnight courier, or, if mailed, upon receipt, as follows:
Address for the Employer:

DxNALLC
c/o Glory BioVentures LLC
39 Broadway, 37th Floor
New York, NY 10006
Attention: Martin Ben-Dayan
Address for the Executive:

Phillip H. Grimm
PO Box 1155
Draper, UT 84020
5.6
Ru]es of Construction. Captions of the several Articles and Sections of this
Agreement are for convenience of reference only, and shall not be considered or referred to in
resolving questions of interpretation with respect to this Agreement.
5.7
Severability. The provisions of this Agreement are severable. If any provision of
this Agreement shall be held to be invalid or otherwise unenforceable, in whole or in part, the
remainder of the provisions or enforceable parts hereof shall not be affected thereby and shall be
enforced to the fullest extent permitted by law.
5.8
Multiple Counterparts; Facsimile Signatures. This Agreement may be executed in
one or more counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original, but all of which together
shall constitute one and the same instrument. Facsimile signatures on this Agreement shall be
given the same effect as original signatures.

cc

~

~

[The remainder of this page has intentionally been left blank.]
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Agreement has been executed and delivered by
the parties hereto as of the date :first above written.

EMPLOYER:
DxNALLC

By: - - - - - - - - - - - - Name:
Title:

EXECUTIVE
Phillip H. Grimm
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EXHIBIT A
PROXY
PHILLIP H. GRIMM (''Grimm") hereby irrevocably constitutes and appoints GLORY
BIOVENTURES LLC as his true and lawful proxy, for and in his name, place and stead, to vote
the equity iI1terests of DxNA LLC, a Delaware limited liability company ("DxNA',), issued to
him pursuant to his Employment Agreement with DxNA. The foregoing proxy shall include the
right to sign Grimm's name (as a member ofDxNA) to any consent, certificate or other
document relating to DxNA that applicable law or the charter documents of Dx.NA may permit
or require so as to cause Grimm's equity interests in DxNA to be voted in accordance with the
preceding sentence. Grimm hereby revokes all other proxies and powers of attorney with respect
to the equity interests of DxNA issued to him pursuant to his Employment Agreement with
DxNA that he may have appointed or granted. Grimm covenants that he will not give a
subsequent proxy or power of attorney (and if given, such subsequent proxy or power of attorney
will not be effective) or enter into any other voting agreement with respect to the equity interests
of DxNA issued to him pursuant to his Employment Agreement with DxNA.
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This Proxy is irrevocable and coupled with an interest.

Phillip H. Grimm

(CJ
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From:
Sent:

To:
Subject:
Attachments:

Greenslade, George [GGreenslade@eapdlaw.com]
Tuesday, June 02, 2009 2:24 PM
Phillip Grimm
FW: Contact Info
5009-06-01 Employment Agreement.DOC; acknowledgment of rights to IP - Phil Grimm.DOC;
non-competition agt for Phil Grimm.DOC

Phil - I have reviewed the draft of your employment agreement that was attached to your June 1, 2009 email and have
only the following comments:

•

1. Section 1.2 of the employment agreement provides that the principal place of your employment shall be at Salt Lake
City, \.Vith travel to Saint George, Utah as dictated by business requirements. The previous draft had provided that the
principal place of !.:mployment would be split between Salt Lake City and Saint George, with time allocated between such
locations as dictated by business requirements.

•

2. Section 3.8(b) of the employment agreement provides for 26 weeks of salary and benefits upon a termination by the
company of your employment without cause or upon a termination of employment by you for good reason. The previous
draft provided for 15 weeks of salary and benefits.

3. Section 3.B(c) of the employment agreement refers to the 120 day notice period of Section 3.2 of the employment
agreement. However, Section 3.2 provides for a 90 day notice period. Therefore, the reference to 120 days in Section
3.8(c) should be changed back to 90 days.

•

I will raise these issues with Marty and get back to you. These issues are the only one separating the parties.
As you requested, I have also attached Exhibit Band Exhibit C to your employment agreement. These are almost
identical to the agreements signed by the other parties at the closing.
The employment agreement and the exhibits thereto will be dated June 6, 2008 (not June 1, 2008), which was the date of
the closing.
George Greenslade
Edwards Angell Palmer & Dodge LLP
750 Lexington Avenue
New York, NY 10022

•

•.

Direct dial: 212.912.2779
Fax:
866.881 .2699
www.eapdlaw.com

From: Phillip Grimm [mailto:Phillip.Grimm@dxnd.com]

•

Sent: Monday, June 01, 2009 2:03 PM
To: Greenslade, George
Subject: Re: Contact Info
George -

Please review the attached and see if there are any changes needed so we can get this done in the next few days as we are
'at the one year anniversary and I know Marty would like it completed .. I assume we will date this as of June 1, 2008.
, Also, I need exhibits Band C.

~.:.)
1 of 3
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Thanks

Phil

.hillip H. Grimm
Chief Executive Officer - CEO
DxNALLC
Tel: +1.435.628.0324 ext. 130 (office)
Tel: +1.602.524.2433 (mobile- preferred)

Fax: +1.435.628.4490
Email: ph illip.grimm@dxna.com
Web: www.dxna.cgm
Utah Office:
3879 South ruver Road, Building A
Saint George, Utah 84790
New York Office:
39 Broadway, 37th Floor
New York, New York 10006

From: "Greens)ade, George" <GGreensJade@eapdlaw.com>
Date: Wed, 27 May 2009 08:52:07 -0600

To: Phillip Grimm <phillip.grimm@dxna.com>
Cc: "Levinson, Leslie" <LLevinson@eapdlaw.com>
.ubject: Contact Info
Phil - Here is my new contact information:
George Greenslade
Edwards Angell Palmer & Dodge LLP
750 Lexington Avenue

New York, NY 10022
Direct dial: 212.912.2779
Fax:
866.881.2699
www.eapdlaw.com <http://www.eapdlaw.com/>

13oston MA, Ft. Lauderdale FL, Hartford CT, Madison NJ, New York NY, Newport Beach CA, Providence RI,
Stamford CT, Washington DC, West Palm Beach FL, Wilmington DE, London UK, Hong Kong (associated
office)
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE
This e-mail message from Edwards Angell Palmer & Dodge LLP and Edwards Angell Palmer & Dodge UK LLP is intended
only for the individual or entity to which it is addressed. This e-mail may contain information that is privileged, confidential
and exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any
~issemination. distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you received this e-mail by accident,
~please notify the sender immediately and destroy this e-mail and all copies of it. We take steps to protect against viruses
but advise you to carry out your own checks and precautions as we accept no liability for any which remain. We may
monitor emails sent to and from our server(s) to ensure regulatory compliance to protect our clients and business.
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Edwards Angell Palmer & Dodge UK LLP is a limited liability partnership registered in England (registered number
/ -.___ OC333092) and is regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority. A list of members' names and their professional
\' qualifications may be inspected at our registered office, One Fetter Lane, London EC4A 1JB, UK. telephone +44 207 583

.4055.
Disclosure Under U.S. IRS Circular 230: Edwards Angell Palmer & Dodge LLP informs you that any tax advice contained
in this communication, including any attachments, was not intended or written to be used, and cannot be used, for the
purpose of avoiding federal tax related penalties or promoting, marketing or recommending to another party any
transaction or matter addressed' herein.

(j)
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EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
This Employment Agreement (this "'Agreement,') is entered into as of June 6,
2008 by and \Jetween DxNA LLC, a Delaware limited liability company (the "Employer"), and
Phillip H. Grimm (the ''Executive").
RECITALS

<iv

WHEREAS, the Employer desires to employ th~ Executive as Chief Executive
Officer of the Employer, and the Executive desires to accept ½mployment with the Employer, on

the terms and conditions set forth below.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing recitals and the respective
covenants and agreements of the parties contained in this document, the Employer and the
Executive agree as follows:

ARTICLE I
EMPLOYMENT AND DUTIES
1.1
Position and Duties. The Executive shall serve as Chief Executive Officer of the
Employer. The Executive shall initially report directly to the Board of Directors of the
Employer. The Executive shall discharge such duties as are assigned to him from time to time as
the Board of Directors of the Employer in a diligent and professional manner, on a full-time
basis.

I~

1.2
Location. The principal place of employment of the Executive shall be at Salt
Lake City, Utah with travel to the Saint George, Utah facility as dictated by business
requirements.
1.3
Outside Business Activities Precluded. During the Employment Term (as
hereinafter defined), the Executive shall devote his full business time, energy and ability to the
performance of thls Agreement. The Executive shall not, without the prior written consent of the
Employer, perfonn other business services of any kind or engage in any other business activity,
with or without compensation. The Executive shall not, without the prior written consent of the
Employer, engage or prepare to engage in any business activity adverse to the Employer's
interests; provided, however, that nothing in this Section 1.3 shall prevent the Executive from
participating in the following activities for so long as such activities do not impair the
Executive's ability to fulfill his duties or obligations under this Agreement or under the NonCompete Agreement referred to in Section 4.2 below: (a) engaging in religious, charitable or
other community activities; (b) serving on the board of directors of an entity that does not
compete with the business of the Employer, or (c) managing the Executive's personal
investments if such investments are not in entities that compete with the business of the
Employer.
~
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ARTICLE II
COMPENSATION
~ - For the Executive's services hereunder, the Employer shall pay as salary
2.1
to the Executive the amount of $250,000 per year during each of the calendar years of the
Employment Tenn, prorated for any year in which this Agreement is in effect for only a portion
of a calendar year. The Executive's salary shall be payable in equal instaJlments in conformity
with the Employer's normal pa}TOll practices, unless otherwise agreed to by the Board of
Directors of the Employer. The Executive's base salary shall be reviewed by the Employer from
time to time at its discretion, and the Executive S'hall receive such salary increases, if any, as the
Employer, in its sole discretion, shall detennine.
2.2
Other Benefits. During the Employment Term, the Executive shall be entitled to
participate in and receive all other benefits of employment generally available to the Employer's
other personnel, including, but not limited to, inclusion in the Employer's retirement plans,
medical plans, disability plans and other similar benefit plans, subject to and on a basis
consistent with the terms, conditions and overall administration of such plans. The Executive
shall be entitled to 20 d_ays of paid vacation each year during the Employment Tenn, which 'Will
accrue in conformity with the Employer's normal vacation pay practices. The Employer may, in
its sole discretion, grant such additional benefits to the Executive from time to time as the
Employer deems proper and desirable.
2.3

Equity Incentive Arrangement

(a)
On each of the first, second and third anniversaries of the date of this
Agreement, the Executive shall be granted, for no additional consideration, a I% membership
interest in the Employer; provided, however, that no such grant will be made unless the
Executive is then employed as the Chief Executive Officer of the Employer.
(b)
The membershlp interest granted to the Executive on the first anniversary
of the date of this Agreement will not vest until 18 months after the date of this Agreement and
will only vest if the Executive is still employed as the Chief Executive Officer of the Employer
on the date that is 18 months after the date of this Agreement. Until the membership interests
have vested, the Executive shall have no rights to receive distributions in respect of such
membership interests or to exercise voting or other rights with respect thereto.

Any membership interest issued to the Executive on the second and third
(c)
anniversaries of the of the date of this Agreement will not be subject to vesting.
(d)
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 2.3(a) and Section 2.3(b), in the
event that a Liquidity Event occurs on or prior to the third anniversary of the date of this
Agreement, any membership interests previous)y granted to the Executive or to be granted to the
Executive on the first, second and tbfrd anniversaries of the date of this Agreement will, to the
extent that they have not already done so, be granted, accelerate and/or vest upon a Liquidity
Event.
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(e)
Prior to becoming a member of the Employer, the Executive will be
required to execute a Joinder to Operating Agreement in substantially the form of Exhibit B to
the operating agreement of the Employer.

If requested by Glory BioVentures LLC ("Glory"), the Executive agrees
(f)
that he will execute and deliver to Glory a proxy in substantially the form attached hereto as
Exhibit A pursuant to which the Executive grants to Glory the right to vote the membership
interests in the Employer that are issued to him pursuant to the provisions of tlris Section 2.3.
The Executive agrees that he will re-execute a proxy whenever requested by Glory. The
provisions ofthis Section 2.3(f) shall remain in effect for the Employment Tenn and for a period
of 3 years after the tennination of the Employment Term.
2.4
Expenses. The Executive shall be entitled to receive prompt reimbursement for
all travel and reasonable business-related expenses incurred by him during the Employment
Tenn, including reimbursement for the Executive's travel related expenses incurred in
connection with domestic and foreign travel in the course of discharging his duties to the
Employer, such reimbursements to be made in accordance with the policies and procedures from
time to time adopted by the Emp]oyer, provided that the Executive properly accounts for such
business expenses in accordance with the Employer's policies. In addition, the Employer will
provide to the Executive the use of an automobile and will pay the associated operating expenses
for such automobile.

2.5
Deductions and Withholdings. All amounts payable or which become payable
W1der any provision of this Agreement shall be subject to any deductions authorized by the
Executive and any deductions, taxes and withholdings required by law.

ARTICLEill
TERM OF EMPLOYMENT
3.1

Tenn. The term of this Agreement sha11 commence on the date hereof and shall
continue through the 3rd anniversary of such date, unless renewed or tenninated as hereinafter
provided (the "Employment Term").
3.2
Renewal of Term. This Agreement shall be renewed and the Employment Tenn
shall be extended for successive one-year periods upon mutual agreement of the parties at least
90 days prior to the end of the Employment Term.

Early Termination by the Employer for other than Cause. The Executive's
3.3
employment by the Employer may be tenninated at any time during the Employment Tenn by
the Board of Directors of the Employer, for any or no reason and without Cause (as hereinafter
defined), upon delivery of written notice to the Executive. The Employer may, but shall not be
required to, give the Executive advance written notice of the tennination of the Executive's
employment. The termination of the Executive's employment shall be effective as of the date
specified in such written notice.

•
.

Early Termination by the Employer for Cause. The Executive's employment may
3.4
be terminated for Cause at any time by the Board of Directors of the Employer. For these
purposes, termination for ''Cause" shall mean termination because of the Executive's (a)
NYC:770114. 7/GLO 128·251687
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personal dishonesty or willful misconduct in the performance of his duties or obligations
hereunder; (b) intentional or repeated failure to perfonn satisfactorily his duties or obligations
hereunder; (c) gross carelessness or neglect in the performance of his duties or obligations
hereunder; (d) violation of any law, rule, or regulation applicable to the business of the
Employer; (e) committing embezzlement or being charged with a felony or other offence
involving moral turpitude; (f) committing any material b,each of this Agreement by the
Executive; or (g) committing acts that have a material and adverse effect on the Employer's
reputation or the reputation of an affiliate of the Employer. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the
Executive shall not be deemed to have been terminated for Cause unless the Board of Directors
of the Employer delivers a written notice to the Executive setting forth the reasons for the
Employer's intention to tenninate for Cause and specifically identifying the manner in which the
Board of Directors of the Employer believes that the Executive has engaged in conduct giving
rise to the Employer's ability to tenninate his employment for Cause, which conduct (to the
extent it can be corrected) is not substantially corrected by the Executive within 30 days
following his receipt of such notice.

3.5
Early Termination by the Executive for other than Good Reason. The Executive
may terminate his employment under this Agreement at any time by giving the Employer written
notice of his resignation at least 60 days in advance; provided, however, the Board of Directors
of the Employer may determine upon receipt of such notice that the effective date of such
resignation shall be immediate or some time prior to the expiration of the 60-day notice period.
The Executive's employment shall terminate as of the effective date of his resignation as
determined by the Board of Directors oftbe Employer.

Early Tennination by the Executive for Good Reason. The Executive may
3.6
terminate his employment under this Agreement at any time for Good Reason (as hereinafter
defined). Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Executive's employment under this Agreement
shall not be deemed to have been terminated for Good Reason unless the Executive delivers a
written notice to the Board of Directors of the Employer setting forth the reasons for the
Executive's intention to terminate for Good Reason and specifically identifying the manner in
which the Executive believes that the Employer has engaged in conduct giving rise to the
Executive's ability to terminate·hls employment for Good Reason, which conduct (to the extent
it can be corrected) is not substantially corrected by the Employer within 30 days following
delivery to the Board of Directors of the Employer of such notice. For the purpose of this
Agreement, "Good Reason" shall mean: (a) without the Executive's express written consent, a
material reduction of the Executive's duties, position or responsibilities relative to the
Executive's duties, position or responsibilities in effect immediately prior to such reduction, or
the removal of the Executive from such position, duties and responsibilities; and (b) without the
Executive's express written consent, a reduction of the Executive's salary or incentive bonus
opportunity in effect immediately prior to such reduction.
Tem1ination Due to Death or Disability. The Executive's employment hereunder
3.7
shall terminate immediately upon his death. In the event that by reason of injury, i11ness or other
physical or mental impairment the Executive shall be: (a) completely unable to perfonn his
services hereunder for more than two consecutive months, or (b) unable to perform his services
hereunder for 50% or more of the normal working day throughout four consecutive months, then
the Employer may terminate the Executives employment hereunder upon written notice to the
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Executive. The Executive's beneficiaries, estate, heirs, representatives or assigns, as appropriate,
shall be entitled to the proceeds, if any, due under any Employer-paid life inswance policy held
by the Executive, as determined by and in accordance with the terms of any such policy, as well
as any vested benefits such as accrued vacation benefits.
3.8
Payment of Compensation and Benefits Upon and Following Termination of
Employment.
(a)
Upon tennination of employment under Section 3.4 (Early Termination by
the Employer for Cause), Section 3.5 (Early Termination by the Executive for other than Good
Reason) or Section 3.7 (Termination Due to Death or Disability), all salary and benefits of the
Executive hereunder shall cease immediately and the Employer shall pay to the Executive all
amounts accrued and unpaid hereunder. The Executive shall be required to execute and deliver a
general release to the Employer in connection with any such termination of employment.

(l;I

(b)
Upon termination of employment under Section 3.3 (Early Tennination by
the Employer for other than Cause) or Section 3.6 (Early Termination by the Executive for Good
Reason), so long as the Executive shall execute and deliver a general release to the Employer in
connection therewith, the Executive shall be entitled to receive payments in amounts equal to the
continuation of the Executive's then current salary for a period of 26 weeks following the date
that the Executive's employment is terminated and to the continuation of the Executive's then
current medical and dental plans for a period of26 weeks following the date that the Executive's
employment is terminated.
(c)
Upon termination of employment under this Agreement for a failure to
renew the Employment Term at least 120 days prior to the end of the Employment Term as
contemplated by Section 3.2 (Renewal of Term), all salary and benefits of the Executive
hereunder shall cease as of the end of the then current Employment Term. The Executive shall
be required to execute and deliver a general release to the Employer in connection with any such
termination of employment. The Employer and the Executive agree that a failure to renew the
Employment Term at least 120 days prior to the end of the Employment Term as contemplated
by Section 3.2 (Renewal of Term) shall not be deemed to constitute a termination of employment
by the Employer under Section 3.3 of this Agreement (Early Termination by the Employer for
other than Cause) or to provide a basis for tennination by the Executive under Section 3.6 of this
Agreement (Early Tennination by the Executive for Good Reason).

ARTICLE IV
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
4.1
Intellectual Property. It shall be a condition precedent to the effectiveness of this
Agreement that the Executive execute and deliver to the Employer an Acknowledgment of
Rights to Intellectual Property and Assignment of Intellectual Property in substantially the form
attached hereto as Exhibit B.
4.2
Non-Competition. It shall be a condition precedent to the effectiveness of this
Agreement that the Executive execute and deliver to the Employer a Non-Competition
Agreement in substantially the form attached hereto as Exhibit C.

NYC:7701 J4.7/GLOJ28-251687
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ARTICLEV
GENERAL PROVISIONS
5.1
Entire Agreement. This Agreement and the exhibits hereto contain the entire
understanding and sole and entire agreement between the parties with respect to the subject
matter hereof and supersede any and all prior agreements, negotiations and discussions between
the parties hereto with respect to the subject matter covered hereby. Each party to this
Agreement acknowledges that no representations, inducements, promises or agreements, oral or
otherwise, have been made by any party, or anyone acting on behalf of any party, which are not
embodied herein, and that no other agreement, statement or promise not contained in this
Agreement shall be valid or binding. This Agreement may not be modified or amended by oral
agreemem, but rather only by an agreement in writing signed by the Executive and the Employer
which specifically states the intent of the parties to amend this Agreement.

5.2
Assignment and Binding Effect. Neither this Agreement nor the rights or
obligations hereunder shall be assignable by the Executive. The Employer may assign this
Agreement to any successor of the Employer, and upon such assignment any such successor
shall be deemed substituted for the Employer upon the terms and subject to the conditions
hereof.
5.3

Governing Law; Consent to Jurisdiction.

(a)
This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of New York
applicable to agreements made and to be performed entirely within the State of New York.

Gb

Any legal action, suit or proceeding in equity or in law arising out of or
(b)
relating to this Agreement and the transactions contemplated hereby shall be instituted only in (a)
any state or federal court in the State of New York, (b) any federal or state court in the State of
Utah or (c) any state or federal court in a state in which the undersigned is then resident, and the
Executive agrees not to assert, by way of motion, as a defense, or otherwise, in any such action,
suit or proceeding, any claim that the Executive is not subject personally to the jurisdiction of
such court, that his property is exempt or immune from attachment, that the action, suit or
proceeding is brought in an inconvenient forum, that the venue of the action, suit or proceeding
is improper, or that this Agreement may not be enforced by such court. The Executive further
irrevocably submits to the jurisdiction of any such court in any such action, suit or proceeding.
Nothing contained herein shall be deemed to affect the right of any party to serve process in any
manner permitted by law.
5.4
No Waiver. No waiver of any term, provision or condition of this Agreement,
whether by conduct or otherwise, in any one or more instances shall be deemed or be construed
as a further or continuing waiver of any such term, provision or condition, or as a waiver of any
other tenn, provision or condition of this Agreement.
5.5
Notices. Any notice or other communication required or that may be given
hereunder shall be in writing and shall be delivered personally, sent by receipted facsimile
transmission or overnight courier, or sent by certified, registered or express mail, postage

NYC:7701 l4.7/GLOl28-251687
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prepaid, and shall be deemed given when so delivered personally, or sent by receipted facsimile
transmission or overnight courier, or, if mailed, upon receipt, as follows:
Address for the Employer:

DxNALLC
c/o Glory BioVentures LLC
39 Broadway, 37th Floor

New York, NY I 0006
Attention: Martin Ben-Dayan

(it)

Address for the Executive:

Phillip H. Grimm
PO Box 1155

Draper, UT 84020

5.6
Rules of Construction. Captions of the several Articles and Sections of this
Agreement are for convenience of reference only, and shal] not be considered or referred to in
resolving questions of interpretation with respect to this Agreement.
5. 7
Severability. The provisions of this Agreement are severable. If any provision of
this Agreement shall be held to be invalid or otherwise unenforceable, in whole or in part, the
remainder of the provisions or enforceable parts hereof shall not be affected thereby and shall be
enforced to the fullest extent permitted by law.
5.8

Multiple Counterparts; Facsimile Signatures. This Agreement may be executed in

one or more counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original, but all of which together
shall constitute one and the same instrument. Facsimile signatures on this Agreement shall be
given the same effect as original signatures.
[The remainder of this page has intentionally been left blank.]
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IN WTINESS WHEREOF, this Agreement has been executed and delivered by
the parties hereto as of the date first above written.

EMPLOYER:

DxNALLC

By: - - - - - - - - - - - - Name:
Title:

EXECUTIVE
Phillip H. Grimm

NYC:7701 t4.7/GL0128-25l687
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EXHIBIT A
PROXY

PHILLIP H. GR.Th1M: ("Grimm") hereby irrevocably constitutes and appoints GLORY
BIOVENTURES LLC as his true and lawful proxy, for and in his name, place and stead, to vote
the equity interests of DxNA LLC, a De]aware limited liability company {"DxNA"), issued to
him pursuant to his Employment Agreement with DxNA. The foregoing proxy shall include the
right to sign Grimm's name (as a member of DxNA) to any consent, certificate or other
document relating to DxNA that applicable law or the charter documents of DxNA may permit
or require so as to cause Grimm's equity interests in DxNA to oe voted in accordance with the
preceding sentence. Grimm hereby revokes all other proxies and powers of attorney with respect
to the equity interests ofDxNA issued to him pursuant to his Employment Agreement with
DxNA that he may have appointed or granted. Grimm covenants that he will not give a
subsequent proxy or power of attorney (and if given, such subsequent proxy or power of attorney
will not be effective) or enter into any other voting agreement with respect to the equity interests
of Ox.NA issued to him pursuant to his Employment Agreement with DxNA.

(ii)

This Proxy is irrevocabk and coupled with an interest.

Phillip H. Grimm

~

<1t)
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EXIIlBITB
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RIGHTS TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
ASSIGNMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Tius Acknowledgment of Rights to Intellectual Property and Assignment of Intellectual
Property (this "Acknowledgment and Assignment") is made as of June 6, 2008 by Phillip H.
Grimm.

WHEREAS, DxNA LLC (the ''Company") and the undersigned have entered into an
Employment Agreement, dated on or about the date hereof (the "Employment Agreement"),
pursuant to which the undersigned has agreed to serve as Chief Executive Officer of the
Company upon the terms and subject to the conditions set forth in the Employment Agreement.
WHEREAS, the Employment Agreement provides that it shall be a condition precedent
to the effectiveness thereof that the undersigned shall have executed and delivered this
Acknowledgment and Assignment.
~

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration for the foregoing and other good and valuable

consideration, the receipt and adequacy of which are hereby acknowledged, the undersigned
acknowledges and agrees as follows:
1.

Acknowledgment.

(a)
The undersigned acknowledges that the Company owns all right, title and
interest in all Work Product (as defined below), including, without limitAtion, all patentable
subject matter.

Gj

(b)
Without limiting the scope of paragraph l(a) above, all Work Product, to
the extent copyrightable under the United States Copyright Act of 1976 (the "Act"), shall be
considered "works made for hire" pursuant to the Act, and the Company shall thereby own all
right, title and interest in all copyrightable Work Product
2.

Assignment of Work Product and Intellectual Property.

(a)
To the extent that the undersigned has not previously done so, the
undersigned hereby irrevocably and absolutely sells, transfers, conveys, assigns and delivers to
1he Company all of his right, title and interest in and to the (a) the Work Product and (b) the
Intellectual Property that the W1dersigned created, conceived, developed or first reduced to
practice, either solely or in collaboration with others.
The rights being conveyed by this Acknowledgment and Assignment shall
include, but not be limited to, the right to copy, distribute, modify, alter, adapt, revise, and
prepare derivative works from the Work Product
(b)

3.
"Work Product" Defined. As used in this Acknowledgment and Assignment,
"Work Product" means, collectively, all Intellectual Property of Dx Nucleic Analytics, LLC
("DxNA") or any of its affiliates created, conceived, developed or first reduced to practice by the

NYC 327130.J
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(I;

undersigned, either solely or in collaboration with others, including, without limitation, designs,
inventions, improvements, processes, computer programs, graphics, pictorial representations,
user interfaces, functional specifications, reports and analyses that directly or indirectly arise out
of the undersigned's performance as a director, officer, employee or consultant ofDxNA,
Advanced Molecular Systems, LLC (" AMS") or Venture Solutions Group, LLC ("VSG").

4.
"Intellectual Property" Defined. As used in this Acknowledgment and
Assignment, "Intellectual Property" means the interests of DxN A, AMS or VSG or any affiliate
ofDxNA in any of the following:
(a)
United States and foreign registered and unregistered copyrights in and to
any works possessed, used, or intended by DxNA or any affiliate of DxNA to be used, in
conjunction with the operation of the business of DxNA, including, without limitation, (i)
registered copyrights set forth in Schedule A annexed hereto; (ii) all common law or other rights
to register and obtain any renewal or extension of copyright; (iii) all other interests accruing by
reason of international copyright conventions, moral rights laws or otherwise; (iv) with respect to
the foregoing, any applications therefor; and (v) the right to sue for, settle, or release any past,
present, or future infringement of any of the foregoing and to collect and retain all damages and
profits therefor;

•
.

(b)
United States and foreign registered patents, as such patents may now
exist or hereinafter come into existence, and registrations, licenses, and applications therefor,
possessed, relating to, used in, or intended to be used in conjunction with the operation of the
business of DxNA, including, without limitation, (i) all right, title and benefit of DxNA and any
affiliate of DxNA in and to the inventions, discoveries, improvements, processes and formulae;
(ii) the filed patent applications and issued patents listed in Schedule A annexed hereto, or such
patents that may be granted therefor and thereon and all provisionals, continuations,
continuations-in-part, divisions, reissues, reexaminations, reregistrations, renewals and
extensions thereof, and all patent applications and patents to which any of the foregoing claim
priority; and (iii) the right to sue for, settle, or release any past, present, or future infringement of
any of the foregoing and to collect and retain all damages and profits therefor;
(c)
United States and foreign registered and common law trademarks, service
marks, trade names, and any corporate names possessed, used in, or intended to be used in
conjunction with the operation of the business of Dx.NA, including, without limitation, (i) the
registered and unregistered trademarks, service marks and trade names set forth in Schedule A
annexed hereto; (ii) all other trademark or service mark interests accruing therefor by reason of
international trademark conventions, accompanied by the goodwill of all business of DxNA
connected with the use of and symbolized by such marks or names; (iii) with respect to the
foregoing, any applications therefor; and (iv) the right to sue for, settle, or release any past,
present, or future infringement thereof or unfair competition involving any of the foregoing and
retain all damages and profits therefor;
(d)
all generic and country code internet top level domain names and any
applications and rights to register or renew same in any registry or with any registrar, anywhere
in the world, all as set forth in Schedule A annexed hereto; and
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(j)

(e)
to the extent not otherwise provided in the interests set forth in paragraphs
(a), (b), (c) or (d) above, any Confidential Information (as such tennis defined below),
technology, idea, website, design, product drawings, concept, data, customer lists(s),
docwnentation, method, technique, process, skill, tool, library, adaptation, invention, business
ideas, discovery, or improvement, whether or not patentable, and including trade secrets, and
know-how, that are used, or usable, in conjunction with the operation of the business ofDxNA
or otherwise pertaining to the business ofDxNA.

~

"Confidential Information" Defined. As used in this Acknowledgment and
5.
Assignment, ''Confidential Information" shall include, without limitation, any information,
including, without limitation, trade secrets or proprietary infonnation, processes, patent
applications, source code, product development and product development techniques, price lists,
pricing data, vendor and customer lists, pricing polities and marketing plans, operational
methods, methods of doing business, technical processes, formulae, designs and design projects,
inventions, research projects, policies and strategic plans, product infonnation, manufacturing
and advertising know-how, possible acquisition infonnation, including business and personnel
acquisition plans, and other business affairs of Dx:NA or any affiliate of DxNA, which is or are
designed to be used in, or are or results from any of the research or development activities of any
such entity, and is private or confidential in that it is not generally known or available to the
public.

6.

Consideration; Specific Performance; Severability of Provisions.

(a)
The undersigned acknowledges and agrees that the agreements and
covenants contained in this Acknowledgment and Assignment are essential to protect the value
of the assets of the Company, that legally sufficient consideration is being paid for the execution
by the undersigned of this Acknowledgment and Assignment and that the undersigned expressly
waives any right to assert inadequacy of consideration as a defense to enforcement of the
provisions of Acknowledgment and Assignment should such enforcement ever become
necessary.
The undersigned acknowledges that a remedy at law for any breach or
attempted breach of this Ac!cnowledgrnent and Assignment will be inadequate and further agrees
that any breach of this Acknowledgment and Assignment will result in irreparable hann to the
Company and the business of the Company; and the undersigned covenants and agrees not to
oppose any demand for specific performance and injunctive and other equitable relief in case of
any such breach or attempted breach.
(b)

(c)
Whenever possible, each provision of this Acknowledgment and
Assignment shall be interpreted in such manner as to be effective and valid under applicable law,
but if any provision of this Acknowledgment and Assignment shall be prohibited by or
prohibited or inva]id under applicable law, such provision shall be ineffective to the extent of
such prohibition or invalidity, without invalidating the remainder of such provision or the
remaining provisions of this Acknowledgment and Assignment If any provision of this
Acknowledgment and Assignment shall, for any reason, be judged by any court of competent
jurisdiction to be invalid or unenforceable, such judgment shall not affect, impair or invalidate
the remainder of this Acknowledgment and Assignment, but shall be confined in its operation to
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the provision of this Acknowledgment and Assignment directly involved in the controversy in
which such judgment shall have been rendered. In the event that the provisions of this
Acknowledgment and Assignment should ever be deemed to exceed the time or geographic
limitations permitted by applicable law, then such provision shall be reformed to the maximum
time or geographic limitations permitted by applicable law.
7.
Further Assurances. Fallowing the execution of this Acknowledgment and
Assignment, the undersigned shall deliver to the Company such further information and
documents and shall execute and deliver to the Company such further instruments and
agreements as the Company shall request to consummate or confirm the foregoing, to
accomplish the purpose of this Acknowledgment and Assignment or to assure to the Company
the benefits of this Acknowledgment and Assignment.

~

8.
Facsimile Signatures. Facsimile signatures on this Acknowledgment and
Assignment shall be given the same effect as original signa1:ures.

9.
Governing Law. This Acknowledgment and Assignment shall be governed by
the laws of the State of New York, without giving effect to any principles of conflicts of laws.
Any provision of this Acknowledgment and Assignment prohibited by the laws of the State of
New York shall be ineffective to the extent of such prohibition without invalidating the
remaining provisions of this Acknowledgment and Assignment.
10.
Successors and Assigns. This Acknowledgment and Assignment shall be
binding upon the heirs, executors, administrators and other legal representatives of the
undersigned and shall be for the benefit of the Company and its successors and assigns. The
Company mayt without the consent of the undersigned, assign its rights under this
Acknowledgment and Assignment in connection with any sale, transfer or other disposition of all
or substantially all of its assets or business, whether by merger, consolidation or otherwise.

I 1.
Consent to Jurisdiction. Any legal action, suit or proceeding in equity or in law
arising out of or relating to this Agreement and the transactions contemplated hereby shall be
instituted only in (a) any state or federal court in the State of New York, (b) any federal or state
court in the State of Utah or (c) any state or federal court in a state in which the undersigned is
then resident, and the undersigned agrees not to assert, by way of motion, as a defense, or
otherwise, in any such action, suit or proceeding, any claim that the undersigned is not subject
personally to the jurisdiction of such court, that his property is exempt or immune from
attachment, that the action, suit or proceeding is brought in an inconvenient forum, that the venue
of the action, suit or proceeding is impropel', or that this Agreement may not be enforced by such
court. The undersigned further irrevocably submits to the jurisdiction of any such court in any
such action, suit or proceeding. Nothing contained herein shall be deemed to affect the right of
any party to serve process in any manner permitted by law.

~

[The remainder of this page has intentionally been Jeft blank. J
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, thls acknowledgment has been executed by the undersigned
th

as of this 6 day of June, 2008.

PHILLIP H. GRilv111

STATE OF ----

)

COUNTY OF

)

----

)ss.:

On the _ _ day of _ _ _ _ _ _ 2009, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Pub]ic
in and for said State, personally appeared PHILLIP H. GRilv111, personaUy known to me or
provided to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the individual whose name is
subscribed to the within instnnnent, and acknowledged to me that he executed the same in his
capacity, and that by his signature on the instrument, the individual, or the person upon behalf of
which the individual acted, executed the instrument.

Notary Public
My Commission Expires:
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1. Patents
(i)

(ii)

U.S. Patent:

Fluorescence Detection System

Patent No.:
Date Issued:
Date Filed:

January 1, 2008
January 7, 2005

U.S. Patent Application:
App. No.:
Date Filed:
Status:

(iii)

(v)

(vi)

Rapid Thermocycler

11/697,917
April 9, 2007
A waiting examination

U.S. Patent Application:
App. No.:
Date Filed:
Status:

Methods and Apparatus for Controlling
DNA Amplification

11/383,534
May 16, 2006
Abandoned

U.S. Patent AppHcation:
App. No.:
Date Filed:
Status:

Methods and Apparatus for Amplification of
DNA Using Sonic Energy

11/432,935
May 12, 2006
Under final rejection; HRO has recommended filing an
RCE

U.S. Patent Application:
App. No.:
Dated Filed:
Status:

Rapid Thermocycler

10/991,746
November 18, 2004
Awaiting examination

U.S. Patent Application:
App. No.:
Date Filed:
Status:

(iv)

US 7,315,376 B2

PCR Sample Processing Module

11/958,332
December 17, 2007
Awaiting Examination

~

(vii)

U.S. Patent Application:
App. No.:
Date Filed:
Status:

Ultra Sonic Release of DNA or RNA

11/958,299
December 17, 2007
Awaiting Examination
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(viii) Rapid Reverse Transcriptase for PCR
App. No.:

Date Filed:
Status:

11/733,035
April 9, 2007

Awaiting examination

2. License Agreements Pursuant to which DxNA is a Licensee
Technology License Agreement dated as of September 1, 2005, by and between

AMS and Dx:NA - Grants Dx:NA a license to use certain diagnostic products
developed by AMS for the purpose of developing additional diagnostic products
to be used to diagnose diseases caused by certain DNA or RNA containing
organisms

3. Trademarks: FluoroGene One (pending) and GeneSTAT (DxNA has not used the name
in commerce, aod received a notice of abandonment in April. DxNA have until June 10,
2008 to request reinstatement and file appropriate fees.)

4. Domain names: www.dxna.com
5. GeneSTAT Software

a. Firmware (software that runs the analyzer)
b. PCReports (the data management package)

~

~

NYC 327130.1
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

EXHIBITC
NON-COMPETITION AGREEMENT

This Non-Competition Agreement (this "Agreement"), dated as of June 6, 2008, is
entered into by DxNA LLC, a Delaware limited liability company (the "Company''), and Phillip
H. Grimm (the ''Second Party").

WHEREAS, the Company and the Second Party have entered into an Employment
Agreement, dated on or about the date hereof (the "Employment Agreement"), pursuant to which
the Second Party has agreed to serve as Chief Executive Officer of the Company upon the terms
and subje<;t to the conditiol'ls set forth in the Emp]oyment Agreement.
WHEREAS, the Employment Agreement provides that it shall be a condition precedent
to the effectiveness thereof that the Second Party shall have executed and delivered this
Agreement.
WHEREAS, the Second Party is accepting employment with the Company and is a
member of a select group of key employees who will have access to confidential and proprietary
information and trade secrets in the course of his duties and this Agreement is a condition of
such employment as it is designed to protect the Company from use or disclosure of such
confidential and proprietary information and trade secrets.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration for the foregoing and other good and valuable
consideration, the receipt and adequacy of which are hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto
agree as follows:
l.

Certain Covenants of the Second Party.

1.1
Restrictive Covenants. The Second Party acknowledges and agrees that
agreements and covenants contained in this Agreement are essential to protect the value of the
assets of the Company, that legally sufficient consideration is being paid for the execution by the
Second Party of this Agreement and that the Second Party expressly waives any right to ~sert
inadequacy of consideration as a defense to enforcement of the provisions of this Agreement
should such enforcement ever become necessary.
The Second Party covenants and agrees that for a period of the later of (a) two (2)
years from the closing of the transactions contemplated by that certain Contribution Agreement,
dated as of June 5, 2008 between Ox Nucleic Analytics, LLC and Glory Bioventures LLC, or (b)
the second (2nd) anniversary of the tennination of the Second Party's employment with the
Company for any reason (the "Restricted Period"):
1.1.1 Non-Compete. The Second Party will not engage or invest in,
own, manage, operate, finance or control, or participate in the ownership, management,
operation, financing, or control of, any individual, business, finn, corporation, partnership,
association, joint venture or other entity that directly or indirectly engages anywhere within the
world in the business of developing diagnostic PCR devices (the "Business"); provided,
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however, that the Second Party may own less than five percent (5%) of the outstanding shares of
any class of securities of any enterprise (but without otherwise participating in the activities of
such enterprise) if such securities are listed on any national or regional securities exchange or
have been registered under Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended;
1.1.2 Employees of the Company. The Second Party will not, either for
himself or any other corporation, general partnership, limited partnership, limited liability
company,joint venture, association, individual or other entity ("Person"), solicit any officer or
employee of the Company or any of its affiliates at any time during the Restricted Period without
the prior written consent of the Company nor in any other way assist another Person in
recruiting, soliciting or inducing any officer or employee of the Company to terminate his or her
employment or other relationship with the Company or any of its affiliates;

1.1.3 Competing Products or Services. The Second Party will not seek
to sell nor sell any competing products or services to any customer of the Company or any of its
affiliates or be paid or receive commissions or other consideration based upon or in consideration
of sales of any competing products or services to any customer of the Company or any of its
affiliates; and
1.1.4 Filing of Patents The Second Party will not file any patents with
any governmental authority that are intended to be used in or in conjunction with PCR diagnostic
devises or that are intended to improve or enhance the :functionality or efficacy of PCR
diagnostic devices, nor will the Second Party cause or permit any Person acting on behalf of the
Second Party to file any such patents with any governmental authority.
1.2
Acknowledgment of Second Papy. The Second Party expressly
acknowledges and agrees that the agreements and covenants contained in this Section 1 are
essential to protect the value of the assets and Business oftbe Company and that legally
sufficient consideration is being paid for the non-competition and other provisions of this Section
I, and the Second Party expressly waive any right to assert inadequacy of consideration as a
defense to enforcement of the non-competition or other provisions of this Section 1 should such
enforcement ever become necessary.
1.3

Rights and Remedies Upon Breach.

1.3.1 Injunction for Breach; Enforcement; Attorney's Fees. The Second
Party acknowledges that in the event of an actual or threatened breach of this Agreement, the
Company shall be entitled to seek from a court of competent jurisdiction a temporary restraining
order, preliminary injunction, permanent injunction, and/or any other form of equitable relief
(without the requirement of posting a bond or other security). These rights and remedies shall be
in addition to any other legal and equitable rights and remedies, including compensatory and
punitive damages, that the Company may have for any actual or threatened breach of this
Agreement or for any violation of the Company,s rights or the Second Party's duties or
obligations to the Company or for any violation of law. It is agreed that in any judicial
proceeding brought by the Company for an actual or threatened breach of this Agreement, the
prevailing party shall also be entitled to be reimbursed by the other party for its reasonable
attorneys' fees, expenses and costs ..
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1.3.2 Extension of Restricted Period. If the Second Party violates any
provisions of this Section 1, the parties agree that the effective period of each such covenant so
violated shall be extended by a period of time equal to the period of such violation. It is the
intent of this Section 1 that the running of the effective period of each restrictive covenant shall
be tolled during any period of violation of such covenant so that the parties shall get the full and
reasonable protection for which they contracted and so that neither party may profit by any
breach of an)' covenant.
1.4
Severability of Covenants. Whenever possible, each provision of this
Section 1 shall be interpreted in such manner as to be effective and valid under applicable law~
but if any provision of this Section 1 shall be prohibited by or prohibited or invalid under
applicable law, such provision shall be ineffective to the extent of such prohibition or invalidity,
without invalidating the remainder of such provision or the remaining provisions of this Section
1.

1.5
BJue-Penciling. If any provision of this Section 1 shall, for any reason, be
judged by any court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid or unenforceable, such judgment
shall not affect, impair or invalidate the remainder of this Section 1, but shall be confined in its
operation to the provision of this Section 1 directly involved in the controversy in which such
judgment shall have been rendered. In the event that the provisions of this Section 1 should ever
be deemed to exceed the time or geographic limitations permitteEI by applicable law, then such
provision shall be reformed to the maximum time or geographic limitations permitted by
applicable law.

)

2.

Other Provisions.

2.1
Consent to Jurisdiction and Service of Process. Any legal action, suit or
proceeding in equity or in law arising out of or relating to this Agreement and the transactions
contemplated hereby or thereby shall be instituted only in (a) any state of federal court in the
State of New York, (b) any state or federal court in the State of Utah or (c) any state or federal
court in a state in which the Second Party is then resident, and each party agrees not to assert, by
way of motion, as a defense, or otherwise, in ~y such action, suit or proceeding, any claim that
such party is not subject personally to the jurisdiction of such court, that his or its property is
exempt or immune from attachment, that the action, suit or proceeding is brought in an
inconvenient forum, that the venue of the action, suit or proceeding is improper, or that this
Agreement may not be enforced by such court. Each party further irrevocably submits to the
jurisdiction of any such court in any such action, suit or proceeding. Nothing contained herein
shall be deemed to affect the right of any party to serve process in any manner permitted by law.
2.2
Notices. Any notice or other communication required or that may be
given hereunder shall be in writing and shall be delivered personally, sent by receipted facsimile
transmission or overnight courier, or sent by certified, registered or express mail, postage
prepaid, and shall be deemed given when so delivered personally, or sent by receipted facsimile
transmission or overnight courier, or, if mailed, upon receipt, as follows:
(i)

if to the Company, to:

.. 3 NYC 327136.1
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DxNALLC
do Glory BioVentures, LLC
39 Broadway, 37th Floor
New York, New York 10006
Attention: Martin Ben-D~yan
facsimile number: (212) 938-3630
(ii)
if to the Second Party, to the address set forth on the signature page of this
Agreement.

~

Any party may by notice given in accordance with this Section to the other parties designate
another address for receipt of notices herem1der.
2.3
Entire Agreement Tbis Agreement contains the entire agreement between
the parties with respect to the subject matter hereof and supersedes all prior agreements, written
or oral, with respect thereto.

2.4
Waivers and Amendments. This Agreement may be amended, modified,
superseded, canceled, renewed or extended, and the tenns and conditions hereof may be waived,
only by a written instrwnent signed by the parties. No de1ay on the part of any party in
exercising any right, power or privilege hereunder shall operate as a waiver thereof, nor shall any
waiver on the part of any party of any right, power or privilege hereunder, nor any single or
partial exercise of any right power or privilege hereunder, prec]ude any other or further exercise
thereof or the exercise of any other right, power or privilege hereunder.

([i

2.5
Governing Law. This Agreement shall be governed and construed in
accordance with the laws of the State of New York applicable to agreements made and to be
performed entirely within such State.
2.6
Assignment. This Agreement, and the Second Party's rights and
obligations hereunder, may not be assigned by the Second Party. The Company may, without
the Second Party's consent, assign its rights, together with its obligations, under this Agreement
in connection with any sale, transfer or other disposition of all or substantially all of its assets or
business, whether by merger, consolidation or otherwise.
2. 7
Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in two or more
counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original but all of which together shall constitute
one and the same instrument.
2.8
Headings. The headings in this Agreement are for reference purposes only
and shall not in any way '1-ffect the meaning or interpretation of this Agreement.
2.9
Facsimile Signatures. Facsimile signatures on this Agreement shall be
given the same effect as original signatures.
[The remainder of this page has intentionally been left blank.]
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IN WHNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement on the date first

above written.
Dx:NALLC

By: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

~

Name:

Title:

PHILLIP H. GR.IlvfM:
Address of Second Party:
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EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
This Employment Agreement (this "Agreement") is entered into as of June 6,
2008 by and between DxNA LLC, a Delaware limited liability company (the "Employer"), and
Phillip H. Grimm (the "Executive").

RECITALS
WHEREAS, the Employer desires to employ the Executive as Chief Executive
Officer of the Employer, and the Executive desires to accept employment with the Employer, on
the terms and conditions set forth below.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing recitals and the respective
covenants and agreements of the parties contained in this document, the Employer and the
Executive agree as follows:

ARTICLE I
EMPLOYMENT AND DUTIES
1.1
Position and Duties. The Executive shall serve as Chief Executive Officer of the
Employer. The Executive shall initially report directly to the Board of Directors of the
Employer. The Executive shall discharge such duties as are assigned to him from time to time as
the Board of Directors of the Employer in a diligent and professional manner, on a full-time
basis.
1.2
Location. The principal place of employment of the Executive shall be at Salt
Lake City, Utah with travel to the Saint George, Utah facility as dictated by business
requirements.
1.3
Outside , Business Activities Precluded. During the Employment Term (as
hereinafter defined), the Executive shall devote his full business time, energy and ability to the
performance of this Agreement. The Executive shall not, without the prior written consent of the
Employer, perform other business services of any kind or engage in any other business activity,
with or without compensation. The Executive shall not, without the prior written consent of the
Employer, engage or prepare to engage in any business activity adverse to the Employer's
interests; provided, however, that nothing in this Section 1.3. shall prevent the Executive from
participating in the following activities for so long as such activities do not impair the
Executive's ability to fulfill his duties or obligations under this Agreement or under the NonCompete Agreement referred to in Section 4.2 below: (a) engaging in religious, charitable or
other community activities; (b) serving on the board of directors of an entity that does not
compete with the business of the Employer, or (c) managing the Executive's personal
investments if such investments are not in entities that compete with the business of the
Employer.
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ARTICLE II
COMPENSATION
2.1
Salary. For the Executive's serv~ces hereunder, the Employer sh~l pay as salary
to the Ex~cutive the amount of $250,000 per year during each of the calendar years of the
Employment Term, prorated for any year in which this Agreement is in effect for only a portion
of a calendar year. The Executive's salary shall be payable in equal installments in confonnity
with the Employer's nonnal payroll practices, unless otherwise agreed to by the Board of
Directors of the Employer. The Executive's base salary shall be reviewed by the Employer from
time to time at its discretion, and the Executive shall receive such salary increases, if any, as the
Employer, in its sole discretion, shall detennine.
2.2
Other Benefits. During the Employment Tenn, the Executive shall be entitled to
participate in and receive all other benefits of employment generally available to the Employer's
other personnel, including, but not limited to, inclusion in the Employer's retirement plans,
medical plans, disability plans and other similar benefit plans, subject to and on a basis
consistent with the terms, conditions and overall administration of such plans. The Executive
shall be entitled to 20 days of paid vacation each year during the Employment Term, which will
accrue in conformity with the Employer's normal vacation pay practices. The Employer may, in
its sole discretion, grant such additional benefits to the Executive from time to time as the
Employer deems proper and desirable.
·
2.3

Equity Incentive Arrangement.

(a)
On each of the first, second and third anniversaries of the date of this
Agreement, the Executive shall be granted, for no additional consideration, a 1% membership
interest in the Employer; provided, however, that no such grant will be made unless the
Executive is then employed as the Chief Executive Officer of the Employer.
(b)
The membership interest granted to the Executive on the first anniversary
of the date of this Agreement will not vest until 18 months after the date of this Agreement and
will only vest if the Executive is still employed as the Chief Executive Officer of the Employer
on the date that is 18 months after the date of this Agreement. Until the membership interests
have vested, the Executive shall have no rights to receive distributions in respect of such
membership interests or to exercise voting or other rights with respect thereto.
. (c)
Any membership interest issued to the Executive on the second and third
anniversaries of the of the date of this Agreement will not be subject to vesting.
(d)
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 2.3(a) and Section 2.3(b), in the
event that a Liquidity Event occurs on or prior to the third anniversary of the date. of this
Agreement, any membership interests previously granted to the Executive or to be granted to the
Executive on the first, second and third anniversaries of the date of this Agreement will, to the
extent that they have not already done so, be granted, accelerate and/or vest upon a Liquidity
Event.
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(e)
Prior to becoming a member of the Employer, the Executive will be
required to execute a Joinder to Operating Agreement in substantially the form of Exhibit B to
the operating agreement of the Employer.
·
(f)
If requested by Glory Bio Ventures LLC ("Glory"), the Executive agrees
that he will execute and· deliver to Glory a proxy in substantially the fonn attached hereto as
' Exhibit A pursuant to which the Executive grants to Glory the right to vote the membership
interests in the Employer that are issued to him pursuant to the provisions of this Section 2.3.
The Executive agrees that he will re-execute a proxy whenever requested by Glory. The
provisions of this Section 2.3(f) shall remain in effect for the Employment Tenn and for a period
of 3 years after the termination of the Employment Term.
~

2.4
Expenses. The Executive shall be entitled to receive prompt reimbursement for
all travel and reasonable business-related expenses incurred .by him during the Employment
Term, including reimbursement for the Executive's travel related expenses incurred in
connection with domestic and foreign travel in the course .of discharging his duties to the
Employer, such reimbursements to be made in accordance with the policies and procedures from
time to time adopted by the Employer, provided that the Executive properly accounts for such
business expenses in accordance with the Employer's policies. In addition, the Employer will
provide to the Executive the use of an automobile and will pay the associated operating expenses
for such automobile.
2.5
Deductions and Withholdings. All amounts payable or which become payable
under any provision of this Agreement shall be subject to any deductions authorized by the
Executive and any deductions, taxes and withholdings required by law.
ARTICLE III
TERM OF EMPLOYMENT

3.1
Term. The term of this Agreement shall commence on the date hereof and shall
continue through the 3rd anniversary of such date, unless renewed or terminated ~ hereinafter
provided (the "Employment Term'').
3.2
Renewal of Term. This Agreement shall be renewed and the Employment Term
shall be extended for successive one-year periods upon mutual agreement of the parties at least
90 days prior to the end of the Employment Tenn.
3.3 . Early Termination by the Employer for other than Cause. The Executive's
employment by the Employer may be terminated at any time during the Employment Term by
the Board of Directors of the Employer, for any or no reason and without Cause (as hereinafter
defined), upon delivery of written notice to the Executive. The Employer may, but shail not be
required to, give the Executive advance written notice of the termination of the Executive's
employment. The termination of the Executive's employment shall be effective as of the date
specified in such written notice.
3.4
Early Termination by the Employer for Cause. The Executive's employment may
be terminated for Cause at any time by the Board of Directors of the Employ~. For th~se
purposes, termination for "Cause" shall mean termination because of the Executive's (a)
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J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
NYC:770114.7/GLOI28-251687
- 3Library,
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

personal dishonesty or willful misconduct in the performance of his duties or obligations
hereunder; (b) intentional or repeated failure to perform satisfactorily his duties or obligations
hereunder; (c) gross carelessness or neglect in the performance of his duties or obligations
hereunder; (d) violation of any law, rule, or regulation applicable to the business of the
Employer; (e) committing embezzlement or being charged with a felony or other offence
involving moral turpitude; (f) committing any material breach of this Agreement by the
Executive; or (g) committing acts that have a material and adverse effect on the Employer's
reputation or the reputation of an affiliate of the Employer. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the
Executive shall not be deemed to have been terminated for Cause unless the Board of Directors
of the Employer delivers a written notice to the Executive setting forth the reasons for the ·
Employer's intention to terminate for Cause and specifically identifying the manner in which the
Board of Directors of the Employer believes that the Executive has engaged in conduct giving
rise to the Employer's ability to terminate his employment for Cause, which conduct (to the
extent it can be corrected) is not substantially corrected by the Executive within 30 days
following his receipt of such notice.

/,,,-.

3.5
Early Termination by the Executive for other than Good Reason. The Executive
may terminate his employment under this Agreement at any time by giving the Employer written
notice of his resignation at least 60 days in advance; provided, however, the Board of Directors
of the Employer may determine upon receipt of such notice that the effective date of such
resignation shall be immediate or some time prior to the expiration of the 60-day notice period.
The Executive's employment shall terminate as of the effective date of his resignation as
determined by the Board of Directors of the Employer.
· 3.6
Early Termination by the Executive for Good Reason. The Executive may
terminate his employment under this Agreement at any time for Good Reason (as hereinafter
defined). Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Executive's employment under this Agreement
shall not be deemed to have been tenninated for Good Reason unless the Executive delivers a
written notice to the Board of Directors of the Employer setting forth the reasons for the
Executive's intention to terminate for Good Reason and specifically identifying the manner in
which the Executive believes that the Employer has engaged in conduct giving rise to the
Executive's ability to terminate his employment for Good Reason, which conduct (to the extent
it can be corrected) is not substantially corrected by the Employer within 30 days following
delivery to the Board of Directors of the Employer of such notice. For the purpose of this
Agreement, "Good Reason" shall mean: (a) without the Executive's express written consent, a
material reduction of the Executive's duties, position or responsibilities relative to the
Executive's ~uties, position or responsibilities in effect immediately prior to such reduction, or
the removal of the Executive from such position, duties and responsibilities; and (b) without the
Executive's express written consent, a reduction of the Executive's salary or incentive bonus
opportunity in effect immediately prior to such reduction.
3.7
Termination Due to Death or Disability. The Executive's employment hereunder
shall terminate immediately upon his death. In the event that by reason of injury, illness or other
physical or mental impairment the Executive shall be: ( a) completely unable to perform his
services hereunder for more than two consecutive months, or (b) unable to perform his services
hereunder for 50% or more of the normal working day throughout four consecutive months, then
the Employer may terminate the Executive's employment hereunder upon written notice to the
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Executive. The Executive's beneficiaries, estate, heirs, representatives or assigns, as appropriate,
shall be entitled to the proceeds, if any, due under any Employer-paid life insurance policy held
by the Executive, as determined by and in accordance with the terms of any such policy, as well
as any vested benefits such as accrued vacation benefits.
3.8
Payment of Compensation and Benefits Upon and Following Termination of
Employment.
(a)
Upon termination of employment under Section 3.4 (Early Termination by
the Employer for Cause), Section 3.5 (Early Termination by the Executive for other than Good
Reason) or Section 3.7 (Termination Due to Death or Disability), all salary and benefits of the
Executive hereunder shall cease immediately and the Employer shall pay to the Executive all
amounts accrued and ·unpaid hereunder. The Executive shall be required to execute and deliver a
general release to the Employer in connection with any such termination of employment.
(b)
Upon termination of employment under Section 3.3 (Early Termination by
the Employer for other than Cause) or Section 3.6 (Early Termination by the Executive for Good
Reason), so long as the Executive shall execute and deliver a general release to the Employer in
connection therewith, the Executive shall be entitled to receive payments in amounts equal to the
continuation of the Executive's then current salary for a period of 26 weeks following the date
that the Executive's employment is terminated and to the continuation of the Executive's then
current medical and dental plans for a period of 26 weeks following the date that the Executive's
employment is terminated.

(c)
Upon termination of employment under this Agreement for a failure to
renew the Employment Term at least 120 days prior to the end of the Employment Term as
contemplated by Section 3.2 (Renewal of Tenn), all salary and benefits of the Executive
hereunder shall cease as of the end of the then current Employment Term. The Executive shall
be required to execute and deliver a general release to the Employer in connection with any such
termination of employment. The Employer and the Executive agree that a failure to renew the
Employment Tenn at least 120 days prior to the end of the Employment Term as contemplated
by Section 3.2 (Renewal of Tenn) shall not be deemed to constitute a termination of employment
by the Employer under Section 3.3 of this Agreement (Early Termination by the Employer for
other than Cause) or to provide a basis for termination by the Executive under Section 3 .6 of this
Agreement (Early Termination by the Executive for Good Reason).
ARTICLE IV
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

4.1
Intellectual Property. It shall be a condition precedent to the effectiveness of this
Agreement that the Executive execute and deliver to the Employer an Acknowledgment of
Rights to Intellectual Property and Assignment of Intellectual· Property in substantially the form
attached hereto as Exhibit B.
4.2
Non-Competition. It shall be a condition precedent to the effectiveness of this
Agreement that the Executive execute and deliver to the Employer a Non-Competition
Agreement in substantially the form attached hereto as Exhibit C.
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ARTICLEV
GENERAL PROVISIONS
5.1
Entire Agreement. This Agreement and the exhibits hereto contain the entire
understanding and sole and entire agreement between the parties with respect to the subject
matter hereof and supersede any and all prior agreements, negotiations arid discussions between
the parties hereto with respect to the subject matter covered hereby. Each party to this
Agreement acknowledges that no representations, inducements, promises or agreements, oral or
otherwise, have been made by any party, or anyone acting on behalf of any party, which are not
embodied herein, and that no other agreement, statement or promise not contained in this
Agreement shall be valid or binding. This Agreement may not be modified or amended by oral
agreement, but rather only by an agreement in writing signed by the Executive and the Employer ·
which specifically states the intent of the parties to amend this Agreement.
5.2
Assignment and Binding Effect. Neither this Agreement nor the rights or
obligations hereunder shall be assignable by the Executive. The Employer may assign this
Agreement to any successor of the Employer, and upon such assignment any such successor
shall he deemed substituted for the Employer upon the terms and subject to ·the conditions
hereof.
5.3

Governing Law;- Consent to Jurisdiction.

(a)
This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of New York
applicable to agreements made and to be performed entirely within the State of New York.
(b)
Any legal action, suit or proceeding in equity or in law arising out of or
relating to this Agreement and the transactions contemplated hereby shall _be instituted only in (a)
any state or federal court in the State of New York, (b) any federal or state court in the State of
Utah or (c) any state or federal court in a state in which the undersigned is then resident, and the
Executive agrees not to assert, by way of motion, as a defense, or otherwise, in any such action,
suit or proceeding, any claim that the Executive is not subject personally to the jurisdiction of
such court, that his property is exempt or immune from attachment, that the action, suit or
proceeding is brought in an inconvenient forum, that the venue of the action, suit or proceeding
is improper, or that this Agreement may not be enforced by such court. The Executive further
irrevocably submits to the jurisdiction of any such court in any such action, suit or proceeding.
Nothing contained herein shall be deemed to affect the right of any party to serve process in any
manner permitted by law.

5.4
No Waiver. No waiver of any term, provision or condition of this Agreement,
whether by conduct or otherwise, in any one or more instances shall be deemed or be construed
as a further or continuing waiver of any such term, provision or condition, or as a waiver of any
other term, provision or condition of this Agreement.
5.5
Notices. Any notice or other communication required or that may be given
hereunder shall be in writing and shall be delivered personally, sent by receipted facsimile
transmission or overnight courier, or sent by certified, registered or express mail, postage

NYC:770114.7/GL0128-251687Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter-6Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

Iii

prepaid, and shall be deemed given when so delivered personally, or sent by receipted facsimile
transmission or overnight courier, or, if mailed, upon receipt, as follows:
Address for the Employer:
DxNALLC
c/o Glory BioVentures LLC
39 Broadway, 37th Floor
New York, NY 10006
Attention: Martin Ben-Dayan
Address for the Executive:
~

Phillip H. Grimm

PO Box 1155
Draper, UT 84020
5.6
Rules of Construction. Captions of the several Articles and Sections of this
Agreement are for convenience of reference only, and shall not be considered or referred to in
resolving questions of interpretation with respect to this Agreement.
5. 7
Severability. The provisions of this Agreement are se_verable. If any provision of
this Agreement shall be held to be invalid or otherwise unenforceable, in whole or in part, the
remainder of the provisions or enforceable parts hereof shall not be affected thereby and shall be
enforced to the fullest extent permitted by law.
5.8
Multiple Counterparts: Facsimile Signatures. This Agreement may be executed in
one or more counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original, but all of which together
shall constitute one and the same instrument. Facsimile signatures on this Agreement shall be
given the same effect as original signatures.
[The remainder of this page has intentionally been left blank.]
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Agreement has been executed and delivered by
the parties hereto as of the date first above written.
EMPLOYER:
DxNALLC

By: - - - - - - - - - - - - Name:
Title:

EXECUTIVE
Phillip H. Grimm

)
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EXHIBIT A
PROXY
PHILLIP H. GRIMrv.1 ("Grimm") hereby irrevocably constitutes and appoints GLORY
BIOVENTURES LLC as his true and lawful proxy, for and in his name, place and stead, to vote
the equity interests ofDxNA LLC, a Delaware limited liability company ("DxNA"), issued to
him pursuant to his Employment Agreement with DxNA. The foregoing proxy shall include the
right to sign Grimm's name (as a member ofDxNA) to any consent, certificate or other
document relating to DxNA that applicable law or the charter documents of DxNA may permit
or require so as to cause Grimm's equity interests in DxNA to be voted in accordance with the
preceding sentence. Grimm hereby revokes all other proxies and powers of attorney with respect
to the equity interests of DxNA issued to him pursuant to his Employment Agreement with
DxNA that he may have appointed or granted. Grimm covenants that he will not give a
subsequent proxy or power of attorney (and if given, such subsequent proxy or power of attorney
will not be effective) or enter into any other voting agreement with respect to the equity interests
of DxNA issued to him pursuant to his Employment Agreement with DxNA.
· ·
·
This Proxy is irrevocable and coupled with an interest.

Phillip H. Grimm

@
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EXHIBITB

I

ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RIGHTS TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
ASSIGNMENT OF INTELiECTUAL PROPERTY
This Acknowledgment of Rights to Intellectual Property and Assignment of Intellectual
Property (this "Acknowledgment and Assignment") is made as of June 6, 2008 by Phillip H.
Grimm.

WHEREAS, DxNA LLC (the "Company") and the undersigned have entered into an
Employment Agreement, dated on or about the date hereof (the "Employment Agreement"),
pursuant to which the undersigned has agreed to serve as Chief Executive Officer of the
Company upon the terms and subject to the conditions set forth in the Employment Agreement.

Ci,

WHEREAS, the Employment Agreement provides that it shall be a condition precedent
to the effectiveness thereof that the undersigned shall have executed and delivered this
Acknowledgment and Assignment.

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration for the foregoing and other good and valuable
consideration, the receipt and adequacy of which are hereby acknowledged, the undersigned
acknowledges and agrees as follows:

1.

Acknowledgment.

(a)
The undersigned acknowledges that the Company owns all right, title and
interest in all Work Product (as defined below), including, without limitation, all patentable
subject matter.
(b)
Without limiting the scope of paragraph l(a) above, all Work Product, to
the extent copyrightable under the United States Copyright Act of 1976 (the "Act"), shall be
considered "works made for hire" pursuant to the Act, and the Company shall thereby own all
right, title and interest in all copyrightable Work Product.

2.

Assignment of Work Product and Intellectual Property.

(a)
To the extent that the undersigned has not previously done so, the
undersigned hereby irrevocably and absolutely sells, transfers, conveys, assigns and delivers to
the Company all of his right, title and interest in and to the (a) the Work Product and (b) the
Intellectual Property that the undersigned created, conceived, developed or first reduced to
practice, either solely or in collaboration with others.
(b)
The rights being conveyed by this Acknowledgment and Assignment shall
include, but not be limited to, the right to copy, distribute, modify, alter, adapt, revise, and
prepare derivative works from the Work Product.

"Work Product" Defined. As used in this Acknowledgment and Assignment,
3.
"Work Product" means, collectively, all Intellectual Property ofDx Nucleic Analytics, LLC
("DxNA") or any of its affiliates created, conceived, developed or first reduced to practic·e by the
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undersigned, either solely odn collaboration with others, including, without limitation, designs,
. inventions, improvements, processes, computer programs, graphics, pictorial representations,
user interfaces, functional specifications, reports and analyses that directly or indirectly arise out
of the undersigned's performance as a director, officer, employee or consultant of DxNA,
Advanced Molecular Systems, LLC ("AMS") or Venture Solutions Group, LLC ("VSG").
4.
"Intellectual Property" Defined. As used in this Acknowledgment and
Assignment, "Intellectual Property" means the interests of DxNA, AMS or VSG or any affiliate
of DxNA in any of the following:

(a)
United States and foreign registered and unregistered copyrights in and to
any works possessed, used, or intended by DxNA or any affiliate ofDxNA to be used, in
conjunction with the operation of the business of DxNA, including, without limitation, (i)
registered copyrights set forth in Schedule A annexed hereto; (ii) all common law or other rights
to register and obtain any renewal or extension of copyright; (iii) all other interests accruing by
reason of ~temational copyright conventions, moral rights laws <?r otherwise; (iv) with respect to
the foregoing, any applications therefor; and (v) the right to sue for, settle, or release any past,
present, or future infringement of any of the foregoing and to collect and retain all damages and
profits therefor;
(b)
United States and foreign registered patents, as such patents may now
exist or hereinafter come into existence, and registrations, licenses, and applications therefor,
possessed, relating to, used in, or intended to be used in conjunction with the operation of the
business ofDxNA, including, without limitation, (i) all right, title and benefit of DxNA and any
affiliate of DxNA in and to the inventions, discoveries, improvements, processes and formulae;
(ii) the filed patent applications and issued patents listed in Schedule A annexed hereto, or such
patents that may be granted therefor and thereon and all provisionals, continuations,
continuations-in-part, divisions, reissues, reexaminations, reregistrations, renewals and
extensions thereof, and all patent applications and patents to which any of the foregoing claim
priority; and (iii) the right to sue for, settle, or release any past, present, or future infringement of
any of the foregoing and to collect and retain all damages and profits therefor;

(j

(c)
United States and foreign registered and common law trademarks, service
marks, trade names, and any corporate names possessed, used in, or intended to be used in
conjunction with the operation of the business of DxNA, including, without limitation, (i) the
registered and unregistered trademarks, service marks and trade names set forth in Schedule A
annexed hereto; (ii) all other trademark or service mark interests accruing therefor by reason of
international trademark conventions, accompanied by the goodwill of all business of DxNA
connected with the use of and symbolized by such marks or names; (iii) with respect to the
foregoing, any applications therefor; and (iv) the right to sue for, settle, or release any past,
present, or future infringement thereof or unfair competition involving any of the foregoing and
retain all damages and profits therefor;
all generic and country code internet top level domain names and any
(d)
applications and rights to register or renew same in any registry or with any registrar, anywhere
in the world, all as set forth in Schedule A annexed hereto; and
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(e)
to ~e extent not otherwise provided in the interests set forth in paragraphs
(a), (b), (c) or (d) above, any Confidential Information (as such tennis defined below),
technology, idea, website, design, product drawings, concept, data, customer lists(s),
documentation, method, technique, process, skill, tool, library, adaptation, invention, business
ideas, discovery, or improvement, whether or not patentable, and including trade secrets, and
know-how, that are used, or usable, in conjunction with the operation of the business ofDxNA
or otherwise pertaining to the business ofDxNA.
5.
"Confidential Information" Dermed. As used in this Acknowledgment and
Assignment, "Confidential Information" shall include, without limitation, any information,
including, without limitation, trade secrets or proprietary information, processes, patent
applications, source code, product development and product development techniques, price lists,
pricing data, vendor and customer lists, pricing policies and marketing plans, operational
methods, methods of doing business, technical processes, formulae, designs and design projects,
inventions, research projects, policies and strategic plans, product information, manufacturing
and advertising know-how, possible acquisition information, including business and personnel
acquisition plans, and oth~r business affairs of DxNA or any affiliate of DxNA, which is or are
designed to be used in, or are or results from any of the research or ·development activities of any
such entity, and is private or confidential in that it is not generally known or available to the
public.

6.

Consideration; Specific Performance; Severability of Provisions.

(a)
The undersigned acknowledges and agrees that the agreements and
covenants contained in this Acknowledgment and Assignment are essential to protect the value
of the assets of the Company, that legally sufficient consideration is being paid for the execution
by the undersigned of this Acknowledgment and Assignment and that the undersigned-expressly
waives any right to assert inadequacy of consideration as a defense to enforcement of the
provisions of Acknowledgment and Assignment should such enforcement ever become
necessary.
(b)
The undersigned acknowledges that a remedy at law for any breach or
attempted breach of this Acknowledgment and Assignment will be inadequate and further agrees
that any breach of this Acknowledgment and Assignment will result in irreparable harm to the
Company and the business of the Company; and the undersigned covenants and agrees not to .
oppose any demand for specific performance and injunctive and other equitable.relief in case of
any such breach or attempted breach.
(c)
Whenever possible, each provision of this Acknowledgment and
Assignment shall be interpreted in such manner as to be-effective and valid under applicable law,
but if any provision of this Acknowledgment and Assignment shall be prohibited by or
prohibited or invalid under applicable law, such provision shall be ineffective to the extent of
such prohibition or invalidity, without invalidating the remainder of such provision or the
remaining provisions of this Acknowledgment and Assignment. If any provision of this
Acknowledgment and Assignment shall, for any reason, be judged by any court of competent
jurisdiction to be invalid or unenforceable, such judgment shall not affect, impair or invalidate
the remainder of this Acknowledgment and Assignment, but shall be confined in its operation to
-3-
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the provision of this Acknowledgment and Assignment directly involved in the controversy in
which such judgment shall have· been rendered. In the event that the provisions of this
Acknowledgment and Assignment should ever be deemed to exceed the time or geographic
limitations permitted by applicable law, then such provision shall be reformed to the maximum
time or geographic limitations permitted by applicable law.

Cj)

~

7.
Further Assurances. Following the execution of this Acknowledgment and
Assignment, the undersigned shall deliver to the Company such further information and
documents and shall execute and deliver to the Company such further instruments and
agreements as the Company shall request to consummate or confirm the foregoing, to
accomplish the purpose of this Acknowledgment and Assignment or to assure to the Company
the benefits of this Acknowledgment and Assignment.
8.
Facsimile Signatures. Facsimile signatures on this Acknowledgment and
Assignment shall be given .the same effect as original signatures.
9.
Governing Law. This Acknowledgment and Assignment shall be governed by
the laws of the State of New York, without giving effect to any principles of conflicts of laws.
Any provision of this Acknowledgment and Assignment prohibited by _the laws of the State of
New York shall be ineffective to the extent of such prohibition without invalidating the
.remaining provisions of this Acknowledgment and Assignment.
10.
Successors and Assigns. This Acknowledgment and Assignment shall be
binding upon the heirs, executors, administrators and other legal representatives of the
undersigned and shall be for the benefit of the Company and its successors and assigns. The
Company may, without the consent of the undersigned, assign its rights under this
Acknowledgment and Assignment in connection with any sale, transfer or other disposition of all
or substantially all of its assets or business, whether by merger, consolidation or otherwise.
11.
Consent to Jurisdiction. Any legal action, suit or proceeding in equity or in law
arising out of or relating to this Agreement and the transactions contemplated hereby shall be
instituted only in (a) any state or federal court in the State of New York, (b) any federal or state
court in the State of Utah or (c) any state or federal court in a state in which the undersigned is
then resident, and the undersigned agrees not to assert, by way of motion, as a defense, or
otherwise, in any such action, suit or proceeding, any claim that the undersigned is not subject
personally to the jurisdiction of such court, that his property is exempt or immune from
attachment, that the action, suit or proceeding is brought in an inconvenient forum, that the venue
of the action, suit or proceeding is improper, or that this Agreement may not be enforced by such
court. The undersigned further irrevocably submits to the jurisdiction of any such court in any
such action, suit or proceeding. Nothing contained herein shall be deemed to affect the right of
any party to serve process in any manner permitted by law.
[The remainder of this page has intentionally been left blank.]
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IN WITNESS WHEREOf, this acknowledgment has been executed by the undersigned
as of this 6th day of June, 2008.

(

PHILLIP H. GRIMM

STATE OF - - - -

COUNTY OF - - - -

)
)ss.:
)

On the _ _ day of _ _ _ _ _ _ , 2009, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public
in and for said State, personally appeared PHILLIP H. GRIMM, personally known to me or
provided to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the individual whose name is
subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that he executed the same in his
capacity, and that by his signature on the instrument, the individual, or the person upon behalf of
which the individual acted, executed the instrument.

Notary Pu~lic
My Commission Expires:

~

)
-5NYC 327130.1

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Schedule A
[see attachment)

(j

/(-'\

0
@

NYC 327130.1

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1. Patents
(i)

(ii)

U.S. Patent:

Fluorescence Detection System

Patent No.:
Date Issued:
Date Filed:

US 7,315,376 B2
January 1, 2008
January 7, 2005

U.S. Patent Application:
App. No.:
Date Filed:
Status:

(iii)

(iv)

(vi)

(vii)

NYC 327130.1

PCR Sample Processing Module

11/958,332
December 17, 2007
A waiting Examination

U.S. Patent Application:
App.No.:
Date Filed:
Status:

Rapid Thermocycler

11/697,917
April 9, 2007
Awaiting examination

U.S. Patent Application:
App. No.:,
Date Filed:
Status:

Methods '!fid Apparatus for Controlling
DNA Amplification

11/383,534
May 16, 2006
Abandoned

U.S. Patent Application:
App. No.:
Date Filed:
Status:

Methods and Apparatus for Amplification of
DNA Using Sonic Energy

11/432,935
May 12, 2006
Under final rejection; HRO has recommended filing an
.
RCE

U.S. Pat~t Application:

App. No.:
Dated Filed:
Status:
(v)

10/991,746
November 18, 2004
Awaiting examination

U.S. Patent Application:

App. No.:
Date Filed:
Status:

Rapid Thermocycler

Ultra Sonic Release of DNA or RNA

11/958,299
December 17, 2007
Awaiting ~xamination
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(viii)

Rapid Reverse Transcriptase for PCR
App.No.:
Date Filed:
Status:

11/733,035
April 9, 2007
Awaiting examination

2. License Agreements Pursuant to which DxNA is a Licensee
1/iD

Technology License Agreement dated _as of September I, 2005, by and between
AMS and DxNA- Grants DxNA a license to use certain diagnostic products
developed by AMS for the purpose of developing additional diagnostic products
to be used to diagnose diseases caused by certain DNA or RNA containing
organisms
3. Trademarks: FluoroGene One (pending) and GeneSTAT (DxNA has not used the name
in commerce, and received a notice of abandonment in April. DxNA have until June I 0,
2008 to request reinstatement and file appropriate fees.)
4. Domain names: www.dxna.com

5. GeneSTAT Software
a. Firmware (software that runs the analyzer)
b. PCReports (the data management package)

(41
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EXHIBITC
NON-COMPETITION AGREEMENT
This Non-Competition Agreement (this "Agreement"), dated as of June 6, 2008, is
entered into by DxNA LLC, a Delaware limited liability company (the "Company"), and Phillip
H. Grimm (the "Second Party").
,
~

WHEREAS, the Company and the Second Party have entered into an Employment
Agreement, dated on or about the date hereof (the "Employment Agreement"), pursuant to which
the Second Party has agreed to serve as Chief Executive Officer of the Company upon the terms
and subject to the conditions set forth in the Employment Agreement.
· WHEREAS, the Employment Agreement provides that it shall be a condition precedent
to the effectiveness thereof that the Second Party shall have executed and delivered this
Agreement.
WHEREAS, the S~cond Party is accepting employment with the Company and is a
member of a select group of key employees who will have access to confidential and proprietary
information and trade secrets in the course of his duties and this Agreement is a condition of
such employment as it is designed to protect the Company from use or disclosure of such
confidential and proprietary information and trade secrets.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration for the foregoing and other good and valuable
consideration, the receipt and adequacy of which are hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto
agree as follows:

l.

Certain Covenants of the Second Party.

1.1
Restrictive Covenants. The Second Party acknowledges and agrees that
agreements and covenants contained in this Agreement are essential to protect the value of the
assets of the Company, that legally sufficient consideration is being paid for the execution by the
Second Party of this Agreement and that the Second Party expressly waives any right to assert
inadequacy of consideration as a defense to enforcement of the provisions of this Agreement
should such enforcement ever become necessary.
The Second Party covenants and agrees that for a period of the later of (a) two (2)
years from the closing of the transactions contemplated by that certain Contribution Agreement,
dated as of June 5, 2008 between Dx Nucleic Analytics, LLC and Glory Bioventures LLC, or (b)
the second (2nd) anniversary of the termination of the Second Party's employment with the
Company for any reason (the "Restricted Period"):
1.1.1 Non-Compete. The Second Party will not engage or invest in,
own, manage, operate, finance or control, or participate in the ownership, management,
operation, financing, or control of, any individual, business, :firm, corporation, partnership,
association, joint venture or other entity that directly or indirectly engages anywhere within-the
world in the business of developing diagnostic PCR devices (the "Business"); provided,
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however, that the Second Party may own less than five percent (5%) of the outstanding shares of
any class of securities of any enterprise (but without otherwise participating in the activities of
such enterprise) if such securities ·are listed on any national or regional securities exchange or
have been registered under Section l 2(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended;
1.1.2 Employees of the Company. The Second Party will not, ~ither for
himself or any other corporation, general partnership, limited partnership, limited liability
company, joint venture, association, individual or other entity ("Person"), solicit any officer or
·employee of the Company or any of its affiliates at any time during the Restricted Period without
the prior written consent of the Company nor in any other way assist another Person in
recruiting, soliciting or inducing any officer or employee of the Company to terminate his or her
employment or other relationship with the Company or any of its affiliates;

~

1.1.3 Competing Products or Services. The Second Party will not seek
to sell nor sell any competing products or services to any customer of the Company or any of its
affiliates or be paid or receive commissions or other consideration based upon or in consideration
of sales of any competing products or services to any customer of the Company or any of its
affiliates; and
1.1.4 Filing of Patents The Second Party will not file any patents with
any governmental authority that are intended to be used in or in conjunction with PCR diagnostic
devises or that are intended to improve or enhance the functionality or efficacy of PCR
diagnostic devices, nor will the Second Party cause or permit any Person acting on behalf of the
Second Party to file any such patents with any governmental authority.
1.2
Acknowledgment of Second Party. The Second Party expressly
acknowledges and agrees that the agreements and covenants contained in this Section 1 are
essential to protect the value of the assets and Business of the Company and that legally
sufficient consideration is being paid for the non-competition and other provisions of this Section
I, and the Second Party expressly waive any right to assert inadequacy of consideration as a
defense to enforcement of the non-competition or other provisions of this Section 1 should such
enforcement ever become necessary.
1.3

Rights and Remedies Upon Breach.

~

1.3.1 Injunction for Breach; Enforcement; Attorney's Fees. The Second
Party acknowledges that in the event of an actual or threatened breach of this Agreement, the
Company shall be entitled to seek from a court of competent jurisdiction a temporary restraining
_order, preliminary injunction, permanent injunction, and/or any other form of equitable relief
(without the requirement of posting a bond or other security). These rights and remedies shall be
in addition to any other legal and equitable rights and remedies, including compensatory and
punitive damages, that the Company may have for any actual or threatened breach of this
Agreement or for any violation of the Company's rights or the Second Party's duties or
obligations to the Company or for any violation oflaw. It is agreed that in any judicial
proceeding brought by the Company for an actual or threatened breach of this Agreement, the
prevailing party shall also be entitled to be reimbursed by the other party for its reasonable
attorneys' fees, expenses and costs ..

-2-
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1.3.2 Extension of Restricted Period. If the Second Party violates any
provisions of this Section 1, the parties agree that the effective period of each such covenant so
violated shall be exte~ded by a period of time equal to the period of such violation. It is the
intent of this Section 1 that the running of the effective period of each restrictive covenant shall
be tolled during any period of violation of such covenant so that the parties shall get the full and
reasonable protection for which they contracted and so that neither party may profit by any
breach of any covenant.

4i;.i

1.4
Severability of Covenants. Whenever possible, each provision of this
Section 1 shall be interpreted in such manner as to be effective and valid under applicable law,
but if any provision of this Section 1 shall be prohibited by or prohibited or invalid under
applicable law, such provision shall be ineffective to the extent of such prohibition or invalidity,
without invalidating the remainder of such provision or the remaining provisions of this Section

1.
1.5
Blue-Penciling. If any provision of this Section 1 shall, for any reason, be
judged by any court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid or unenforceable, such judgment
shall not affect, impair or invalidate the remainder of this Section 1, but shall be confined in its
operation to the provision of this Section 1 directly involved in the controversy in which such
judgment shall have been rendered. In the event that the provisions of this Section 1 should ever
be deemed to exceed the time or geographic limitations permitted by applicable law, then such
provision shall be reformed to the maximum time or geographic limitations permitted by
applicable law.
....

__

,

2.

Other Provisions.

2.1
Consent to Jurisdiction and Service of Process. Any legal action, suit or
proceeding in equity or in law arising out of or relating to this Agreement and the -transactions
contemplated hereby or thereby shall be instituted only in (a) any state of federal court in the
State ofNew York, (b) any state or federal court in the State of Utah or (c) any state or federal
court in a state in which the Second Party is then resident, and each party agrees not to assert, by
way of motion, as a defense, or otherwise, in any such action, suit or proceeding, any claim that
such party is not subject personally to the jurisdiction of such court, that his or its property is
exempt or immune from attachment, that the action, suit or proceeding is brought in an
inconvenient forum, that the venue of the action, suit or proceeding is improper, or that this
Agreement may not be enforced by such court. Each party further irrevocably submits to the
jurisdiction of any such court in any such action, suit or proceeding. Nothing contained herein
shall be deemed to affect the right of any party to serve process in any manner permitted by law.
2.2
Notices. Any notice or other communication required or that may be
given hereunder shall be in writing and shall be delivered personally, sent by receipted facsimile
transmission or overnight courier, or sent by certified, registered or express mail, postage
prepaid, and shall be deemed given when so delivered personally, or sent by receipted facsimile
transmission or overnight courier, or, if mailed, upon receipt, as follows:
(i)

ifto the Company, to:
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DxNALLC
c/o Glory BioVentures, LLC
39 Broadway, 37th Floor
New York, New York 10006
Attention: Martin Ben-Dayan
facsimile number: (212) 938-3630
(ii)
if to the Second Party, to the address set forth on the signature page of this
Agreement.

Any party may by notice given in accordance with this Section to the other parties designate
another address for receipt of notices hereunder.
2.3
Entire Agreement. This Agreement contains the entire agreement between
the parties with respect to the subject matter hereof and supersedes all prior agreements, written
or oral, with respect thereto.

~

2.4
Waivers and Amendments. This Agreement may be amended, modified,
superseded, canceled, renewed or extended, and the terms and conditions hereof may be waived,
only by a written instrument signed by the parties. No delay on the part of any party in
exercising any right, power or privilege hereunder shall operate as a waiver thereof, nor shall any
waiver on the part of any party of any right, power or privilege hereunder, nor any single or
partial exercise of any right power or privilege hereunder, preclude any other or further exercise
thereof or the exercise of any other right, power or privilege hereunder.
2.5
Governing Law. This Agreement shall be governed and construed in
accordance with the laws of the State of New York applicable to agreements made and to be
performed entirely within such State.

@

2.6
Assignment. This Agreement, and the Second Party's rights and
obligations hereunder, may not be assigned by the Second Party. The Company may, without
the Second Party's consent, assign its rights, together with its obligations, under this Agreement
in connection with any sale, transfer or other disposition of all or substantially all of its assets or
business, whether by merger, consolidation or otherwise.

~

2. 7
Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in two or more
counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original but all of which together shall constitute
one and the same instrument.
2.8
Headings. The headings in this Agreement are for reference purposes only
and shall not in any way affect the meaning or interpretation of this Agreement.
2.9
Facsimile Signatures. Facsimile signatures on this Agreement shall be
given the same effect as original signatures.
[The remainder of this· page has intentionally been left blank.]
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement on the date first
above written.
DxNALLC
-By: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Name:

~

Title:

PHILLIP H. GRIMM

Address of Second Party:

(

~
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Meeting Follow Up

Gilbert Jennings
From:

Phillip Grimm [phillip.h.grimm@gmail.com]

Sent:

Sunday, January 23, 2011 10:04 PM

To:

Gilbert Jennings

Subject:

Meeting Follow Up

Attachments: DxNA Layoff Cost 15 Week Severance.xlsx; DxNA Layoff Cost 26 Week Severance.xlsx; 201101-19 Phil G PTO Accrual.xis

Gilbert As discussed in our meeting on Friday, I am emailing you a reconciliation of amounts owed and created
through my layoff. I have attached two files with the only difference being the amount of severance. I
have also attached a file that outlines my PTO balance due. As you are probably aware, there are three
potential employment agreements that could be used with one having 15 weeks of severance and the other
two, 26 weeks. The components in these files are as follows:
1. Expense Reports yet to be reimbursed
2. Unpaid Payroll
3. PTO
4. Severance

I have also included interest through the termination date consistent with what has been offered to other
shareholders for loans.

It should not come as a surprise that these amounts are very large - well in excess of $300,000.
In addition to the amounts in the files, I also have an amount owed for HRA reimbursement but Jim
indicated that I should submit this to him directly for prompt payment. Also, the employment agreement
with Glory had a stock component with an additional 2% owed at this time.
As we are both aware, Utah State law requires settlement of amounts owed within 24 hours of termination
of employment. However, as we discussed, this requirement could cause immediate financial challenges
for the Company so we agreed to try and find an acceptable means of getting this balance paid. Of
immediate concern to me is the method or type of security provided to insure that the outstanding amount
owed will be paid and not discharged at some later date and I believe both you and Jeff were supportive
of this logic. Therefore, let me propose the following. All outstanding balances will continue to accrue
interest at a rate similar to that ofloans made by other shareholders (currently 12%). The outstanding
balance will be secured either by guarantee of the shareholders or through a first lien right. I would
believe that the best strategy would be to secure it in the $5mm amount that advances Glory. A payment
schedule will be developed to provide for settlement of the balance and accruing interest. Initially, the
amount of the monthly commitment will be $10,000 per month and we will mutually agree to an
accelerated amount as the business begins to establish revenue.
I would like to reach some level of understanding tomorrow related to the mechanics of payoff and
security to support the debt Then we can sit down to review the details behind the amounts owed and
make any adjustments needed when I get back from my travels in a week.
As is typical in this situation, we have to develop a 'story' related to my termination. Let me suggest the
following as an idea for you to consider. What if we communicate that I have been moved from my role
as CEO to a member on the Board as a method to reduce some of the financial burden for the Company as
well as to allow me to focus more attention on other personal business interest. In taking a role on th

8/18/2011
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BOD, I could continue to support Craig, Jim and Ernie as well as DxNA through a transition for the rest of 2011.
We could use this strategy to create minimum disruption to both the DxNA business, it's customers and other
business contacts as well as minimize impacts to my personal future endeavors. As a significant shareholder, I
have a vested interest in seeing DxNA be successful and this would allow me to assist in this effort without the
ongoing cost to the business.

~

I look forward to getting quick resolution to all of the above matters and will be available to speak with you as
needed. I am in the process of organizing my files to pass to Ernie and also organizing the supporting
documentation (receipts) behind my weekly expenses. As I showed you last week, I keep very organized
documentation in this area and strong separation between personal and business items.
I will be in transit to Atlanta on Monday afternoon but available in the morning or after I arrive.
Thanks

Phil
Phillip H. Grimm
PO Box429
Draper, UT 84020
cell: 602 524-2433

No virus found in this message.
Checked by AVG - ·;i\0 ;y~.,v.a-vg.ccr-:i
Version: 10.0.1191 / Virus Database: 1435/3399 - Release Date: 01/23/11
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DxNA Amounts Due
Week Beginning Exp. Reports Payroll

PTO

Severance Interest

Balance

($

~

~

(-ii

£~

(;@

(@

l.(jj

~~/

3/1/2009
3/8/2009
3/15/2009
3/22/2009
3/29/2009
4/5/2009
4/12/2009
4/19/2009
4/26/2009
5/3/2009
5/l0/2009
5/17/2009
5/24/2009
5/31/2009
6/7/2009
6/14/2009
6/21/2009
6/28/2009
7/5/2009
7/12/2009
7/19/2009
7/26/2009
8/2/2009
8/9/2009
8/16/2009
8/23/2009
8/30/2009
. 9/6/2009
9/13/2009
9/20/2009
9/27/2009
10/4/2009
10/11/2009
10/18/2009
10/25/2009
11/1/2009
11/8/2009
11/15/2009
11/22/2009
11/29/2009
12/6/2009
12/13/2009
12/20/2009
12/27/2009
1/1/2010

2133.66
314.26
3331.86
2227.51
896.16
992.92
729.86
307.87
702.51
114.11
811.72
693.72
1618.97
177.03
1439.85
142.66
935.51
79.02
2562.18
1131.33
601.86
0
3299.25
1243.33
451.69
258.3
147.74
856.56
2126.36
773.09
1465.66
310.59
237.64
120.55
365.33
1703.88
687.33
4139.36
1132.54
322.15
3177.65
1007.66
2792.25
49.93
10

80.07

110.14

150.65

179.11

224.65

279.42

321.25

349.46

429.59

.507.38

2133.66
2447.92
5779.78
8007.29
8983.52
9976.44
10706.3
11014.17
11826.82
11940.93
12752.65
'13446.37
15065.34
15393.02
16832.87
16975.53
17911.04
18169.17
20731.35
21862.68
· 22464.54
22689.19
25988.44
27231.77
27683.46
27941.76
28368.92
29225.48
31351.84
32124.93
33911.84
34222.43
34460.07
34580.62
34945.95
36999.29
37686.62
41825.98
42958.52
43710.26
46887.91
47895.57
50687.82
50737.75
51255.13
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1/3/2010
1/10/2010
1/17/2010
1/24/2010
1/31/2010
2/7/2010
2/14/2010
2/21/2010
2/28/2010
3/7/2010
3/14/2010
3/21/2010
3/28/2010
4/4/2010
4/11/2010
4/18/2010
4/25/2010
5/2/2010
5/9/2010
5/16/2010
5/23/2010
5/30/2010
6/6/2010
6/13/2010
6/20/2010
6/27/2010
7/4/2010
7/11/2010
7/18/2010
7/25/2010
8/1/2010
8/8/2010
8/15/2010
8/22/2010
8/29/2010
9/5/2010
9/12/2010
9/19/2010
9/26/2010
10/3/2010
10/10/2010
10/17/2010
10/24/2010
10/31/2010
11/7/2010
11/14/2010
11/21/2010
11/28/2010
12/5/2010

1035.71
1699.67
1269.31
864.15
1988.32
2832.15
124.45
962.98
1197.48
616.89
69.8
337.41
295.22
474.05
332.57
277.69
388.19
1862.08
651.94
286.26
302.6
86.95
839.72
827.14
2967.25
319.39
388.63
569.2
239.3
0
382
479.65
3.82
987.69
1054.45
418.78
208.14
94.1
202.25
108.95
392.09
78.26
1788.94
416.53
313.46
219.23
44.01
252.76
406.94

561.24

625.93

654.41

674.75

716.4

770.78

793.65
2751.17
9711.53
944.75
9711.53
9711.53
1166.18
9711.53
9711.53
9711.53

1397.78

9711.53
1615.92

52290.84
53990.51
55259.82
56123.97
58673.53
61505.68
61630.13
62593~11
64416.52
65033.41
65103.21
65440.62
66390.25
66864.3
67196.87
67474.56
68537.5
70399.58
71051.52
71337.78
71640.38
72443.73
73283.45
74110.59
77077.84
78168.01
78556.64
79125.84
79365.14
79365.14
80540.79
83771.61
83775.43
94474.65
96473.85
106604.2
106812.3
116617.9
117986.4
127806.8
128198.9
137988.7
139777.7
151303.5
151617
161547.7
161591.7
163460.4
163867.4
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12/12/2010
12/19/2010
12/26/2_010
1/1/2011
1/2/2011
1/9/2011
1/16/2011
1/23/2010

222.34
62.38
29.38

9711.53
1738.93

0

161.77
126.53

9711.53
9711.53 56129.93

72836.48

~
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164089.7
164152.1
173893
175631.9
175793.7
185631.7
185631.7
324309.7
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DxNA Amounts Due
Week Beginnin~ Exp. Reports Payroll

r~
"-_,,'

3/1/2009
3/8/2009
3/15/2009
3./22/2009
3/29/2009
4/5/2009
4/12/2009
4/19/2009
4/26/2009
5/3/2009
5/10/2009
5/17/2009
5/24/2009
5/31/2009
6/7/2009
6/14/2009
6/21/2009
6/28/2009
7/5/2009
7/12/2009
7/19/2009
7/26/2009
8/2/2009
8/9/2009
8/16/2009
8/23/2009
8/30/2009
9/6/2009
9/13/2009
9/20/2009
9/27/2009
10/4/2009
10/11/2009
10/18/2009
10/25/2009
11/1/2009
11/8/2009
11/15/2009
11/22/2009
11/29/2009
12/6/2009
12/13/2009
12/20/2009
12/27/2009
1/1/2010

2133.66
314.26
3331.86
2227.51
896.16
992.92
729.86
307.87
702.51
114.11
811.72
693.72
1618.97
·177.03
1439.85
142.66
935.51
79.02
2562.18
1131.33
601.86
0
3299.25
1243.33
451.69
258.3
147.74
856.56
2126.36
773.09
1465.66
310.59
237.64
.120.55
365.33
1703.88
687.33
4139.36
1132.54
322.15
3177.65
1007.66
2792.25
49.93
10

PTO

Severance

Interest

80.07

110.14

150.65

179.11

224.65

279.42

321.25

349.46

429.59

507.38

Balance

2133.66
2447.92
5779.78
8007.29
8983.52
9976.44
10706.3
11014.17
11826.82
11940.93
12752.65
13446.37
15065.34
15393.02
16832.87
16975.53
17911.04
18169.17
20731.35
21862.68
22464.54
22689.19
25988.44
27231.77
27683.46
27941.76
28368.92
29225.48
31351.84
32124.93
33911.84
34222.43
34460.07
34580.62
34945.95
36999.29
37686.62
41825.98
42958.52
43710.26"
46887.91
47895.57
50687.82
50737.75
51255.13
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1/3/2010
1/10/2010
1/17/2010
1/24/2010
1/31/2010
2/7/2010
2/14/2010
2/21/2010
2/28/2010
3/7/2010
3/14/2010
3/21/2010
3/28/2010
4/4/2010
4/11/2010
4/18/2010
4/25/2010
5/2/2010
5/9/2010
5/16/2010
5/23/2010
5/30/2010
6/6/2010
6/13/2010
6/20/2010
6/27/2010
7/4/2010
'7/11/2010
7/18/2010
7/25/2010
8/1/2010
· 8/8/2010
8/15/2010
8/22/2010
. 8/29/2010
9/5/2010
9/12/2010
9/19/2010
9/26/2010
10/3/2010
10/10/2010
10/17/2010
10/24/2010
10/31/2010
11/7/2010
11/14/2010
11/21/2010
11/28/2010
12/5/2010

1035.71
1699.67
1269.31
864.15
1988.32
2832.15
124.45
962.98
1197.48
616.89
69.8
337.41
295.22
474.05
332.57
277.69
388.19
1862.08
651.94
286.26
302.6
86.95
839.72
827.14
2967.25
319.39
388.63
569.2
239.3
0
382
479.65
3.82
987.69
1054.45
418.78
208.14
94.1
202.25
108.95
392.09
78.26
1788.94
416.53
313.46
219.23
44.01
252.76
406.94

561.24

625.93

654.41

674.75

716.4

770.78

793.65
2751.17
9711.53
944.75
9711.53
9711.53
1166.18
9711.53
9711.53
9711.53

1397.78

9711.53
1615.92

52290.84
53990.51
55259.82
56123.97
58673.53
61505.68
61630.13
62593.11
64416.52
65033.41
65103.21
65440.62
66390.25
66864.3
67196.87
67474.56
68537.5
70399.58
71051.52
71337.78
71640.38
72443.73
73283.45
74110.59
77077.84
78168.01
78556.64
79125.84
79365.14
79365.14
80540.79
83771.61
83775.43
94474.65
96473.85
106604.16
106812.3
116617.93
117986.36
127806.84
128198.93
137988.72
139777.66
151303.5
151616.96
161547.72
161591.73
163460.41
163867.35
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12/12/2010
12/19/2010
12/26/2010
1/1/2011
1/2/2011
1/9/2011
1/16/2011
1/23/2010

222.34
62.38
29.38
0
161.77
126.53

9711.53
1738.93
9711.53
9711.53

56129.93

126249.89

164089.69
164152.07
173892.98
175631.91
175793.68
185631.74
185631.74
377723.09
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Phillip Grimm
PTO Accrual
Start date10/1/07
Beginning
Ck Date
PP Ending
Vacation Hrs
PTO Used (hrs) PTO Earned (hrs) PTO Hours Bal
10/10/2007
10/7/2007
9.23
9.23
10/24/2007 10/21/2007
9.2300
9.23
18.46
11/7/2007
11/4/2007
18.4600
9.23
27.69
11/21/2007 11/18/2007
27.6900
9.23
36.92
12/5/2007
12/2/2007
36.9200
-8
9.23
38.15
12/19/2007 12/16/2007
38.1500
9.23
47.38
1/2/2008 12/30/2007
47.3800
-8
9.23
48.61
1/16/2008
1/13/2008
48.6100
-8
9.23
49.84
1/30/2008
1/27/2008
49.8400
9.23
59.07
2/13/2008
2/10/2008
59.0700
9.23
68.30
2/27/2008
2/24/2008
68.3000
-8
9.23
69.53
3/12/2008
3/9/2008
69.5300
9.23
78.76
3/26/2008
3/23/2008
78.7600
-8
9.23
79.99
4/9/2008
4/6/2008
79.9900
9.23
89.22
4/23/2008
4/20/2008
89.2200
9.23
98.45
5/7/2008
5/4/2008
98.4500
9.23
107.68
5/21/2008
5/18/2008
107.6800
9.23
116.91
6/4/2008
6/1/2008
116.9100
-8
9.23
118.14
6/19/2008
6/15/2008
118.1400
9.23
127.37
7/3/2008
6/29/2008
127.3700
9.23
136.60
7/17/2008
7/13/2008
:136.6000
-8
9.23
137.83
7/31/2008
7/27/2008
137.8300
-40
9.23
107.06
8/14/2008
8/10/2008
107.0600
9.23
116.29
8/28/2008
8/24/2008
116.2900
9.23
125.52
9/11/2008
9/7/2008
125.5200
-8
9.23
126.75
9/25/2008
9/21/2008
126.7500
9.23
135.98
10/9/2008
10/5/2008
135.9800
9.23
145.21
10/23/2008 10/19/2008
145.2100
9.23
154.44
11/6/2008
11/2/2008
154.4400
9.23
163.67
11/20/2008 11/16/2008
163.6700
9.23
172.90
12/4/2008 11/30/2008
172.9000
-8
9.23
174.13
12/18/2008 12/14/2008
174.1300
9.23
183.36
1/1/2009 12/28/2008
183.3600
-8
9.23
184.59
1/15/2009
1/11/2009
184.5900
-8
9.23
185.82
1/29/2009
1/25/2009
185.8200
9.23
195.05
2/12/2009
2/8/2009
195.0500
9.23
204.28
2/26/2009
2/22/2009
204.2800
-8
9.23
205.51
3/12/2009
3/8/2009
205.5100
9.23
214.74
3/26/2009
3/22/2009
214.7400
9.23
223.97
4/9/2009
415/2009
223.9700
9.23
233.20
4/23/2009
4/19/2009
233.2000
-8
9.23
234.43
5/7/2009
5/3/2009
234.4300
9.23
243.66
5/21/2009
5/17/2009
243.6600
9.23
252.89
6/4/2009
5/31/2009
252.8900
-8
9.23
254.12
6/18/2009
6/14/2009
254.1200
9.23
263.35

Comments

$ per hour

Thanksgiving
Christmas
New Years Day

Presidents Day
Easter/Good Friday

Memorial Day
July 4th
July 24th

labor Day

Thanksgiving
Christmas
New Years Day

Presidents Day

Easter/Good Friday
Memorial Day
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120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19

Adj per$
pay period
9.23
9.23
9.23
9.23
1.23
9.23
1.23
1.23
9.23
9.23
1.23
9.23
1.23
9.23
9.23
9.23
9.23
1.23
9.23
9.23
1.23
-30.77
9.23
9.23
1.23
9.23
9.23
9.23
9.23
9.23
1.23
9.23
1.23
1.23
9.23
9.23
1.23
9.23
9.23
9.23
1.23
9.23
9.23
1.23
9.23

Value on
account
$ 1,109.35
$ 2,218.71
$ 3,328.06
$ 4,437.41
$ 4,585.25
$ 5,694.60
$ 5,842.44
$ 5,990.27
$ 7,099.62
$ 8,208.98
$ 8,356.81
$ 9,466.16
$ 9,614.00
$ 10,723.35
$ 11,832.71
$ 12,942.06
$ 14,051.41
$ 14,199.25
$ 15,308.60
$"16,417.95
$ 16,565.79
$ 12,867.54
$ 13,976.90
$ 15,086.25
$ 15,234.08
$ 16,343.44
$ 17,452.79
$ 18,562.14
$ 19,671.50
$ 20,780.85
$ 20,928.68
$ 22,038.04
$ 22, 1.85.87
$ 22,333.71
$ 23,443.06
$ 24,552.41
$ 24,700.25
$ 25,809.60
$ 26,918.95
$ 28,028.31
$ 28,176.14
$ 29,285.50
$ 30,394.85
$ 30,542.68
$ 31,652.04

~

iD

)

(

7/2/2009
7/16/2009
7/30/2009
8/13/2009
8/27/2009
9/10/2009
9/24/2009
10/8/2009
10/22/2009
11/5/2009
11/19/2009
12/3/2009
12/17/2009
12/31/2009
1/14/2010
1/28/2010
2/11/2010
2/25/2010
3/11/2010
3/25/2010
4/8/2010

4/22/2010
5/6/2010
5/20/2010
6/3/2010
6/17/2010
7/1/2010
7/15/2010
7/29/2010
8/12/2010
8/26/2010
9/9/2010
9/23/2010
10/7/2010
10/21/2010

6/28/2009
7/12/2009
7/26/2009
8/9/2009
8/23/2009
9/6/2009
9/20/2009
10/4/2009
10/18/2009
11/1/2009
11/15/2009
11/29/2009
12/13/2009
12/27/2009
1/10/2010
1/24/2010
2/7/2010
2/21/2010
317/2010
3/21/2010
4/4/2010
4/18/2010
5/2/2010
5/16/2010
5/30/2010
6/13/2010
6/27/2010
7/11/2010
7/25/2010
8/8/2010
8/22/2010
9/5/2010
9/19/2010
10/3/2010
10/17/2010

263.3500
272.5800
273.8100
243.0400
252.2700
261.5000
262.7300
271.9600
281.1900
290.4200
299.6500
308.8800
310.1100
319.3400
320.5700
321.8000
331.0300
340.2600
341.4900
350.7200
359.9500
361.1800
370.4100
379.6400
388.8700
390.1000
399.3300
408.5600
409.7900
411.0200
388.2500
397.4800
406.7100
407.9400
417.1700

9.23
9.23
9.23
9.23
9.23
9.23
9.23
9.23
9.23
9.23
9.23
9.23
9.23
9.23
9.23
9.23
9.23
9.23
9.23
9.23
9.23
9.23
9.23
9.23
9.23
9.23
9.23
9.23
9.23
9.23
9.23
9.23
9.23
9.23
9.23

-8
-40

-8

-8
-8
-8

-8
-8

-8
-8
-8

-32
-8

272.58
273.81
243.04
252.27
261.50
262.73
271.96
281.19
290.42
299.65
308.88
310.11
319.34
320.57
321.80
331.03
340.26
341.49

350.72
359.95
361.18
370.41
379.64
388.87
3~0.10
399.33
408.56
409.79
411.02

July 4th
July 24th

Labor Day

Thanksgiving
Christmas
New Years Day
Presidents Day
Easter/Good Friday

Memorial Day
July 4th
July 24th

388.25

397.48
406.71
407.94
417.17
426.40

Labor Day
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120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
120.19
·120.19
120.19
120.19

9.23
1.23
-30.77
9.23
9.23
1.23
9.23
9.23
9.23
9.23
9.23
1.23
9.23
1.23
1.23
9.23
9.23
1.23
9.23
9.23
1.23
9.23
9.23
9.23
1.23
9.23
9.23
1.23
1.23
-22.77
9.23
9.23
1.23
9.23
9.23

$

32,761.39

$ 32,909.22

$ 29,210.98
$ 30,320.33

$ 31,429.69
$ 31,577.52
$ 32,686.87
$ 33,796.23
$ 34,905.58
$ 36,014.93
$ 37,124.29
$ 37,272.12
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

38,381.47

38,529.31
38,677.14
39,786.50
40,895.85
41,043.68
42, 153.04
43,262.39
43,410.22
44,519.58
45,628.93
46,738.29
46,886.12
47,995.47
49,104.83
49,252.66
49,400.49
46,663.77
47,773.12
48,882.47
49,030.31
$ 50,139.66
$ 51,249.02

